diff --git a/.changeset/acp-client-runtime.md b/.changeset/acp-client-runtime.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d580e1511
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/acp-client-runtime.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+"@runfusion/fusion": minor
+---
+
+Add an ACP (Agent Client Protocol) client runtime plugin (`runtimeId: "acp"`)
+that drives any external ACP-compatible agent over JSON-RPC/stdio, built on the
+official `@agentclientprotocol/sdk`. Installed on demand (experimental).
+
+The agent runs as an untrusted subprocess that calls back into Fusion, so the
+integration ships a defense-in-depth security floor: per-category permission
+gating against the live policy (never a preset shortcut; `allow_once` only;
+unmappable kinds and missing policy default-deny), an unrestricted-risk
+acknowledgement that escalates blanket allows to approval under the allow-all
+default, an opt-in filesystem capability behind a real symlink-resolving cwd jail
+(realpath + `O_NOFOLLOW`, secret/`.git` deny-list, writes gated through the
+permission policy), untrusted-output sanitization and bounds, and an env
+allow-list for the subprocess.
diff --git a/docs/acp-contract.md b/docs/acp-contract.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2e40f2cdfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/acp-contract.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# ACP (Agent Client Protocol) Runtime Contract
+
+Date: 2026-06-03
+
+Launch/readiness contract and failure taxonomy for `fusion-plugin-acp-runtime`,
+which drives any external [Agent Client Protocol](https://agentclientprotocol.com)
+agent over JSON-RPC/stdio. Mirrors the shape of `docs/cursor-cli-contract.md`.
+
+## Transport
+
+- **Newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0 over stdio** (no Content-Length framing).
+  Provided by `@agentclientprotocol/sdk` (`ndJsonStream` + `ClientSideConnection`).
+- The client (Fusion) launches the agent as a subprocess with piped stdio. The
+  agent's stdin is the JSON-RPC *output* stream; its stdout is the *input* stream.
+- `stderr` is captured (redacted) for diagnostics, never parsed as protocol.
+
+## Invocation and binary detection
+
+- Unlike a single-vendor CLI, ACP is a protocol — the agent binary + ACP-mode
+  flag are user-configured:
+  - `acpBinaryPath` — e.g. `gemini`, `npx`, or an absolute path.
+  - `acpArgs` — the flag(s) that put the agent in ACP/stdio mode, e.g. `["--acp"]`.
+- The subprocess environment is built from the `acpEnvAllowList` allow-list only
+  (inherited `process.env` is **not** forwarded — the agent is untrusted).
+
+## Readiness = the `initialize` handshake
+
+There is no `--version` probe. Readiness is the protocol handshake itself:
+
+1. Spawn the agent subprocess.
+2. Send `initialize { protocolVersion: 1, clientCapabilities: { fs } }` under a
+   timeout (default 30s — research flagged Gemini-on-macOS OAuth and Claude-adapter
+   `session/new` stalls).
+3. The agent responds with its integer `protocolVersion`, `agentCapabilities`,
+   and `authMethods`.
+4. The client compares the integer protocol version; an unsupported version is a
+   hard failure (do not assume the agent errors first).
+
+`fs` capabilities are advertised **only** when `acpFsRead`/`acpFsWrite` are
+enabled (writes default OFF).
+
+## Failure taxonomy (`probe.ts` `AcpProbeReason`)
+
+| Reason | Trigger |
+| --- | --- |
+| `ok` | Handshake completed (with `authRequired: true` when `authMethods` is non-empty) |
+| `missing_binary` | Spawn `ENOENT` (binary not found, code 127) |
+| `spawn_error` | Other spawn failure |
+| `handshake_timeout` | `initialize` did not complete within the bound (code 124) |
+| `incompatible_protocol` | Agent negotiated an unsupported integer protocol version |
+| `unauthenticated` | Agent requires an auth method the client cannot satisfy |
+
+## Lifecycle / teardown
+
+- The engine has no `AbortSignal` in the runtime contract; teardown enters via an
+  unawaited synchronous `dispose()` plus the process-registry kill. The
+  **registry SIGKILL is the authoritative no-orphan / no-deadlock guarantee**; a
+  best-effort `session/cancel` + pending-permission drain runs first when timing
+  allows but is opportunistic.
+
+## Sources
+
+- https://agentclientprotocol.com (introduction, schema, transports, initialization, tool-calls)
+- `@agentclientprotocol/sdk` v0.24.0 — https://www.npmjs.com/package/@agentclientprotocol/sdk
+- Validation: the SDK example echo agent (CI) + an in-repo controllable fixture
+  (`src/__tests__/fixtures/echo-agent.mjs`); Gemini CLI / Claude-adapter for manual e2e.
diff --git a/packages/cli/src/__tests__/bundle-output.test.ts b/packages/cli/src/__tests__/bundle-output.test.ts
index 21aefeb9ac..b0ee34f08b 100644
--- a/packages/cli/src/__tests__/bundle-output.test.ts
+++ b/packages/cli/src/__tests__/bundle-output.test.ts
@@ -260,6 +260,23 @@ describe("CLI bundle output", () => {
     expect(manifest.name?.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
   });
 
+  it("dist/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/ is staged with the acp runtime manifest", () => {
+    const stagedRoot = join(cliRoot, "dist", "plugins", "fusion-plugin-acp-runtime");
+    const manifestPath = join(stagedRoot, "manifest.json");
+
+    expect(existsSync(manifestPath)).toBe(true);
+    const manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf-8")) as {
+      id?: string;
+      runtime?: { runtimeId?: string };
+    };
+    expect(manifest.id).toBe("fusion-plugin-acp-runtime");
+    // The runtime is selected by runtimeId; assert it is "acp".
+    expect(manifest.runtime?.runtimeId).toBe("acp");
+    expect(existsSync(join(stagedRoot, "bundled.js"))).toBe(true);
+    // v1 ships no mcp-schema-server.cjs (MCP forwarding deferred, KTD5).
+    expect(existsSync(join(stagedRoot, "mcp-schema-server.cjs"))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
   it("pi-claude-cli source imports child process helpers from node:child_process", () => {
     const processManagerSource = readFileSync(join(cliRoot, "dist", "pi-claude-cli", "src", "process-manager.ts"), "utf-8");
 
diff --git a/packages/cli/src/commands/plugin.ts b/packages/cli/src/commands/plugin.ts
index fa0d53e9b0..730f509112 100644
--- a/packages/cli/src/commands/plugin.ts
+++ b/packages/cli/src/commands/plugin.ts
@@ -57,6 +57,14 @@ export const BUILTIN_PLUGINS: BuiltinPluginCatalogEntry[] = [
     path: "./plugins/fusion-plugin-droid-runtime",
     experimental: true,
   },
+  {
+    id: "fusion-plugin-acp-runtime",
+    name: "ACP Runtime",
+    description: "Runtime provider that drives any external Agent Client Protocol agent over JSON-RPC/stdio.",
+    category: "runtime",
+    path: "./plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime",
+    experimental: true,
+  },
   {
     id: "fusion-plugin-dependency-graph",
     name: "Dependency Graph",
diff --git a/packages/cli/tsup.config.ts b/packages/cli/tsup.config.ts
index 817e063ade..581c768372 100644
--- a/packages/cli/tsup.config.ts
+++ b/packages/cli/tsup.config.ts
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ const RUNTIME_PLUGIN_IDS = [
   "fusion-plugin-paperclip-runtime",
   "fusion-plugin-cursor-runtime",
   "fusion-plugin-droid-runtime",
+  "fusion-plugin-acp-runtime",
 ] as const;
 
 const RUNTIME_PLUGINS_WITH_MCP_SCHEMA_SERVER = new Set([
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/README.md b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aab2331b72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# @fusion-plugin-examples/acp-runtime
+
+A Fusion runtime plugin that drives **any** external [Agent Client Protocol
+(ACP)](https://agentclientprotocol.com) agent over JSON-RPC/stdio. One
+integration unlocks every ACP-compatible agent (Gemini CLI, the Claude Code ACP
+adapter, and any future agent that speaks the protocol) through the standard
+protocol instead of a bespoke per-CLI integration.
+
+Selected via `runtimeId: "acp"`. Installed on demand (`experimental`) — see the
+Fusion plugin catalog (`fn plugin install fusion-plugin-acp-runtime`).
+
+## Security posture
+
+The ACP agent is an **untrusted subprocess** that calls back into Fusion for
+permissions and filesystem access. This plugin enforces a defense-in-depth floor:
+
+- **Per-category permission gating.** Each `session/request_permission` is
+  classified by tool kind into a Fusion action category and checked against the
+  live permission policy — never a preset shortcut. `allow_once` only (never a
+  persisted blanket grant). Unmappable kinds and missing policy default-deny.
+- **Unrestricted-risk acknowledgement (`acpAllowUnrestricted`).** Because the
+  shipped default policy is `unrestricted` (allow-all), a blanket `allow` on a
+  *sensitive* category is escalated to approval unless the user explicitly sets
+  `acpAllowUnrestricted: true`. Prefer running the ACP runtime under an
+  `approval-required` policy.
+- **Filesystem jail.** `fs/read_text_file` / `fs/write_text_file` are opt-in
+  (`acpFsRead` / `acpFsWrite`, writes default OFF), confined to the session
+  `cwd` by a real symlink-resolving jail (realpath + `O_NOFOLLOW`), with a
+  deny-list for secrets (`.env`, `*.pem`, …) and git internals (`.git/**`).
+  Writes are gated through the `file_write_delete` permission category.
+- **Untrusted-input bounds.** Streamed output is sanitized (ANSI/control strip)
+  and bounded (per-turn + per-chunk caps; bounded tool-call correlation map).
+- **Subprocess isolation.** The agent env is built from an allow-list
+  (`acpEnvAllowList`) — inherited `process.env` is **not** forwarded.
+
+Not sandboxed in v1: the agent's own process/network syscalls run with Fusion's
+user privileges (OS-level sandboxing is recommended future work).
+
+## Settings
+
+| Key | Default | Meaning |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `acpBinaryPath` | `acp-agent` | Agent binary to spawn |
+| `acpArgs` | `[]` | Args that launch the agent in ACP/stdio mode (e.g. `["--acp"]`) |
+| `acpModel` | — | Optional model identifier reported via `describeModel` |
+| `acpFsRead` | `false` | Advertise/register `fs/read_text_file` |
+| `acpFsWrite` | `false` | Advertise/register `fs/write_text_file` (gated) |
+| `acpEnvAllowList` | `[]` | Env var names forwarded to the agent subprocess |
+| `acpAllowUnrestricted` | `false` | Acknowledge the untrusted-agent risk under an allow-all policy |
+
+## Upstream / third-party integration evidence
+
+Per `AGENTS.md` (External-integration evidence):
+
+- **Protocol homepage / docs:** https://agentclientprotocol.com
+- **Upstream protocol repo:** https://github.com/agentclientprotocol/agent-client-protocol
+- **TypeScript SDK repo:** https://github.com/agentclientprotocol/typescript-sdk
+- **Dependency (npm):** `@agentclientprotocol/sdk` — https://www.npmjs.com/package/@agentclientprotocol/sdk
+- **Pinned release:** `0.24.0` (Apache-2.0)
+- **Tarball:** https://registry.npmjs.org/@agentclientprotocol/sdk/-/sdk-0.24.0.tgz
+- **Integrity (sha512):** `sha512-vvu9appvGvfYstBj19C6NCepV6SvUhY5VRv60KUZ4XzhTah/olOYul5Zo4C+x2enyshMSvgB2mm/OEmrsHaSmA==`
+- **Agent binaries driven:** user-supplied ACP agents (e.g. `gemini --acp`, the
+  `@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp` adapter). These are configured by the
+  user at runtime, not bundled — `upstream-pending-verification` per agent.
+
+See `docs/acp-contract.md` for the launch/readiness contract and failure taxonomy.
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/control-handler.test.ts b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/control-handler.test.ts
index 22724e6590..2887612c81 100644
--- a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/control-handler.test.ts
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/control-handler.test.ts
@@ -110,13 +110,37 @@ describe("resolvePermission — the security floor", () => {
   });
 
   // [Risk S2] allow → allow_once, allow_always NEVER selected.
+  // (acknowledged: with allowUnrestricted the S1 escalation is off, so the allow
+  // disposition reaches option selection — the point of this test.)
   it("selects allow_once for an allow category and never allow_always even when offered", async () => {
     const gate = gateWithRules({ ...UNRESTRICTED, command_execution: "allow" });
-    const res = await resolvePermission(toolCall("execute"), ALL_OPTIONS, gate);
+    const res = await resolvePermission(toolCall("execute"), ALL_OPTIONS, gate, {
+      allowUnrestricted: true,
+    });
     expect(selectedId(res)).toBe("allow_once_id");
     expect(selectedId(res)).not.toBe("allow_always_id");
   });
 
+  // [Risk S1] WITHOUT acknowledgement, a blanket allow on a sensitive category
+  // is escalated to approval — and default-denies when no approver exists.
+  it("escalates a sensitive allow to deny under the unrestricted default (no acknowledgement, no approver)", async () => {
+    const gate = gateWithRules(UNRESTRICTED); // command_execution: "allow"
+    const res = await resolvePermission(toolCall("execute"), ALL_OPTIONS, gate);
+    expect(selectedId(res)).toBe("reject_once_id");
+  });
+  it("auto-allows a sensitive call only when the unrestricted risk is acknowledged", async () => {
+    const gate = gateWithRules(UNRESTRICTED);
+    const res = await resolvePermission(toolCall("execute"), ALL_OPTIONS, gate, {
+      allowUnrestricted: true,
+    });
+    expect(selectedId(res)).toBe("allow_once_id");
+  });
+  it("never escalates an exempt (read-only) kind regardless of acknowledgement", async () => {
+    const gate = gateWithRules(UNRESTRICTED);
+    const res = await resolvePermission(toolCall("read"), ALL_OPTIONS, gate);
+    expect(selectedId(res)).toBe("allow_once_id");
+  });
+
   it("exempt kinds (read) always allow via allow_once", async () => {
     // Even with a block-everything policy, a read-only kind is exempt → allow.
     const gate = gateWithRules({
@@ -159,7 +183,9 @@ describe("resolvePermission — the security floor", () => {
       { optionId: "allow_always_id", name: "Allow always", kind: "allow_always" },
       { optionId: "reject_always_id", name: "Reject always", kind: "reject_always" },
     ];
-    const res = await resolvePermission(toolCall("execute"), noAllowOnce, gate);
+    const res = await resolvePermission(toolCall("execute"), noAllowOnce, gate, {
+      allowUnrestricted: true,
+    });
     // No reject_once either → cancelled, and definitely not allow_always.
     expect(res.outcome.outcome).toBe("cancelled");
     expect(selectedId(res)).toBeUndefined();
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/fs-capabilities.test.ts b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/fs-capabilities.test.ts
index 011f548af6..d21755d0c5 100644
--- a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/fs-capabilities.test.ts
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/fs-capabilities.test.ts
@@ -134,7 +134,9 @@ describe("writeTextFile", () => {
   }
 
   it("writes within cwd when policy allows; content persists and reads back", async () => {
-    const res = await writer(allowGate)({
+    // Acknowledge the unrestricted risk so an `allow` disposition isn't escalated
+    // to approval (S1) — this test exercises the allow→write path itself.
+    const res = await writer(allowGate, { allowUnrestricted: true })({
       sessionId: "s",
       path: "out.txt",
       content: "written-by-agent",
@@ -144,6 +146,14 @@ describe("writeTextFile", () => {
     expect(onDisk).toBe("written-by-agent");
   });
 
+  it("escalates an allow write to approval/deny without the unrestricted acknowledgement (S1)", async () => {
+    // allowGate sets file_write_delete: "allow", but with no acknowledgement and
+    // no approver the write must be denied, not silently written.
+    await expect(
+      writer(allowGate)({ sessionId: "s", path: "out2.txt", content: "x" } as never),
+    ).rejects.toThrow();
+  });
+
   it("rejects an oversized write before touching the fs", async () => {
     await expect(
       writer(allowGate, { writeMaxBytes: 10 })({
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/index.test.ts b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/index.test.ts
index 2b47eb8937..6a9cda345e 100644
--- a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/index.test.ts
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/index.test.ts
@@ -59,6 +59,13 @@ describe("resolveCliSettings", () => {
     expect(s.fsWrite).toBe(false);
     // env allow-list empty by default (KTD6b) — no inherited process.env.
     expect(s.envAllowList).toEqual([]);
+    // Risk S1 acknowledgement is off by default (safe).
+    expect(s.allowUnrestricted).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("honors the acpAllowUnrestricted acknowledgement", () => {
+    expect(resolveCliSettings({ acpAllowUnrestricted: true }).allowUnrestricted).toBe(true);
+    expect(resolveCliSettings({ acpAllowUnrestricted: "yes" }).allowUnrestricted).toBe(false);
   });
 
   it("honors explicit binary, args, and capability toggles", () => {
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/provider-permission.test.ts b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/provider-permission.test.ts
index 7977d80763..4b18fcc9c5 100644
--- a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/provider-permission.test.ts
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/__tests__/provider-permission.test.ts
@@ -46,12 +46,26 @@ function selectedId(res: RequestPermissionResponse): string | undefined {
 }
 
 describe("createBridgingClientHandler — requestPermission delegates to the gate", () => {
-  it("answers allow_once for an allow category", async () => {
-    const { handler } = createBridgingClientHandler({}, gate({ ...UNRESTRICTED, command_execution: "allow" }));
+  it("answers allow_once for an allow category (risk acknowledged)", async () => {
+    const { handler } = createBridgingClientHandler(
+      {},
+      gate({ ...UNRESTRICTED, command_execution: "allow" }),
+      undefined,
+      { allowUnrestricted: true },
+    );
     const res = await handler.requestPermission(req("execute"));
     expect(selectedId(res)).toBe("allow_once_id");
   });
 
+  it("escalates a sensitive allow to deny without the unrestricted acknowledgement (S1)", async () => {
+    const { handler } = createBridgingClientHandler(
+      {},
+      gate({ ...UNRESTRICTED, command_execution: "allow" }),
+    );
+    const res = await handler.requestPermission(req("execute"));
+    expect(selectedId(res)).toBe("reject_once_id");
+  });
+
   it("default-denies (reject_once) when no gate is supplied", async () => {
     const { handler } = createBridgingClientHandler({});
     const res = await handler.requestPermission(req("read"));
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/cli-spawn.ts b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/cli-spawn.ts
index e8716d308f..f1aad70cb8 100644
--- a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/cli-spawn.ts
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/cli-spawn.ts
@@ -23,6 +23,16 @@ export interface AcpCliSettings {
    * default — callers opt specific vars in by name.
    */
   envAllowList: string[];
+  /**
+   * Risk S1 acknowledgement. The shipped default permission policy is
+   * `unrestricted` (every category → allow). Because the ACP agent is an
+   * untrusted subprocess, the permission floor refuses to auto-approve a
+   * *sensitive* category on a blanket `allow` disposition unless the user has
+   * explicitly acknowledged that risk by setting this true — otherwise such
+   * calls are escalated to approval (or denied when no approver exists).
+   * Default: false (safe).
+   */
+  allowUnrestricted: boolean;
 }
 
 function asTrimmedString(value: unknown): string | undefined {
@@ -46,5 +56,6 @@ export function resolveCliSettings(settings?: Record<string, unknown>): AcpCliSe
   const fsRead = asBool(settings?.acpFsRead);
   const fsWrite = asBool(settings?.acpFsWrite);
   const envAllowList = asStringArray(settings?.acpEnvAllowList) ?? [];
-  return { binaryPath, args, model, fsRead, fsWrite, envAllowList };
+  const allowUnrestricted = asBool(settings?.acpAllowUnrestricted);
+  return { binaryPath, args, model, fsRead, fsWrite, envAllowList, allowUnrestricted };
 }
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/control-handler.ts b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/control-handler.ts
index d9b2aad26b..066258a73e 100644
--- a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/control-handler.ts
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/control-handler.ts
@@ -232,10 +232,40 @@ export async function runApprovalForCategory(
  * `require-approval` without a resolvable approver, or a missing `allow_once`
  * option.
  */
+export interface ResolvePermissionOptions {
+  /**
+   * Risk S1 acknowledgement. When false (the safe default), a blanket `allow`
+   * disposition on a *sensitive* category is escalated to `require-approval`
+   * rather than auto-approved — so the shipped `unrestricted` default policy
+   * does not silently green-light an untrusted agent's command/file/network
+   * calls. The user opts out of the escalation by acknowledging the risk.
+   */
+  allowUnrestricted?: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Per-category disposition with the Risk S1 acknowledgement escalation applied:
+ * a *sensitive* category the policy would `allow` is upgraded to
+ * `require-approval` unless `allowUnrestricted` is set. `exempt` (read-only)
+ * never escalates. Exported so the fs write path applies the identical rule.
+ */
+export function effectiveDisposition(
+  category: FusionCategory | "exempt",
+  gate: PermissionGate,
+  opts?: ResolvePermissionOptions,
+): GateDisposition {
+  const disposition = dispositionFor(category, gate);
+  if (disposition === "allow" && category !== "exempt" && opts?.allowUnrestricted !== true) {
+    return "require-approval";
+  }
+  return disposition;
+}
+
 export async function resolvePermission(
   toolCall: ToolCallUpdate,
   options: PermissionOption[],
   gate: PermissionGate | undefined,
+  opts?: ResolvePermissionOptions,
 ): Promise<RequestPermissionResponse> {
   // No gate / no policy → default-deny.
   if (!gate || !gate.permissionPolicy) {
@@ -248,7 +278,8 @@ export async function resolvePermission(
     return buildResponse(selectOption("deny", options));
   }
 
-  const disposition = dispositionFor(category, gate);
+  // Per-category disposition + S1 acknowledgement escalation.
+  const disposition = effectiveDisposition(category, gate, opts);
 
   if (disposition === "allow") {
     return buildResponse(selectOption("allow", options));
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/fs-capabilities.ts b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/fs-capabilities.ts
index dda548f903..6422080000 100644
--- a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/fs-capabilities.ts
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/fs-capabilities.ts
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import {
   openWithinCwd,
   PathJailError,
 } from "./path-jail.js";
-import { dispositionFor, runApprovalForCategory } from "./control-handler.js";
+import { effectiveDisposition, runApprovalForCategory } from "./control-handler.js";
 import type { PermissionGate } from "./types.js";
 
 /** Hard ceiling on bytes returned from a read when `limit` is absent/huge (S5). */
@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ export interface FsHandlerOptions {
   allowRead: boolean;
   /** Advertise/register `writeTextFile` (default OFF — KTD6). */
   allowWrite: boolean;
+  /**
+   * Risk S1 acknowledgement. When false (default), a blanket `allow` on the
+   * `file_write_delete` category is escalated to `require-approval` for the
+   * untrusted agent rather than auto-approved.
+   */
+  allowUnrestricted?: boolean;
   /** Override the read byte ceiling (tests). */
   readMaxBytes?: number;
   /** Override the write byte ceiling (tests). */
@@ -181,7 +187,9 @@ export function createFsHandlers(opts: FsHandlerOptions): FsHandlers {
       // security floor stays single-sourced.
       const gate = opts.gate;
       const disposition = gate?.permissionPolicy
-        ? dispositionFor("file_write_delete", gate)
+        ? effectiveDisposition("file_write_delete", gate, {
+            allowUnrestricted: opts.allowUnrestricted,
+          })
         : "require-approval";
 
       if (disposition === "block") {
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/index.ts b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/index.ts
index 3c79b2c16e..057d225865 100644
--- a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/index.ts
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/index.ts
@@ -32,6 +32,15 @@ const plugin: FusionPlugin = definePlugin({
         `ACP Runtime Plugin loaded — binary=${settings.binaryPath} args=[${settings.args.join(" ")}] ` +
           `fsRead=${settings.fsRead} fsWrite=${settings.fsWrite}`,
       );
+      // Risk S1: the ACP agent is an untrusted subprocess. Acknowledging the
+      // unrestricted policy disables the per-call approval escalation — warn so
+      // it is a deliberate, visible choice.
+      if (settings.allowUnrestricted) {
+        ctx.logger.warn(
+          "ACP Runtime: acpAllowUnrestricted is set — sensitive tool calls from the untrusted agent " +
+            "will be auto-approved under an allow-all policy. Prefer an approval-required policy.",
+        );
+      }
     },
   },
   runtime: {
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/provider.ts b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/provider.ts
index 4a4bbaee24..4c5ce9d170 100644
--- a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/provider.ts
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/provider.ts
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import {
 } from "@agentclientprotocol/sdk";
 import { spawnAgent, captureStderr, forceKill, unregisterProcess } from "./process-manager.js";
 import { createEventBridge } from "./event-bridge.js";
-import { resolvePermission } from "./control-handler.js";
+import { resolvePermission, type ResolvePermissionOptions } from "./control-handler.js";
 import { createFsHandlers } from "./fs-capabilities.js";
 import { boundIdentifier } from "./sanitize.js";
 import type { AcpCallbacks, PermissionGate } from "./types.js";
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ export function createBridgingClientHandler(
   callbacks: AcpCallbacks,
   gate?: PermissionGate,
   fsOpts?: FsHandlerBuildOptions,
+  permissionOpts?: ResolvePermissionOptions,
 ): BridgingClientHandler {
   const bridge = createEventBridge(callbacks);
 
@@ -125,6 +126,7 @@ export function createBridgingClientHandler(
         gate,
         allowRead: fsOpts.allowRead,
         allowWrite: fsOpts.allowWrite,
+        allowUnrestricted: permissionOpts?.allowUnrestricted,
       })
     : {};
 
@@ -165,7 +167,7 @@ export function createBridgingClientHandler(
         const drain = (response: RequestPermissionResponse) => finish(response);
         pending.add(drain);
 
-        resolvePermission(params.toolCall, params.options, gate).then(
+        resolvePermission(params.toolCall, params.options, gate, permissionOpts).then(
           (response) => finish(response),
           // resolvePermission never rejects, but stay safe: deny-by-cancel.
           () => finish(cancelledResponse),
diff --git a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/runtime-adapter.ts b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/runtime-adapter.ts
index 9c942f1c2d..4e955ab569 100644
--- a/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/runtime-adapter.ts
+++ b/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/runtime-adapter.ts
@@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ export class AcpRuntimeAdapter implements AgentRuntime {
         allowRead: this.settings.fsRead,
         allowWrite: this.settings.fsWrite,
       },
+      // Risk S1: unless the user acknowledged the untrusted-agent risk, a blanket
+      // `allow` on a sensitive category is escalated to approval rather than
+      // auto-approved — so the default `unrestricted` policy can't silently
+      // green-light this untrusted subprocess.
+      { allowUnrestricted: this.settings.allowUnrestricted },
     );
 
     // Spawn + initialize (U2). fs capabilities are advertised only where the