fix(FN-3724): exempt internal coordination tools from action gate

- Expand action-gate exempt tool list to include internal heartbeat, task/agent coordination, messaging, evaluation, identity, and memory bookkeeping calls
- Prioritize exempt-tool classification in gate evaluation to ensure permanent-agent sessions cannot deadlock on internal runtime operations
- Add targeted engine tests covering exempt internal tool behavior and permanent-agent gating interactions
- Document the internal tool exemption policy in docs/agents.md
- Add a patch changeset for @runfusion/fusion describing the exemption behavior

Fusion-Task-Id: FN-3724
This commit is contained in:
Fusion
2026-05-08 01:37:27 -07:00
committed by gsxdsm
parent bea034d1ba
commit ae7a607972
5 changed files with 106 additions and 6 deletions

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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
---
"@runfusion/fusion": patch
---
Exempt internal Fusion runtime coordination tools from permanent-agent action-gate policy enforcement so heartbeat completion and engine coordination calls cannot deadlock behind approval/block rules.

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@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ Unknown/unclassified tool fallback:
- In permanent-agent sessions, unknown tools default to `require-approval` (fail-safe).
- Category `none` only yields `allow` when the tool is positively recognized as read-only.
- Internal Fusion runtime coordination tools (heartbeat completion, task/agent coordination, messaging, evaluations, identity reflection, memory bookkeeping) are exempt by design and always allowed so permanent-agent heartbeats can complete.
Interim enforcement behavior (persistence-integrated, pre-resume lifecycle):

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@@ -71,11 +71,11 @@ describe("agent-action-gate", () => {
it("classifies explicit network and management tools", () => {
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_research_run", args: {}, permissionPolicy: unrestrictedPolicy }).category).toBe("network_api");
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_task_create", args: {}, permissionPolicy: unrestrictedPolicy }).category).toBe("task_agent_mutation");
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_task_create", args: {}, permissionPolicy: unrestrictedPolicy }).category).toBe("exempt");
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_task_add_dep", args: {}, permissionPolicy: unrestrictedPolicy }).category).toBe("task_agent_mutation");
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_delegate_task", args: {}, permissionPolicy: unrestrictedPolicy }).category).toBe("task_agent_mutation");
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_delegate_task", args: {}, permissionPolicy: unrestrictedPolicy }).category).toBe("exempt");
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_update_agent_config", args: {}, permissionPolicy: unrestrictedPolicy }).category).toBe("task_agent_mutation");
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_update_identity", args: {}, permissionPolicy: unrestrictedPolicy }).category).toBe("task_agent_mutation");
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_update_identity", args: {}, permissionPolicy: unrestrictedPolicy }).category).toBe("exempt");
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_spawn_agent", args: {}, permissionPolicy: unrestrictedPolicy }).category).toBe("task_agent_mutation");
});
@@ -84,6 +84,60 @@ describe("agent-action-gate", () => {
expect(evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "fn_task_update", args: {}, permissionPolicy: approvalPolicy }).disposition).toBe("allow");
});
it.each([
"fn_heartbeat_done",
"fn_task_create",
"fn_delegate_task",
"fn_send_message",
"fn_memory_append",
"fn_update_identity",
"fn_reflect_on_performance",
])("always allows newly exempt internal tool %s under locked-down policies", (toolName) => {
const lockedDownPolicy: AgentPermissionPolicy = {
presetId: "locked-down",
rules: {
"git_write": "block",
"file_write_delete": "block",
"command_execution": "block",
"network_api": "block",
"task_agent_mutation": "block",
},
};
const decision = evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName, args: {}, permissionPolicy: lockedDownPolicy });
expect(decision.disposition).toBe("allow");
expect(decision.category).toBe("exempt");
});
it("keeps bash and write blocked under locked-down policy", () => {
const lockedDownPolicy: AgentPermissionPolicy = {
presetId: "locked-down",
rules: {
"git_write": "block",
"file_write_delete": "block",
"command_execution": "block",
"network_api": "block",
"task_agent_mutation": "block",
},
};
const bashDecision = evaluateAgentActionGate({
agentId: "a1",
toolName: "bash",
args: { command: "git commit -m x" },
permissionPolicy: lockedDownPolicy,
});
const writeDecision = evaluateAgentActionGate({
agentId: "a1",
toolName: "write",
args: { path: "a.ts", content: "x" },
permissionPolicy: lockedDownPolicy,
});
expect(bashDecision.disposition).toBe("block");
expect(writeDecision.disposition).toBe("block");
});
it("resolves disposition from policy", () => {
const result = evaluateAgentActionGate({ agentId: "a1", toolName: "write", args: { path: "a.ts" }, permissionPolicy: approvalPolicy });
expect(result.disposition).toBe("require-approval");

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@@ -619,6 +619,33 @@ describe("wrapToolsWithActionGate", () => {
expect(createApprovalRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(tool.execute).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("passes through exempt internal tools under locked-down policy", async () => {
const execute = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ok: true });
const tool = { name: "fn_heartbeat_done", label: "Heartbeat Done", description: "", parameters: {}, execute };
const { wrapToolsWithActionGate } = await import("../pi.js");
const wrapped = wrapToolsWithActionGate([tool as any], {
agentId: "agent-1",
agentName: "Agent",
isEphemeral: false,
taskId: "FN-1",
permissionPolicy: {
presetId: "locked-down",
rules: {
"git_write": "block",
"file_write_delete": "block",
"command_execution": "block",
"network_api": "block",
"task_agent_mutation": "block",
},
},
createApprovalRequest: vi.fn(),
findPendingApprovalByDedupeKey: vi.fn(),
});
await (wrapped[0] as any).execute("t1", {});
expect(execute).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
describe("createFnAgent", () => {

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@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ export interface AgentActionGateContext {
findPendingApprovalByDedupeKey: (dedupeKey: string) => Promise<unknown | null>;
}
// FN-3724: Internal Fusion runtime/coordinator tools never perform external mutations.
// They must bypass user-configurable approval/block policies so permanent-agent heartbeats cannot deadlock.
const EXEMPT_TOOLS = new Set([
"read",
"find",
@@ -42,6 +44,17 @@ const EXEMPT_TOOLS = new Set([
"fn_memory_search",
"fn_memory_get",
"fn_read_messages",
"fn_heartbeat_done",
"fn_task_create",
"fn_delegate_task",
"fn_list_agents",
"fn_agent_show",
"fn_agent_org_chart",
"fn_send_message",
"fn_memory_append",
"fn_read_evaluations",
"fn_update_identity",
"fn_reflect_on_performance",
]);
const TASK_AGENT_MANAGEMENT_TOOLS = new Set([
@@ -196,6 +209,9 @@ export function evaluateAgentActionGate(params: {
operation = params.toolName;
resourceType = "file";
resourceId = typeof args.path === "string" ? args.path : undefined;
} else if (EXEMPT_TOOLS.has(params.toolName)) {
category = "exempt";
operation = params.toolName;
} else if (TASK_AGENT_MANAGEMENT_TOOLS.has(params.toolName)) {
category = "task_agent_mutation";
operation = params.toolName;
@@ -204,9 +220,6 @@ export function evaluateAgentActionGate(params: {
category = "network_api";
operation = params.toolName;
resourceType = "research";
} else if (EXEMPT_TOOLS.has(params.toolName)) {
category = "exempt";
operation = params.toolName;
}
const disposition: AgentPermissionPolicyDisposition | "allow" = category === "exempt"