root/fusion
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
Files
2e0bcd75c4078612f5aa195563b70ce1647ec3df
fusion/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime
History
gsxdsm 642780220e chore(acp): apply subagent-review follow-ups (changeset, KTD10 tests, docs) 
Two-reviewer pass (security + architecture) on KTD10 + the full Route A
increment: no code defects, no P0, merge-ready as a dormant increment. Applying
the P1 follow-ups:

- Add the feature changeset (@runfusion/fusion minor) — the one convention gap.
- KTD10 tests: fail-closed (bridge not resolved -> env stays unset -> -p) and
  idempotency (second onLoad keeps the first published path).
- Document the two intentional, parallel MCP-forwarding paths (U10 engine-adapter
  vs U11 provider-driver) so nobody double-forwards, and the known
  ACP-path-token-usage=0 residual so U12 doesn't treat it as a bug.

Reviewers confirmed: dormancy invariant holds end-to-end (nothing sets
FUSION_CLAUDE_ACP=1; both flag+path required; -p is the default); OAuth pi path
untouched. 206/206 plugin tests, 333/333 pi-claude-cli tests, typecheck clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 11:40:06 -07:00
..
src
chore(acp): apply subagent-review follow-ups (changeset, KTD10 tests, docs)
2026-06-15 11:40:06 -07:00
AGENTS.md
FN-6457: add ACP ask runner and bundled Claude bridge setup
2026-06-15 02:30:41 -07:00
CHANGELOG.md
FN-6457: add ACP ask runner and bundled Claude bridge setup
2026-06-15 02:30:41 -07:00
manifest.json
feat(acp): scaffold fusion-plugin-acp-runtime (U1)
2026-06-03 08:35:51 -07:00
package.json
FN-6457: add ACP ask runner and bundled Claude bridge setup
2026-06-15 02:30:41 -07:00
README.md
FN-6457: add ACP ask runner and bundled Claude bridge setup
2026-06-15 02:30:41 -07:00
tsconfig.json
feat(acp): scaffold fusion-plugin-acp-runtime (U1)
2026-06-03 08:35:51 -07:00
vitest.config.ts
FN-6042: raise dependency security floors
2026-06-08 15:19:27 -07:00

README.md

@fusion-plugin-examples/acp-runtime

A Fusion runtime plugin that drives any external Agent Client Protocol (ACP) agent over JSON-RPC/stdio. One integration unlocks every ACP-compatible agent (Gemini CLI, the Claude Code ACP adapter, and any future agent that speaks the protocol) through the standard protocol instead of a bespoke per-CLI integration.

Selected via runtimeId: "acp". Installed on demand (experimental) — see the Fusion plugin catalog (fn plugin install fusion-plugin-acp-runtime).

Security posture

The ACP agent is an untrusted subprocess that calls back into Fusion for permissions and filesystem access. This plugin enforces a defense-in-depth floor:

  • Per-category permission gating. Each session/request_permission is classified by tool kind into a Fusion action category and checked against the live permission policy — never a preset shortcut. allow_once only (never a persisted blanket grant). Unmappable kinds and missing policy default-deny.
  • Unrestricted-risk acknowledgement (acpAllowUnrestricted). Because the shipped default policy is unrestricted (allow-all), a blanket allow on a sensitive category is escalated to approval unless the user explicitly sets acpAllowUnrestricted: true. Prefer running the ACP runtime under an approval-required policy.
  • Filesystem jail. fs/read_text_file / fs/write_text_file are opt-in (acpFsRead / acpFsWrite, writes default OFF), confined to the session cwd by a real symlink-resolving jail (realpath + O_NOFOLLOW), with a deny-list for secrets (.env, *.pem, …) and git internals (.git/**). Writes are gated through the file_write_delete permission category.
  • Untrusted-input bounds. Streamed output is sanitized (ANSI/control strip) and bounded (per-turn + per-chunk caps; bounded tool-call correlation map).
  • Subprocess isolation. The agent env is built from an allow-list (acpEnvAllowList) — inherited process.env is not forwarded.

Not sandboxed in v1: the agent's own process/network syscalls run with Fusion's user privileges (OS-level sandboxing is recommended future work).

Settings

Key Default Meaning
acpBinaryPath acp-agent Agent binary to spawn
acpArgs [] Args that launch the agent in ACP/stdio mode (e.g. ["--acp"])
acpModel — Optional model identifier reported via describeModel
acpFsRead false Advertise/register fs/read_text_file
acpFsWrite false Advertise/register fs/write_text_file (gated)
acpEnvAllowList [] Env var names forwarded to the agent subprocess
acpAllowUnrestricted false Acknowledge the untrusted-agent risk under an allow-all policy

Upstream / third-party integration evidence

Per AGENTS.md (External-integration evidence):

Bundled Claude ACP bridge evidence

  • Canonical upstream repo URL: https://github.com/moabualruz/claude-code-cli-acp
  • Docs / homepage URL: https://github.com/moabualruz/claude-code-cli-acp#readme
  • Release / download URL: npm package claude-code-cli-acp (version 0.1.1) — https://www.npmjs.com/package/claude-code-cli-acp
  • Binary / CLI name: claude-code-cli-acp
  • Checksum: sha512-qpfRGOXkOs9mqI7oumsGistWisyXcCC0r7ng7wdLvGMIORdzHjmUUa+94Jftgr/NYAVnAUe6N7kimD8PaO3D5g== (from pnpm-lock.yaml for claude-code-cli-acp@0.1.1)
  • Pinned-commit spot-review: tag v0.1.1 points to commit c93f4f4ca449f451d9f3b7db536caf4060883da9 (annotated tag ca33404fc1128d6a88a55b248f042f70b4bc9f9a, unsigned). License: Apache-2.0. Behavior reviewed for this integration: runs claude through a PTY, reads transcript JSONL, exposes an ACP server over stdio, and requires @anthropic-ai/claude-code installed + authenticated.

See docs/acp-contract.md for the launch/readiness contract and failure taxonomy.

Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink