Files

gsxdsm 5f4ad172f4 fix: give Grok ACP absolute paths for chat image attachments

Grok advertises promptCapabilities.image=false and ignores ACP image
ContentBlocks (live probe: NO_IMAGE). Path-based vision works when the
agent is given an absolute file path. Include path hints in chat prompts
from .fusion/chat-attachments and carry path on ChatImageContent for
file:// uris.

2026-07-12 09:56:26 -07:00

src

fix: give Grok ACP absolute paths for chat image attachments

2026-07-12 09:56:26 -07:00

AGENTS.md

FN-6457: add ACP ask runner and bundled Claude bridge setup

2026-06-15 02:30:41 -07:00

CHANGELOG.md

chore(release): v0.58.0

2026-07-11 23:50:00 -07:00

manifest.json

feat(acp): scaffold fusion-plugin-acp-runtime (U1)

2026-06-03 08:35:51 -07:00

package.json

chore(release): v0.58.0

2026-07-11 23:50:00 -07:00

README.md

FN-6457: add ACP ask runner and bundled Claude bridge setup

2026-06-15 02:30:41 -07:00

tsconfig.json

feat(acp): scaffold fusion-plugin-acp-runtime (U1)

2026-06-03 08:35:51 -07:00

vitest.config.ts

FN-6042: raise dependency security floors

2026-06-08 15:19:27 -07:00

README.md

@fusion-plugin-examples/acp-runtime

A Fusion runtime plugin that drives any external Agent Client Protocol (ACP) agent over JSON-RPC/stdio. One integration unlocks every ACP-compatible agent (Gemini CLI, the Claude Code ACP adapter, and any future agent that speaks the protocol) through the standard protocol instead of a bespoke per-CLI integration.

Selected via runtimeId: "acp". Installed on demand (experimental) — see the Fusion plugin catalog (fn plugin install fusion-plugin-acp-runtime).

Security posture

The ACP agent is an untrusted subprocess that calls back into Fusion for permissions and filesystem access. This plugin enforces a defense-in-depth floor:

Per-category permission gating. Each session/request_permission is classified by tool kind into a Fusion action category and checked against the live permission policy — never a preset shortcut. allow_once only (never a persisted blanket grant). Unmappable kinds and missing policy default-deny.
Unrestricted-risk acknowledgement (acpAllowUnrestricted). Because the shipped default policy is unrestricted (allow-all), a blanket allow on a sensitive category is escalated to approval unless the user explicitly sets acpAllowUnrestricted: true. Prefer running the ACP runtime under an approval-required policy.
Filesystem jail. fs/read_text_file / fs/write_text_file are opt-in (acpFsRead / acpFsWrite, writes default OFF), confined to the session cwd by a real symlink-resolving jail (realpath + O_NOFOLLOW), with a deny-list for secrets (.env, *.pem, …) and git internals (.git/**). Writes are gated through the file_write_delete permission category.
Untrusted-input bounds. Streamed output is sanitized (ANSI/control strip) and bounded (per-turn + per-chunk caps; bounded tool-call correlation map).
Subprocess isolation. The agent env is built from an allow-list (acpEnvAllowList) — inherited process.env is not forwarded.

Not sandboxed in v1: the agent's own process/network syscalls run with Fusion's user privileges (OS-level sandboxing is recommended future work).

Settings

Key	Default	Meaning
`acpBinaryPath`	`acp-agent`	Agent binary to spawn
`acpArgs`	`[]`	Args that launch the agent in ACP/stdio mode (e.g. `["--acp"]`)
`acpModel`	—	Optional model identifier reported via `describeModel`
`acpFsRead`	`false`	Advertise/register `fs/read_text_file`
`acpFsWrite`	`false`	Advertise/register `fs/write_text_file` (gated)
`acpEnvAllowList`	`[]`	Env var names forwarded to the agent subprocess
`acpAllowUnrestricted`	`false`	Acknowledge the untrusted-agent risk under an allow-all policy

Upstream / third-party integration evidence

Per AGENTS.md (External-integration evidence):

Protocol homepage / docs: https://agentclientprotocol.com
Upstream protocol repo: https://github.com/agentclientprotocol/agent-client-protocol
TypeScript SDK repo: https://github.com/agentclientprotocol/typescript-sdk
Dependency (npm): @agentclientprotocol/sdk — https://www.npmjs.com/package/@agentclientprotocol/sdk
Pinned release: 0.24.0 (Apache-2.0)
Tarball: https://registry.npmjs.org/@agentclientprotocol/sdk/-/sdk-0.24.0.tgz
Integrity (sha512): sha512-vvu9appvGvfYstBj19C6NCepV6SvUhY5VRv60KUZ4XzhTah/olOYul5Zo4C+x2enyshMSvgB2mm/OEmrsHaSmA==
Agent binaries driven: user-supplied ACP agents (e.g. gemini --acp) and the bundled Claude bridge below. User-configured agents remain upstream-pending-verification per agent.

Bundled Claude ACP bridge evidence

Canonical upstream repo URL: https://github.com/moabualruz/claude-code-cli-acp
Docs / homepage URL: https://github.com/moabualruz/claude-code-cli-acp#readme
Release / download URL: npm package claude-code-cli-acp (version 0.1.1) — https://www.npmjs.com/package/claude-code-cli-acp
Binary / CLI name: claude-code-cli-acp
Checksum: sha512-qpfRGOXkOs9mqI7oumsGistWisyXcCC0r7ng7wdLvGMIORdzHjmUUa+94Jftgr/NYAVnAUe6N7kimD8PaO3D5g== (from pnpm-lock.yaml for claude-code-cli-acp@0.1.1)
Pinned-commit spot-review: tag v0.1.1 points to commit c93f4f4ca449f451d9f3b7db536caf4060883da9 (annotated tag ca33404fc1128d6a88a55b248f042f70b4bc9f9a, unsigned). License: Apache-2.0. Behavior reviewed for this integration: runs claude through a PTY, reads transcript JSONL, exposes an ACP server over stdio, and requires @anthropic-ai/claude-code installed + authenticated.

See docs/acp-contract.md for the launch/readiness contract and failure taxonomy.