Files
fusion/packages/engine/src/agent-action-gate.ts
gsxdsm ee7af2513f fix(MAIN-008): address PR review feedback (#2020)
- Label namespaced mcp__* tools as resourceType "mcp" (not "research") so approvals/audit/dedupe keys describe external MCP actions
- Guard getTask in resumeApprovalAfterUnwindIfNeeded so deferred resume cannot mask execute() finally outcomes
2026-07-12 13:56:36 -07:00

278 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript

import type {
AgentPermissionPolicy,
AgentPermissionPolicyActionCategory,
AgentPermissionPolicyDisposition,
ApprovalRequestStatus,
} from "@fusion/core";
import {
ACTION_GATE_NETWORK_API_TOOLS,
ACTION_GATE_TASK_AGENT_MANAGEMENT_TOOLS,
COMMAND_EXECUTION_FN_TOOLS,
COORDINATION_EXEMPT_TOOLS,
FILE_SCOPE_FN_TOOLS,
READONLY_BUILTIN_TOOLS,
REVIEW_GATE_BYPASS_FN_TOOLS,
classifyGitCommand,
} from "./gating-classifications.js";
import { runtimeLog } from "./logger.js";
/*
FNXC:AgentGating 2026-07-12-18:35:
MAIN-008 review: project MCP tools must not share the "research" resource type used by built-in network research tools. Operators and approval-dedupe keys need a distinct label for external MCP side effects; "mcp" is that resource type.
*/
export type AgentActionGateResourceType = "file" | "git" | "task" | "agent" | "research" | "command" | "mcp" | "other";
export interface AgentActionGateDecision {
disposition: "allow" | "block" | "require-approval";
category: AgentPermissionPolicyActionCategory | "exempt";
toolName: string;
operation: string;
summary: string;
resourceType: AgentActionGateResourceType;
resourceId?: string;
approvalDedupeKey: string;
metadata: Record<string, unknown>;
}
export interface AgentActionGateContext {
agentId: string;
agentName: string;
isEphemeral: boolean;
taskId?: string;
runId?: string;
permissionPolicy: AgentPermissionPolicy;
createApprovalRequest: (decision: AgentActionGateDecision, args: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<unknown>;
findApprovalByDedupeKey?: (dedupeKey: string) => Promise<{ id: string; status: ApprovalRequestStatus } | null>;
/** @deprecated Use findApprovalByDedupeKey */
findPendingApprovalByDedupeKey?: (dedupeKey: string) => Promise<{ id: string } | null>;
pauseForApproval?: (info: { approvalRequestId: string; decision: AgentActionGateDecision }) => Promise<void>;
markApprovalCompleted?: (approvalRequestId: string) => Promise<void>;
}
// FN-3724: Internal Fusion runtime/coordinator tools never perform external mutations.
// They must bypass user-configurable approval/block policies so permanent-agent heartbeats cannot deadlock.
const DEFAULT_EXEMPT_TOOLS = COORDINATION_EXEMPT_TOOLS;
let _exemptTools: Set<string> | null = null;
function getExemptTools(): Set<string> {
if (!_exemptTools) {
_exemptTools = new Set(DEFAULT_EXEMPT_TOOLS);
}
return _exemptTools;
}
/**
* Reloads the exempt-tools registry used by the action gate.
* If no tool list is provided, the canonical default exemption set is restored.
*/
export function reloadExemptTools(newTools?: string[]): string[] {
const nextTools = newTools ?? [...DEFAULT_EXEMPT_TOOLS];
_exemptTools = new Set(nextTools);
const toolNames = [..._exemptTools];
runtimeLog.log(`[action-gate] Reloaded exempt tools (${toolNames.length})`);
return toolNames;
}
/**
* Adds a tool to the exempt-tools registry at runtime.
*/
export function addToExemptTools(toolName: string): string[] {
const nextTools = new Set(getExemptTools());
nextTools.add(toolName);
_exemptTools = new Set(nextTools);
const toolNames = [..._exemptTools];
runtimeLog.log(`[action-gate] Added exempt tool: ${toolName}`);
return toolNames;
}
export function getExemptToolNames(): string[] {
return [...getExemptTools()];
}
const TASK_AGENT_MANAGEMENT_TOOLS = ACTION_GATE_TASK_AGENT_MANAGEMENT_TOOLS;
const NETWORK_API_TOOLS = ACTION_GATE_NETWORK_API_TOOLS;
const COMMAND_EXECUTION_TOOLS = COMMAND_EXECUTION_FN_TOOLS;
const READONLY_DISCOVERY_TOOLS = READONLY_BUILTIN_TOOLS;
const REVIEW_GATE_BYPASS_TOOLS = REVIEW_GATE_BYPASS_FN_TOOLS;
const FILE_SCOPE_TOOLS = FILE_SCOPE_FN_TOOLS;
function normalizeArgs(args: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
return args && typeof args === "object" ? (args as Record<string, unknown>) : {};
}
function extractShellCommand(args: Record<string, unknown>): string {
const command = args.command;
return typeof command === "string" ? command.trim() : "";
}
export function computeApprovalDedupeKey(input: {
agentId: string;
taskId?: string;
toolName: string;
category: string;
resourceType: AgentActionGateResourceType;
resourceId?: string;
operation: string;
}): string {
return [
input.agentId,
input.taskId ?? "",
input.toolName,
input.category,
input.resourceType,
input.resourceId ?? "",
input.operation,
].join("|");
}
export function evaluateAgentActionGate(params: {
agentId: string;
taskId?: string;
toolName: string;
args: unknown;
permissionPolicy: AgentPermissionPolicy;
}): AgentActionGateDecision {
const args = normalizeArgs(params.args);
let category: AgentPermissionPolicyActionCategory | "exempt" = "exempt";
let operation = params.toolName;
let resourceType: AgentActionGateResourceType = "other";
let resourceId: string | undefined;
if (params.toolName === "bash") {
const command = extractShellCommand(args);
const git = classifyGitCommand(command);
if (git?.write) {
category = "git_write";
operation = git.operation;
resourceType = "git";
} else {
category = "command_execution";
operation = git?.operation ?? "shell command";
resourceType = git ? "git" : "command";
}
} else if (params.toolName === "write" || params.toolName === "edit") {
category = "file_write_delete";
operation = params.toolName;
resourceType = "file";
resourceId = typeof args.path === "string" ? args.path : undefined;
} else if (getExemptTools().has(params.toolName)) {
category = "exempt";
operation = params.toolName;
} else if (READONLY_DISCOVERY_TOOLS.has(params.toolName)) {
category = "command_execution";
operation = params.toolName;
resourceType = "file";
} else if (REVIEW_GATE_BYPASS_TOOLS.has(params.toolName)) {
// FNXC:ToolGovernance 2026-07-09-00:00: FN-7728 — fn_task_bypass_review is a merge-gate override, governed by its own review_gate_bypass category rather than task_agent_mutation so operators can dial bypass approval independently of ordinary task mutations.
category = "review_gate_bypass";
operation = params.toolName;
resourceType = "task";
} else if (FILE_SCOPE_TOOLS.has(params.toolName)) {
// FNXC:ToolGovernance 2026-07-09-08:30: FN-7737 — fn_task_file_scope_add (File Scope additional-approval) is governed by its own file_scope category, distinct from task_agent_mutation/file_write_delete, so operators can dial it independently. Uniform grant-all default (no stricter override like review_gate_bypass).
category = "file_scope";
operation = params.toolName;
resourceType = "file";
} else if (TASK_AGENT_MANAGEMENT_TOOLS.has(params.toolName)) {
category = "task_agent_mutation";
operation = params.toolName;
resourceType = params.toolName.includes("agent") || params.toolName.includes("spawn") ? "agent" : "task";
} else if (COMMAND_EXECUTION_TOOLS.has(params.toolName)) {
category = "command_execution";
operation = params.toolName;
resourceType = "command";
} else if (NETWORK_API_TOOLS.has(params.toolName) || params.toolName.startsWith("mcp__")) {
/*
FNXC:AgentGating 2026-07-12-17:18:
MAIN-008 requires every namespaced project MCP operation to remain inside
the external-action approval boundary. MCP tools are dynamically named and
therefore cannot live in the static tool registry; classify the namespace
as network_api instead of falling through to the exempt default.
FNXC:AgentGating 2026-07-12-18:35:
Built-in research tools keep resourceType "research". Namespaced mcp__*
tools use "mcp" so approval UI/audit metadata and dedupe keys describe an
external MCP action rather than a research read.
*/
category = "network_api";
operation = params.toolName;
resourceType = params.toolName.startsWith("mcp__") ? "mcp" : "research";
}
/*
FNXC:ToolPermissions 2026-07-01-00:00:
Exact tool-name overrides must be resolved before category policy so operators can block a single governed tool such as `fn_task_create` without blocking every `task_agent_mutation` tool. Exempt coordination tools remain hard-bypassed to avoid heartbeat deadlocks.
*/
const exactDisposition = category === "exempt" ? undefined : params.permissionPolicy.toolRules?.[params.toolName];
const disposition: AgentPermissionPolicyDisposition | "allow" = category === "exempt"
? "allow"
: exactDisposition ?? params.permissionPolicy.rules[category];
const dedupeKey = computeApprovalDedupeKey({
agentId: params.agentId,
taskId: params.taskId,
toolName: params.toolName,
category,
resourceType,
resourceId,
operation,
});
return {
disposition,
category,
toolName: params.toolName,
operation,
summary: `${params.toolName}: ${operation}`,
resourceType,
...(resourceId ? { resourceId } : {}),
approvalDedupeKey: dedupeKey,
metadata: exactDisposition
? {
permissionPolicyMatch: {
type: "toolRule",
toolName: params.toolName,
disposition: exactDisposition,
},
}
: {},
};
}
export function resolveGateOutcome(
decision: AgentActionGateDecision,
latestRequest: { id: string; status: ApprovalRequestStatus } | null,
): { outcome: "allow" | "block" | "execute-once-then-complete" | "wait-for-approval"; approvalRequestId?: string } {
if (decision.disposition === "allow") {
return { outcome: "allow" };
}
if (decision.disposition === "block") {
return { outcome: "block" };
}
if (!latestRequest) {
return { outcome: "wait-for-approval" };
}
if (latestRequest.status === "pending") {
return { outcome: "wait-for-approval", approvalRequestId: latestRequest.id };
}
if (latestRequest.status === "approved") {
return { outcome: "execute-once-then-complete", approvalRequestId: latestRequest.id };
}
if (latestRequest.status === "denied") {
return { outcome: "block", approvalRequestId: latestRequest.id };
}
return { outcome: "wait-for-approval" };
}
export function buildGateRejection(decision: AgentActionGateDecision, reason: string) {
return {
content: [{ type: "text", text: reason }],
isError: true,
ok: false,
error: reason,
decision,
};
}