Files
fusion/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime
Fusion Agent e80fef3fe0 FN-040: fix chat source-link integrity and contrast
Harden chat source links across streaming providers while improving new-tab behavior and visual contrast.

- Preserve source-link metadata through streamed delta and event bridges.
- Open chat source links safely in new tabs across desktop and mobile surfaces.
- Improve source-link contrast and add regression coverage plus user-facing guidance.

Files changed:
 .changeset/fn-040-chat-source-links.md             |  7 +++
 docs/dashboard-guide.md                            |  3 +
 .../ui-bugs/chat-streamed-source-link-integrity.md | 53 ++++++++++++++++
 packages/dashboard/app/components/ChatView.css     | 24 ++++++++
 .../app/components/StandardChatSurface.tsx         |  8 ++-
 .../components/__tests__/ChatView.core.test.tsx    | 38 ++++++++++++
 .../components/__tests__/ChatView.mobile.test.tsx  | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 .../__tests__/ChatView.sessions-rooms.test.tsx     | 49 +++++++++++++++
 ...andardChatSurface.nativeStructureEmbed.test.tsx | 52 +++++++++++++++-
 .../__tests__/TaskPlannerChatTab.test.tsx          | 48 +++++++++++++++
 .../engine/src/__tests__/streaming-delta.test.ts   | 36 +++++++++++
 packages/engine/src/execution/streaming-delta.ts   | 17 +++++-
 .../src/__tests__/event-bridge.test.ts             | 30 +++++++++-
 packages/pi-claude-cli/src/event-bridge.ts         | 14 +++--
 .../src/__tests__/event-bridge.test.ts             | 42 +++++++++++++
 .../fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/event-bridge.ts  |  8 ++-
 .../src/__tests__/provider.test.ts                 | 34 +++++++++++
 .../src/acp/event-bridge.ts                        |  8 ++-
 .../src/__tests__/event-bridge.test.ts             | 28 +++++++++
 .../src/event-bridge.ts                            | 14 +++--
 .../src/__tests__/provider.test.ts                 | 34 +++++++++++
 .../src/acp/event-bridge.ts                        |  8 ++-
 .../src/__tests__/runtime-adapter.test.ts          | 34 +++++++++++
 .../src/acp/event-bridge.ts                        |  8 ++-
 24 files changed, 642 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

Fusion-Task-Id: FN-040

Fusion-Task-Lineage: 364ad678-df3e-4fb2-b19c-29eb44d8a429

Co-authored-by: Fusion <noreply@runfusion.ai>
2026-08-20 03:57:23 +00:00
..
2026-08-18 22:16:44 -07:00
2026-08-18 22:16:44 -07:00

@fusion-plugin-examples/acp-runtime

A Fusion runtime plugin that drives any external Agent Client Protocol (ACP) agent over JSON-RPC/stdio. One integration unlocks every ACP-compatible agent (Gemini CLI, the Claude Code ACP adapter, and any future agent that speaks the protocol) through the standard protocol instead of a bespoke per-CLI integration.

Selected via runtimeId: "acp". Installed on demand (experimental) — see the Fusion plugin catalog (fn plugin install fusion-plugin-acp-runtime).

Security posture

The ACP agent is an untrusted subprocess that calls back into Fusion for permissions and filesystem access. This plugin enforces a defense-in-depth floor:

  • Per-category permission gating. Each session/request_permission is classified by tool kind into a Fusion action category and checked against the live permission policy — never a preset shortcut. allow_once only (never a persisted blanket grant). Unmappable kinds and missing policy default-deny.
  • Unrestricted-risk acknowledgement (acpAllowUnrestricted). Because the shipped default policy is unrestricted (allow-all), a blanket allow on a sensitive category is escalated to approval unless the user explicitly sets acpAllowUnrestricted: true. Prefer running the ACP runtime under an approval-required policy.
  • Filesystem jail. fs/read_text_file / fs/write_text_file are opt-in (acpFsRead / acpFsWrite, writes default OFF), confined to the session cwd by a real symlink-resolving jail (realpath + O_NOFOLLOW), with a deny-list for secrets (.env, *.pem, …) and git internals (.git/**). Writes are gated through the file_write_delete permission category.
  • Untrusted-input bounds. Streamed output is sanitized (ANSI/control strip) and bounded (per-turn + per-chunk caps; bounded tool-call correlation map).
  • Subprocess isolation. The agent env is built from an allow-list (acpEnvAllowList) — inherited process.env is not forwarded.

Not sandboxed in v1: the agent's own process/network syscalls run with Fusion's user privileges (OS-level sandboxing is recommended future work).

Settings

Key Default Meaning
acpBinaryPath acp-agent Agent binary to spawn
acpArgs [] Args that launch the agent in ACP/stdio mode (e.g. ["--acp"])
acpModel — Optional model identifier reported via describeModel
acpFsRead false Advertise/register fs/read_text_file
acpFsWrite false Advertise/register fs/write_text_file (gated)
acpEnvAllowList [] Env var names forwarded to the agent subprocess
acpAllowUnrestricted false Acknowledge the untrusted-agent risk under an allow-all policy

Upstream / third-party integration evidence

Per AGENTS.md (External-integration evidence):

Bundled Claude ACP bridge evidence

  • Canonical upstream repo URL: https://github.com/moabualruz/claude-code-cli-acp
  • Docs / homepage URL: https://github.com/moabualruz/claude-code-cli-acp#readme
  • Release / download URL: npm package claude-code-cli-acp (version 0.1.1) — https://www.npmjs.com/package/claude-code-cli-acp
  • Binary / CLI name: claude-code-cli-acp
  • Checksum: sha512-qpfRGOXkOs9mqI7oumsGistWisyXcCC0r7ng7wdLvGMIORdzHjmUUa+94Jftgr/NYAVnAUe6N7kimD8PaO3D5g== (from pnpm-lock.yaml for claude-code-cli-acp@0.1.1)
  • Pinned-commit spot-review: tag v0.1.1 points to commit c93f4f4ca449f451d9f3b7db536caf4060883da9 (annotated tag ca33404fc1128d6a88a55b248f042f70b4bc9f9a, unsigned). License: Apache-2.0. Behavior reviewed for this integration: runs claude through a PTY, reads transcript JSONL, exposes an ACP server over stdio, and requires @anthropic-ai/claude-code installed + authenticated.

See docs/acp-contract.md for the launch/readiness contract and failure taxonomy.