Files
fusion/plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/sanitize.ts
gsxdsm 0f3cec0f54 feat(acp): untrusted-input hardening — output bounds + sanitization (U6)
The agent is untrusted input and the high inactivity ceiling (KTD4) does not
bound an actively-flooding agent. Adds sanitize.ts (strip ANSI/control
sequences, bound strings, bound identifiers — reject path separators/NUL so an
agent-supplied id can never reach a path). event-bridge.ts now caps per-turn
cumulative output (5M chars, truncate-and-flag once) and per-chunk size (64k),
sanitizes text/thinking/tool-title before callbacks (S7), and bounds the
toolCallId correlation map with FIFO eviction (S5). sessionId passed through
boundIdentifier before storage. +28 tests (134 total).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-03 09:10:31 -07:00

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// Untrusted-input sanitization helpers (U6 / Risk S7).
//
// Every string an ACP agent emits — text/thinking deltas, tool `title`, plan
// text, `sessionId`, `toolCallId` — is untrusted input. Before any such string
// reaches a Fusion callback, a log, the UI, or (worst) a filesystem path, it must
// be neutralized:
//
// - `stripControlSequences` removes ANSI/OSC escapes and C0/C1 control chars so
// a crafted string cannot inject terminal escapes / rewrite log lines.
// - `boundString` truncates oversized content (Risk S5) with a visible marker.
// - `boundIdentifier` bounds an agent-supplied id and strips path separators /
// NUL bytes so the id can never be interpolated into a filesystem path
// unsanitized.
/** Default cap for an agent-supplied identifier (sessionId, toolCallId). */
export const DEFAULT_IDENTIFIER_MAX = 256;
/** Marker appended when `boundString` truncates its input. */
export const TRUNCATION_MARKER = "…[truncated]";
// ANSI escape sequences:
// CSI / SGR: ESC [ ... <final byte>
// OSC: ESC ] ... (BEL | ST)
// other ESC-prefixed two-char sequences (e.g. ESC ( B)
const ANSI_PATTERN =
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
/\x1b\][^\x07\x1b]*(?:\x07|\x1b\\)|\x1b[@-Z\\-_]|\x1b\[[0-?]*[ -/]*[@-~]|\x1b[ -/]*[0-~]/g;
// Non-printable control chars to drop. C0 = \x00–\x1F, DEL = \x7F, C1 = \x80–\x9F.
// We KEEP \n (\x0A) and \t (\x09) — they are legitimate whitespace in agent text.
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
const CONTROL_CHARS_PATTERN = /[\x00-\x08\x0B-\x1F\x7F-\x9F]/g;
/**
* Remove ANSI escape sequences (CSI/SGR/OSC) and non-printable C0/C1 control
* characters from an untrusted string. Preserves `\n` and `\t`. Never throws —
* a non-string input yields an empty string.
*/
export function stripControlSequences(text: string): string {
if (typeof text !== "string" || text === "") return "";
return text.replace(ANSI_PATTERN, "").replace(CONTROL_CHARS_PATTERN, "");
}
/**
* Truncate `text` to at most `max` characters, appending a short truncation
* marker when the input is cut. A non-positive `max` yields an empty string; a
* non-string input yields an empty string. The returned string is never longer
* than `max` (the marker replaces the tail of the budget, it is not added on
* top).
*/
export function boundString(text: string, max: number): string {
if (typeof text !== "string" || text === "") return "";
if (!Number.isFinite(max) || max <= 0) return "";
if (text.length <= max) return text;
if (max <= TRUNCATION_MARKER.length) {
return text.slice(0, max);
}
return text.slice(0, max - TRUNCATION_MARKER.length) + TRUNCATION_MARKER;
}
/**
* Bound an agent-supplied identifier to a sane length and strip anything that
* could let it escape into a filesystem path: path separators (`/`, `\`), NUL
* bytes, control chars, and `..` traversal segments are removed. The result is
* a flat, length-bounded token safe to use as a Map key or a single path
* component. A non-string / empty input yields `""`.
*/
export function boundIdentifier(id: string, max: number = DEFAULT_IDENTIFIER_MAX): string {
if (typeof id !== "string" || id === "") return "";
const cap = Number.isFinite(max) && max > 0 ? max : DEFAULT_IDENTIFIER_MAX;
// Drop ANSI/control first, then path-dangerous characters, then traversal.
let cleaned = stripControlSequences(id)
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
.replace(/\x00/g, "")
.replace(/[/\\]/g, "_");
// Collapse any remaining `..` traversal tokens (after separators were removed
// a `..` cannot point anywhere, but normalize it away for defense in depth).
cleaned = cleaned.replace(/\.\.+/g, "_");
return cleaned.slice(0, cap);
}