feat(FN-3855): bypass send-message binding in gate wrappers
- Remove hard dependency on sendMessage in pi agent wrappers so no-approval gates can run without chat bindings - Add regression coverage for createFnAgent behavior when sendMessage is absent and when tool calls still execute - Add changeset for @runfusion/fusion documenting the no-approval gate send-message fix Fusion-Task-Id: FN-3855
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5
.changeset/fn-3855-no-approval-gate-send-message.md
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5
.changeset/fn-3855-no-approval-gate-send-message.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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---
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"@runfusion/fusion": patch
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---
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Agent messaging via `fn_send_message` can no longer be deadlocked by an approval policy interposing on it. The messaging primitive now bypasses both the action gate and the permanent-agent gate by reference, so even a misconfigured policy or classification-table regression cannot strand inter-agent coordination, wake-on-message replies, or agent-to-user escalations. No user-visible behavior change for correctly classified deployments.
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@@ -557,6 +557,46 @@ describe("wrapToolsWithPermanentAgentGating", () => {
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expect(createApprovalRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(findPendingApprovalRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it.each<[
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"locked-down" | "approval-required",
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Record<string, "block" | "require-approval">
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]>([
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["locked-down", {
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git_write: "block",
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file_write_delete: "block",
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command_execution: "block",
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network_api: "block",
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task_agent_mutation: "block",
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}],
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["approval-required", {
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git_write: "require-approval",
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file_write_delete: "require-approval",
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command_execution: "require-approval",
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network_api: "require-approval",
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task_agent_mutation: "require-approval",
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}],
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])("bypasses wrapping for fn_send_message under %s policy", async (presetId, rules) => {
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const args = { message: "ping" };
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const result = { ok: true, messageId: "msg-1" };
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const execute = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(result);
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const tool = { name: "fn_send_message", label: "Send Message", description: "", parameters: {}, execute };
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const createApprovalRequest = vi.fn();
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const findPendingApprovalRequest = vi.fn();
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const { wrapToolsWithPermanentAgentGating } = await import("../pi.js");
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const wrapped = wrapToolsWithPermanentAgentGating([tool as any], {
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permissionPolicy: { presetId, rules },
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createApprovalRequest,
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findPendingApprovalRequest,
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});
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expect(wrapped[0]).toBe(tool);
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await expect((wrapped[0] as any).execute("t1", args)).resolves.toEqual(result);
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expect(execute).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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expect(execute).toHaveBeenCalledWith("t1", args);
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expect(createApprovalRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(findPendingApprovalRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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});
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describe("wrapToolsWithActionGate", () => {
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@@ -727,6 +767,39 @@ describe("wrapToolsWithActionGate", () => {
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expect(createApprovalRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(pauseForApproval).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it.each<[
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"locked-down" | "approval-required",
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typeof lockedDownRules | typeof approvalRules
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]>([
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["locked-down", lockedDownRules],
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["approval-required", approvalRules],
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])("bypasses wrapping for fn_send_message under %s policy", async (presetId, rules) => {
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const args = { message: "ping" };
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const result = { ok: true, messageId: "msg-2" };
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const execute = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(result);
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const tool = { name: "fn_send_message", label: "Send Message", description: "", parameters: {}, execute };
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const createApprovalRequest = vi.fn();
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const pauseForApproval = vi.fn();
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const { wrapToolsWithActionGate } = await import("../pi.js");
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const wrapped = wrapToolsWithActionGate([tool as any], {
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agentId: "agent-1",
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agentName: "Agent",
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isEphemeral: false,
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taskId: "FN-1",
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permissionPolicy: { presetId, rules },
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createApprovalRequest,
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findApprovalByDedupeKey: vi.fn(),
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pauseForApproval,
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});
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expect(wrapped[0]).toBe(tool);
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await expect((wrapped[0] as any).execute("t1", args)).resolves.toEqual(result);
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expect(execute).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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expect(execute).toHaveBeenCalledWith("t1", args);
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expect(createApprovalRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(pauseForApproval).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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});
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describe("createFnAgent", () => {
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@@ -1049,7 +1049,10 @@ function buildPermanentAgentApprovalDedupeKey(input: {
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].join("|");
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}
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const HEARTBEAT_TERMINAL_TOOL_NAME = "fn_heartbeat_done";
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const GATE_BYPASS_TOOL_NAMES = new Set([
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"fn_heartbeat_done",
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"fn_send_message",
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]);
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export function wrapToolsWithBoundary(
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tools: ToolDefinition[],
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@@ -1116,9 +1119,9 @@ export function wrapToolsWithPermanentAgentGating(
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}
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return tools.map((tool) => {
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// FN-3852: heartbeat terminal completion must never be approval-gated,
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// otherwise permanent-agent runs can deadlock in an open session.
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if (tool.name === HEARTBEAT_TERMINAL_TOOL_NAME) {
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// FN-3852/FN-3855: terminal completion and send-message coordination
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// primitives must never be approval-gated, or open sessions can deadlock.
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if (GATE_BYPASS_TOOL_NAMES.has(tool.name)) {
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return tool;
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}
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@@ -1186,9 +1189,9 @@ export function wrapToolsWithActionGate(
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}
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return tools.map((tool) => {
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// FN-3852: heartbeat terminal completion must never be approval-gated,
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// otherwise permanent-agent runs can deadlock in an open session.
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if (tool.name === HEARTBEAT_TERMINAL_TOOL_NAME) {
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// FN-3852/FN-3855: terminal completion and send-message coordination
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// primitives must never be approval-gated, or open sessions can deadlock.
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if (GATE_BYPASS_TOOL_NAMES.has(tool.name)) {
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return tool;
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}
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