FN-8224: add Claude ACP runtime support

Add a bundled Claude Code ACP runtime with model discovery and CLI distribution integration.

- Add the Claude ACP runtime plugin, bridge, tool forwarding, and tests.
- Register Claude model discovery and cached picker support in the dashboard.
- Stage the plugin in CLI and desktop packaging with its pinned dependency.
- Add workspace, lockfile, and release metadata.

Files changed:
 .changeset/fn-8224-claude-acp-runtime.md           |   7 +
 packages/cli/package.json                          |   1 +
 packages/cli/src/__tests__/bundle-output.test.ts   |  32 +-
 .../cli/src/plugins/staged-bundled-plugin-ids.ts   |   1 +
 packages/cli/tsup.config.ts                        |  40 +-
 .../core/src/plugins/bundled-plugin-install.ts     |   2 +
 packages/dashboard/package.json                    |   3 +-
 packages/dashboard/src/claude-model-cache.ts       | 185 +++++++
 packages/dashboard/src/routes.ts                   |   1 +
 .../dashboard/src/routes/register-model-routes.ts  |  11 +
 packages/dashboard/src/runtime-provider-probes.ts  |  15 +
 packages/dashboard/vitest.config.ts                |   4 +
 packages/desktop/scripts/workspace-tools.ts        |   1 +
 plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/README.md     |   7 +
 plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/manifest.json |   1 +
 plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/package.json  |   1 +
 .../src/__tests__/cli-spawn.test.ts                |   3 +
 .../src/__tests__/index.test.ts                    |   3 +
 .../src/__tests__/provider.test.ts                 |   8 +
 .../src/__tests__/runtime-adapter.test.ts          |   7 +
 .../src/__tests__/tool-bridge.test.ts              |  79 +++
 .../src/acp-settings.ts                            |  21 +
 .../src/acp/VENDORED.md                            |  30 ++
 .../src/acp/cli-spawn.ts                           | 188 +++++++
 .../src/acp/control-handler.ts                     | 302 ++++++++++++
 .../src/acp/event-bridge.ts                        | 308 ++++++++++++
 .../src/acp/fs-capabilities.ts                     | 263 ++++++++++
 .../fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/src/acp/index.ts  |  16 +
 .../src/acp/path-jail.ts                           | 229 +++++++++
 .../src/acp/process-manager.ts                     | 177 +++++++
 .../src/acp/prompt-builder.ts                      |  87 ++++
 .../src/acp/provider.ts                            | 542 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../src/acp/runtime-adapter.ts                     | 190 ++++++++
 .../src/acp/sanitize.ts                            |  81 +++
 .../src/acp/tool-mapping.ts                        |  47 ++
 .../fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/src/acp/types.ts  | 189 +++++++
 .../fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/src/cli-spawn.ts  |  31 ++
 plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/src/index.ts  |  95 ++++
 .../src/mcp-forwarding.ts                          | 114 +++++
 .../src/mcp-schema-server.cjs                      | 155 ++++++
 plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/src/probe.ts  |   8 +
 .../fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/src/provider.ts   |   8 +
 .../src/runtime-adapter.ts                         | 424 ++++++++++++++++
 .../src/skill-loader.ts                            | 290 +++++++++++
 .../src/tool-bridge.ts                             | 264 ++++++++++
 plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/src/types.ts  | 142 ++++++
 plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/tsconfig.json |  10 +
 .../fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/vitest.config.ts  |  22 +
 pnpm-lock.yaml                                     | 131 ++++-
 pnpm-workspace.yaml                                |   1 +
 50 files changed, 4753 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

Fusion-Task-Id: FN-8224

Fusion-Task-Lineage: 4e626913-32bb-4baa-a142-816c7f4ee7c4

Co-authored-by: Fusion (runfusion.ai) <noreply@runfusion.ai>
This commit is contained in:
gsxdsm
2026-07-17 12:00:26 -07:00
parent 7f1b7e21c1
commit adb3eb3a37
50 changed files with 4753 additions and 24 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
---
"@runfusion/fusion": minor
---
summary: Add a first-class Claude runtime that drives Claude Code over ACP.
category: feature
dev: New bundled `fusion-plugin-claude-runtime` (provider `claude-cli`, runtime `claude`) composes the pinned `claude-code-cli-acp` bridge and is additive to experimental `pi-claude-cli` Route A.

View File

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
"dependencies": {
"@earendil-works/pi-ai": "0.80.10",
"@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent": "0.80.10",
"claude-code-cli-acp": "0.1.1",
"dockerode": "^4.0.12",
"electron": "^33.4.11",
"embedded-postgres": "15.18.0-beta.17",

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll } from "vitest";
import { readFileSync, existsSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
import { readFileSync, existsSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
import { resolvePluginSkillBodyPath } from "@fusion/core";
@@ -379,6 +379,36 @@ describe("CLI bundle output", () => {
expect(existsSync(join(stagedRoot, "mcp-schema-server.cjs"))).toBe(true);
});
it("stages a portable Claude ACP launcher and declares every platform bridge", () => {
const bridgeRoot = join(cliRoot, "dist", "plugins", "fusion-plugin-claude-runtime", "bridge");
const executableName = process.platform === "win32" ? "claude-code-cli-acp.cmd" : "claude-code-cli-acp";
const bridgePath = join(bridgeRoot, executableName);
const launcherManifestPath = join(bridgeRoot, "node_modules", "claude-code-cli-acp", "package.json");
const launcherManifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(launcherManifestPath, "utf8")) as {
optionalDependencies?: Record<string, string>;
};
const cliManifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(cliRoot, "package.json"), "utf8")) as {
dependencies?: Record<string, string>;
};
const supportedPlatformPackages = [
"claude-code-cli-acp-darwin-arm64",
"claude-code-cli-acp-darwin-x64",
"claude-code-cli-acp-linux-arm64",
"claude-code-cli-acp-linux-x64",
"claude-code-cli-acp-win32-arm64",
"claude-code-cli-acp-win32-x64",
];
expect(existsSync(bridgePath)).toBe(true);
expect(existsSync(join(bridgeRoot, "node_modules", "claude-code-cli-acp", "bin", "claude-code-cli-acp.js"))).toBe(true);
expect(cliManifest.dependencies?.["claude-code-cli-acp"]).toBe("0.1.1");
expect(Object.keys(launcherManifest.optionalDependencies ?? {}).sort()).toEqual(supportedPlatformPackages);
if (process.platform !== "win32") expect(statSync(bridgePath).mode & 0o111).not.toBe(0);
// Native binaries intentionally are not staged from the build host. npm installs the matching
// optional package from this manifest on the operator's platform, including platforms unavailable to CI.
}, 35_000);
it("dist/plugins/fusion-plugin-cursor-runtime/ is staged with a valid manifest", () => {
const stagedRoot = join(cliRoot, "dist", "plugins", "fusion-plugin-cursor-runtime");
const manifestPath = join(stagedRoot, "manifest.json");

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ export const RUNTIME_PLUGIN_IDS = [
"fusion-plugin-paperclip-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-cursor-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-grok-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-claude-runtime",
// FNXC:OmpAcp 2026-07-11-23:35: Oh My Pi ACP runtime (omp acp) — staged like acp/droid for explicit runtime use.
"fusion-plugin-omp-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-droid-runtime",

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import { defineConfig } from "tsup";
import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
import { cpSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { chmodSync, cpSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { createRequire } from "node:module";
import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { build as esbuildBuild } from "esbuild";
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ const RUNTIME_PLUGINS_WITH_MCP_SCHEMA_SERVER = new Set([
// FNXC:GrokAcp 2026-07-11-14:00: Grok ACP ships mcp-schema-server.cjs so
// session/new can forward executable Fusion fn_* tools to grok agent stdio.
"fusion-plugin-grok-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-claude-runtime",
// FNXC:OmpAcp 2026-07-14-00:05: OMP ACP ships the same bridge asset for fn_* tools.
"fusion-plugin-omp-runtime",
]);
@@ -245,6 +247,42 @@ async function bundlePluginEntry({ pluginId, srcDir, destDir, withMcpAsset = fal
cpSync(mcpServerAsset, join(destDir, "mcp-schema-server.cjs"));
}
if (pluginId === "fusion-plugin-claude-runtime") {
/*
* FNXC:ClaudeAcpRuntime 2026-07-18-12:30:
* A published CLI npm package is portable, while ACP's native binary is
* platform-specific. Do not bake the build host's binary into the staged
* plugin: stage the identity-pinned JS launcher and declare it as a CLI
* dependency so npm installs exactly the matching optional native package
* on every operator platform. The launcher resolves that package by name
* through the installed CLI's ancestor node_modules.
*/
const bridgeRequire = createRequire(join(srcDir, "package.json"));
const launcherPackageJson = bridgeRequire.resolve("claude-code-cli-acp/package.json");
const launcherSourceDir = dirname(launcherPackageJson);
const bridgeDest = join(destDir, "bridge");
const launcherDestDir = join(bridgeDest, "node_modules", "claude-code-cli-acp");
mkdirSync(launcherDestDir, { recursive: true });
cpSync(join(launcherSourceDir, "bin"), join(launcherDestDir, "bin"), { recursive: true });
cpSync(launcherPackageJson, join(launcherDestDir, "package.json"));
const bridgeWrapper = join(bridgeDest, `claude-code-cli-acp${process.platform === "win32" ? ".cmd" : ""}`);
if (process.platform === "win32") {
writeFileSync(bridgeWrapper, "@echo off\r\nnode \"%~dp0node_modules\\claude-code-cli-acp\\bin\\claude-code-cli-acp.js\" %*\r\n");
} else {
writeFileSync(
bridgeWrapper,
"#!/usr/bin/env node\nimport \"./node_modules/claude-code-cli-acp/bin/claude-code-cli-acp.js\";\n",
);
chmodSync(bridgeWrapper, 0o755);
}
if (!existsSync(join(launcherDestDir, "bin", "claude-code-cli-acp.js"))) {
throw new Error(`[tsup] Missing required Claude ACP launcher after staging`);
}
}
const bundledOutput = join(destDir, "bundled.js");
if (!existsSync(bundledOutput)) {
throw new Error(`[tsup] Missing bundled output for ${pluginId}: expected ${bundledOutput}`);

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import type { PluginStore } from "../plugin-store.js";
const DEPENDENCY_GRAPH_PLUGIN_ID = "fusion-plugin-dependency-graph";
const CURSOR_RUNTIME_PLUGIN_ID = "fusion-plugin-cursor-runtime";
const GROK_RUNTIME_PLUGIN_ID = "fusion-plugin-grok-runtime";
export const CLAUDE_RUNTIME_PLUGIN_ID = "fusion-plugin-claude-runtime";
export const BUNDLED_PLUGIN_IDS = [
"fusion-plugin-dependency-graph",
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ export const BUNDLED_PLUGIN_IDS = [
"fusion-plugin-paperclip-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-cursor-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-grok-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-claude-runtime",
// FNXC:OmpAcp 2026-07-11-23:35: Oh My Pi ACP runtime available as a staged/bundled install target.
"fusion-plugin-omp-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-cli-printing-press",

View File

@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@
"remark-gfm": "^4.0.1",
"unified": "^11.0.5",
"ws": "^8.18.0",
"zod": "^3.25.76"
"zod": "^3.25.76",
"@fusion-plugin-examples/claude-runtime": "workspace:*"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@testing-library/jest-dom": "^6.9.1",

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
/**
* Claude CLI discovery → model-picker mapping, behind a short-TTL,
* single-flight cache so `/api/models` never spawns the `claude` CLI per
* request.
*
* FNXC:ClaudeCli 2026-07-08-00:00:
* FN-7705: mirrors the landed Cursor picker cache (cursor-model-cache.ts,
* FN-7696) end to end. With the Claude Runtime plugin installed and the
* "Claude — via Claude CLI" provider toggle enabled (`useClaudeCli === true`),
* this module owns two contracts:
* 1. A deterministic discovery→model-id mapping (id = discovered id; name
* = label ?? id) so picker selections remain stable across requests.
* 2. A per-binaryPath TTL cache (default 60s) with single-flight
* de-duplication of concurrent in-flight fetches, so parallel
* `/api/models` requests spawn `claude` at most once per TTL window.
* A missing/failed/unavailable `claude` binary (ENOENT, non-zero exit,
* timeout, no API key configured) must degrade to an empty model list —
* never throw — so `/api/models` always returns HTTP 200 with existing rows
* intact. The empty result is cached briefly too, so a persistently-
* unavailable binary does not turn into a spawn-per-request storm. Claude has
* its own settings toggle (`useClaudeCli`); the toggle gate lives in the
* `/api/models` merge site (register-model-routes.ts), not in this module.
*/
import { discoverClaudeCliModels } from "./runtime-provider-probes.js";
/** Stable model-picker row shape emitted for a Claude-discovered model. */
export interface ClaudePickerModel {
provider: "claude-cli";
id: string;
name: string;
reasoning: boolean;
contextWindow: number;
}
/** The picker provider id used for all Claude-derived model rows. */
export const CLAUDE_PICKER_PROVIDER_ID = "claude-cli" as const;
/** Default cache TTL for Claude model discovery, in milliseconds. */
const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 60_000;
/**
* FNXC:ModelCatalog 2026-07-08-00:00:
* FN-7710: mirrors the Cursor picker cache's negative-TTL hardening
* (cursor-model-cache.ts). A transient cold-start empty/unavailable discovery result was
* previously cached for the full `DEFAULT_TTL_MS` (60s), same as a real successful result —
* so a first-load empty right after the provider is toggled on could persist for a minute.
* Empty/unavailable results now use this much shorter negative TTL so a transient cold-start
* empty self-heals quickly, while a non-empty successful discovery keeps the normal 60s TTL.
* Single-flight and never-throw/never-spawn-per-request guarantees are unchanged — only how
* long an empty result is trusted.
*/
const EMPTY_RESULT_TTL_MS = 5_000;
/**
* Map Claude CLI discovery output into the stable `/api/models` row shape.
*
* The discovered `id` is used as the stable model id. `name` falls back to
* `id` when no `label` is provided. `reasoning`/`contextWindow` default to
* `false`/`0` — the real `claude models` text output carries no such
* metadata today; this is pass-through only, never fabricated.
*
* Discovered entries that map to the same id are de-duplicated, keeping the
* first occurrence.
*/
export function claudeDiscoveryToModels(
models: ReadonlyArray<{ id: string; label?: string; reasoning?: boolean; contextWindow?: number }>,
): ClaudePickerModel[] {
const seen = new Set<string>();
const result: ClaudePickerModel[] = [];
for (const model of models) {
const id = model.id?.trim();
if (!id || seen.has(id)) continue;
seen.add(id);
result.push({
provider: CLAUDE_PICKER_PROVIDER_ID,
id,
name: model.label?.trim() || id,
reasoning: model.reasoning ?? false,
contextWindow: model.contextWindow ?? 0,
});
}
return result;
}
interface CacheEntry {
/** Timestamp (ms) at which this entry was populated. */
fetchedAt: number;
/** The resolved (possibly empty, on failure/unavailability) model list. */
models: ClaudePickerModel[];
/** The TTL that applies to this specific entry (short for empty results; see FN-7710). */
ttlMs: number;
}
/** Per-binaryPath cache of the most recently resolved Claude picker models. */
const cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();
/** Per-binaryPath in-flight fetch promise, for single-flight de-duplication. */
const inFlight = new Map<string, Promise<ClaudePickerModel[]>>();
/**
* Reset all cached/in-flight state. Test-only escape hatch — production code
* should never need this since entries expire naturally via TTL.
*/
export function __resetClaudePickerModelsCacheForTests(): void {
cache.clear();
inFlight.clear();
}
export interface GetClaudePickerModelsOptions {
/** Override the Claude CLI binary path. Defaults to `"claude"`. */
binaryPath?: string;
/** Cache TTL in milliseconds. Defaults to 60s. */
ttlMs?: number;
/** Injectable clock (ms epoch) for deterministic tests. Defaults to `Date.now`. */
now?: () => number;
}
/**
* Resolve the Claude CLI binary path: explicit override, then the bare
* `"claude"` command (resolved via PATH by the CLI spawn layer).
*/
function resolveBinaryPath(explicit?: string): string {
return explicit ?? "claude";
}
/**
* Fetch Claude CLI-discovered models for the model picker, behind a
* short-TTL, single-flight cache keyed by binary path.
*
* Never throws: a `discoverClaudeCliModels` failure or an unavailable-binary
* result (empty models + `fallbackUsed: true`) resolves to `[]`, which is
* itself cached briefly (same TTL) so a persistently-unavailable binary does
* not spawn the CLI on every call.
*/
export async function getClaudePickerModels(
opts?: GetClaudePickerModelsOptions,
): Promise<ClaudePickerModel[]> {
const binaryPath = resolveBinaryPath(opts?.binaryPath);
const ttlMs = opts?.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_TTL_MS;
const now = opts?.now ?? Date.now;
const nowMs = now();
const cached = cache.get(binaryPath);
if (cached && nowMs - cached.fetchedAt < cached.ttlMs) {
return cached.models;
}
const existingInFlight = inFlight.get(binaryPath);
if (existingInFlight) {
return existingInFlight;
}
const fetchPromise = (async (): Promise<ClaudePickerModel[]> => {
try {
const result = await discoverClaudeCliModels({ binaryPath });
if (!result || result.models.length === 0) {
return [];
}
return claudeDiscoveryToModels(result.models);
} catch {
// Degrade to zero Claude rows on any spawn/parse failure (ENOENT,
// non-zero exit, timeout, no API key configured) — never let a Claude
// error propagate into /api/models. See FNXC:ClaudeCli comment above.
return [];
}
})();
inFlight.set(binaryPath, fetchPromise);
try {
const models = await fetchPromise;
// FN-7710: empty/unavailable results use a short negative TTL so a
// transient cold-start empty self-heals quickly instead of persisting
// for the full 60s TTL (see FNXC:ModelCatalog comment above).
const effectiveTtlMs = models.length === 0 ? EMPTY_RESULT_TTL_MS : ttlMs;
cache.set(binaryPath, { fetchedAt: now(), models, ttlMs: effectiveTtlMs });
return models;
} finally {
inFlight.delete(binaryPath);
}
}

View File

@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ const BUNDLED_PLUGIN_IDS = new Set([
"fusion-plugin-paperclip-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-cursor-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-grok-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-claude-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-omp-runtime",
"fusion-plugin-cli-printing-press",
"fusion-plugin-compound-engineering",

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import type { CustomProvider } from "@fusion/core";
import { ApiError } from "../api-error.js";
import { getCursorPickerModels, CURSOR_PICKER_PROVIDER_ID } from "../cursor-model-cache.js";
import { getGrokPickerModels, GROK_PICKER_PROVIDER_ID } from "../grok-model-cache.js";
import { getClaudePickerModels, CLAUDE_PICKER_PROVIDER_ID } from "../claude-model-cache.js";
import { getOmpPickerModels, OMP_PICKER_PROVIDER_ID } from "../omp-model-cache.js";
import { getHermesPickerModels, HERMES_PICKER_PROVIDER_ID } from "../hermes-model-cache.js";
import type { AuthStorageLike } from "../routes.js";
@@ -394,6 +395,15 @@ export const registerModelRoutes: ApiRouteRegistrar = (ctx) => {
so an existing row always wins over a colliding Grok row — purely
additive, must never displace, overwrite, or filter out an existing row.
*/
if (useClaudeCli) {
try {
for (const model of await getClaudePickerModels()) {
const key = `${model.provider}/${model.id}`;
if (!seenModelKeys.has(key)) { seenModelKeys.add(key); models.push(model); }
}
} catch (error: unknown) { runtimeLogger.child("models").warn(`Failed to load claude-cli models: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`); }
}
if (useGrokCli) {
// getGrokPickerModels never throws by contract (see
// grok-model-cache.ts), but this try/catch is a defensive belt so a
@@ -452,6 +462,7 @@ export const registerModelRoutes: ApiRouteRegistrar = (ctx) => {
*/
const configuredProviders = await getConfiguredProviderNames(options?.authStorage);
if (useClaudeCli) configuredProviders.add("pi-claude-cli");
if (useClaudeCli) configuredProviders.add(CLAUDE_PICKER_PROVIDER_ID);
if (useDroidCli) configuredProviders.add("droid-cli");
if (useLlamaCpp) configuredProviders.add("llama-server");
// FNXC:ModelCatalog 2026-07-08-00:05 (FN-7696): allow-list "cursor-cli"

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@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ import {
type GrokBinaryStatus,
} from "@fusion-plugin-examples/grok-runtime";
import {
discoverClaudeProviderModels,
probeClaudeBinary,
type ClaudeBinaryStatus,
} from "@fusion-plugin-examples/claude-runtime";
/*
FNXC:OmpAcp 2026-07-13-22:50:
Oh My Pi (omp) ACP runtime probe façade — same boundary as Grok/Cursor so route handlers and tests mock here without importing the plugin package directly.
@@ -72,6 +78,7 @@ export type {
OpenClawBinaryStatus,
CursorBinaryStatus,
GrokBinaryStatus,
ClaudeBinaryStatus,
OmpBinaryStatus,
PaperclipAgentSummary,
PaperclipCliDiscoveryResult,
@@ -88,6 +95,14 @@ export async function probeGrokCliProvider(opts?: { binaryPath?: string }): Prom
return probeGrokBinary(opts);
}
export async function probeClaudeCliProvider(opts?: { binaryPath?: string }): Promise<ClaudeBinaryStatus> {
return probeClaudeBinary(opts);
}
export async function discoverClaudeCliModels(opts?: { binaryPath?: string; timeoutMs?: number }) {
return discoverClaudeProviderModels(opts);
}
/*
FNXC:OmpAcp 2026-07-11-23:35:
Oh My Pi (omp) ACP runtime probe façade — same boundary pattern as Grok/Cursor so

View File

@@ -596,6 +596,10 @@ export default defineConfig({
__dirname,
"../../plugins/fusion-plugin-grok-runtime/src/index.ts",
),
"@fusion-plugin-examples/claude-runtime": resolve(
__dirname,
"../../plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/src/index.ts",
),
/*
FNXC:OmpAcp 2026-07-11-23:35:
runtime-provider-probes.ts imports probeOmpBinary from @fusion-plugin-examples/omp-runtime.

View File

@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ export const DASHBOARD_RUNTIME_PLUGIN_PACKAGES = [
"plugins/fusion-plugin-paperclip-runtime",
"plugins/fusion-plugin-cursor-runtime",
"plugins/fusion-plugin-grok-runtime",
"plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime",
"plugins/fusion-plugin-omp-runtime",
"plugins/fusion-plugin-droid-runtime",
"plugins/fusion-plugin-roadmap",

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
# Claude Runtime Plugin
`fusion-plugin-claude-runtime` exposes Claude Code as Fusion runtime `claude` and CLI provider `claude-cli`. It communicates through Agent Client Protocol (ACP), preserving streaming updates, tool calls, and multi-turn sessions.
The plugin uses the pinned `claude-code-cli-acp` bridge (`0.1.1`). CLI packaging stages its reviewed launcher beside the bundled plugin, while the published `@runfusion/fusion` dependency installs the matching optional native bridge for the operator's OS and CPU. The runtime never falls back to a same-named executable on `PATH`.
This is additive to Fusion's experimental `pi-claude-cli` Route A. Route A remains available; selecting the `claude` runtime explicitly selects this first-class ACP transport.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{"id":"fusion-plugin-claude-runtime","name":"Claude Runtime Plugin","version":"0.1.0","description":"Provides Claude Code model provider and runtime integration over ACP"}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{"name":"@fusion-plugin-examples/claude-runtime","version":"0.1.0","type":"module","description":"Claude Code runtime plugin for Fusion (ACP bridge)","keywords":["fusion-plugin","claude","acp","agent-client-protocol","runtime"],"exports":{".":{"types":"./src/index.ts","source":"./src/index.ts","import":"./dist/index.js"},"./probe":{"types":"./src/probe.ts","source":"./src/probe.ts","import":"./dist/probe.js"}},"private":true,"scripts":{"build":"tsc","test":"vitest run --silent=passed-only --reporter=dot"},"dependencies":{"@agentclientprotocol/sdk":"0.24.0","@fusion/core":"workspace:*","@fusion/plugin-sdk":"workspace:*","claude-code-cli-acp":"0.1.1"},"peerDependencies":{"@earendil-works/pi-ai":"*","@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent":"*"},"devDependencies":{"@types/node":"^25.5.2","typescript":"^5.7.0","vitest":"^4.1.0"}}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { bundledClaudeBridgeBinPath, resolveBundledClaudeBridgeBinary } from "../cli-spawn.js";
describe("staged Claude bridge resolver", () => { it("only accepts an identity-pinned bridge beneath its plugin root", () => { const root="/tmp/plugin"; const path=bundledClaudeBridgeBinPath(root); expect(resolveBundledClaudeBridgeBinary({pluginRoot:root,exists:(candidate)=>candidate===path})).toMatchObject({kind:"resolved",path}); }); it("does not fall back to PATH", () => expect(resolveBundledClaudeBridgeBinary({pluginRoot:"/tmp/plugin",exists:()=>false}).kind).toBe("not_resolved")); });

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import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import plugin from "../index.js";
describe("Claude runtime plugin", () => { it("registers Claude runtime and provider ids", () => { expect(plugin.manifest.id).toBe("fusion-plugin-claude-runtime"); expect(plugin.runtime?.metadata.runtimeId).toBe("claude"); expect(plugin.cliProviders?.[0]?.providerId).toBe("claude-cli"); }); });

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import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
vi.mock("../probe.js", () => ({ probeClaudeBinary: vi.fn() }));
import { probeClaudeBinary } from "../probe.js";
import { discoverClaudeProviderModels } from "../provider.js";
describe("discoverClaudeProviderModels", () => {
it("returns qualified provider-safe Claude ids when bridge is available", async () => { vi.mocked(probeClaudeBinary).mockResolvedValue({ available:true, probeDurationMs:1 }); const result=await discoverClaudeProviderModels(); expect(result.models.map((m)=>m.id)).toContain("claude-sonnet-4-20250514"); expect(result.fallbackUsed).toBe(false); });
it("degrades to empty fallback when the bridge is unavailable", async () => { vi.mocked(probeClaudeBinary).mockResolvedValue({ available:false, reason:"missing", probeDurationMs:1 }); await expect(discoverClaudeProviderModels()).resolves.toMatchObject({models:[],fallbackUsed:true,reason:"missing"}); });
});

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import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { ClaudeRuntimeAdapter } from "../runtime-adapter.js";
const options={cwd:"/tmp",systemPrompt:"",onText:vi.fn()};
describe("ClaudeRuntimeAdapter", () => {
it("returns a visible diagnostic instead of rejecting on ACP create failure", async () => { const adapter=new ClaudeRuntimeAdapter({createAcpAdapter:()=>({createSession:async()=>{throw new Error("bridge unavailable")},promptWithFallback:async()=>undefined,describeModel:()=>"claude/default"})}); const result=await adapter.createSession(options); expect(result.session.state.errorMessage).toContain("Claude ACP failed"); expect(options.onText).toHaveBeenCalled(); });
it("returns a visible diagnostic for follow-up prompts without a live connection", async () => { const adapter=new ClaudeRuntimeAdapter({createAcpAdapter:()=>({createSession:async()=>{throw new Error("bridge unavailable")},promptWithFallback:async()=>undefined,describeModel:()=>"claude/default"})}); const {session}=await adapter.createSession(options); await adapter.promptWithFallback(session,"again"); expect(options.onText).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(expect.stringContaining("no live connection")); });
});

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import { request } from "node:http";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { startFusionToolBridge } from "../tool-bridge.js";
function bridgeEnv(bridge: NonNullable<Awaited<ReturnType<typeof startFusionToolBridge>>>, name: string): string {
if (!("env" in bridge.mcpServer)) throw new Error("custom tool bridge must use stdio MCP");
const value = bridge.mcpServer.env.find((entry) => entry.name === name)?.value;
if (!value) throw new Error(`missing ${name}`);
return value;
}
async function post(url: string, body: string, token?: string): Promise<{ status: number; body: string }> {
const target = new URL("/tool-call", url);
return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const req = request(
{
hostname: target.hostname,
port: target.port,
path: target.pathname,
method: "POST",
headers: {
"content-type": "application/json",
"content-length": Buffer.byteLength(body),
...(token ? { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : {}),
},
},
(res) => {
let response = "";
res.setEncoding("utf8");
res.on("data", (chunk) => (response += chunk));
res.on("end", () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, body: response }));
},
);
req.once("error", reject);
req.end(body);
});
}
describe("startFusionToolBridge", () => {
it("requires a session capability and action-gate authorization before executing a custom tool", async () => {
const execute = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ text: "done" });
const bridge = await startFusionToolBridge(
[{ name: "fn_task_update", execute }],
{ actionGateContext: { permissionPolicy: { rules: { task_agent_mutation: "allow" } } }, allowUnrestricted: true },
);
expect(bridge).not.toBeNull();
if (!bridge) return;
const url = bridgeEnv(bridge, "FUSION_GROK_TOOL_BRIDGE_URL");
const token = bridgeEnv(bridge, "FUSION_TOOL_BRIDGE_CAPABILITY");
try {
expect((await post(url, JSON.stringify({ name: "fn_task_update" }))).status).toBe(401);
expect(execute).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
const response = await post(url, JSON.stringify({ name: "fn_task_update", arguments: { step: 1 } }), token);
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(execute).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
} finally {
await bridge.dispose();
}
});
it("default-denies when no action policy is available and bounds request bodies", async () => {
const execute = vi.fn();
const bridge = await startFusionToolBridge([{ name: "fn_task_update", execute }]);
expect(bridge).not.toBeNull();
if (!bridge) return;
const url = bridgeEnv(bridge, "FUSION_GROK_TOOL_BRIDGE_URL");
const token = bridgeEnv(bridge, "FUSION_TOOL_BRIDGE_CAPABILITY");
try {
expect((await post(url, JSON.stringify({ name: "fn_task_update" }), token)).status).toBe(403);
expect(execute).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect((await post(url, "x".repeat(1_048_577), token)).status).toBe(413);
} finally {
await bridge.dispose();
}
});
});

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import { resolveBundledClaudeBridgeBinary } from "./cli-spawn.js";
/** Only minimal login/path context crosses the untrusted ACP subprocess boundary. */
export const CLAUDE_ACP_ENV_ALLOWLIST = ["HOME", "PATH", "USER", "SHELL", "LANG", "LC_ALL", "TERM", "TMPDIR", "XDG_CONFIG_HOME", "XDG_CACHE_HOME"] as const;
export function normalizeClaudeCliModel(model: string | undefined): string | undefined {
const value=model?.trim(); if (!value) return undefined;
for (const prefix of ["claude-cli/", "claude/"]) if (value.startsWith(prefix)) return value.slice(prefix.length).trim() || undefined;
return value;
}
export function modelForCli(model: string | undefined): string | undefined { const value=normalizeClaudeCliModel(model); return value === "default" ? undefined : value; }
/** Builds settings for the pinned bridge, never a same-named PATH executable. */
export function buildClaudeAcpRuntimeSettings(options: { model?: string; pluginDirs?: string[]; binary?: string } = {}): Record<string, unknown> {
const bridge=options.binary ? {kind:"resolved" as const,path:options.binary} : resolveBundledClaudeBridgeBinary();
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-18-11:45:
Claude is an untrusted ACP subprocess. Do not silently acknowledge unrestricted
sensitive operations: the action gate must require approval unless an operator
explicitly opts in through a supported setting.
*/
return {acpBinaryPath: bridge.path ?? "", acpArgs: [], acpModel: options.model ?? "claude/default", acpEnvAllowList:[...CLAUDE_ACP_ENV_ALLOWLIST], acpFsRead:false, acpFsWrite:false, acpAllowUnrestricted:false, pluginDirs:options.pluginDirs ?? [], binaryResolution:bridge};
}

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# Vendored ACP client
**Source:** `plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src/` (Fusion ACP runtime plugin)
**Vendored:** 2026-07-11 for Grok ACP self-containment
## Why
`fusion-plugin-grok-runtime` is a **bundled, auto-installed** runtime.
`fusion-plugin-acp-runtime` is **experimental / on-demand**. Importing the latter at runtime would couple Grok availability to the ACP plugin install path and drag Claude-bridge packaging into Grok.
## What is copied
Client-side ACP only:
| Module | Role |
| --- | --- |
| `runtime-adapter.ts` | `AgentRuntime` lifecycle |
| `provider.ts` | connect / session / authenticate / prompt |
| `process-manager.ts` | spawn env allow-list + SIGKILL registry |
| `event-bridge.ts` | `session/update` → Fusion callbacks |
| `control-handler.ts` | permission floor |
| `fs-capabilities.ts` / `path-jail.ts` | optional client fs |
| `cli-spawn.ts` | settings resolution |
| `prompt-builder.ts`, `sanitize.ts`, `tool-mapping.ts`, `types.ts` | support |
**Not** copied: plugin `index.ts`, Claude bridge setup, generic ACP probe/setup UI.
## Syncing
When fixing ACP client bugs in `fusion-plugin-acp-runtime`, re-copy the modules above into this directory (or cherry-pick the same change) and note the date in FNXC comments.

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// Resolves the ACP agent launch configuration from plugin settings.
//
// Unlike the Claude/Droid CLIs (one fixed binary per plugin), ACP is a protocol:
// the user points this runtime at *any* ACP-compatible agent binary plus the
// flag that puts it in ACP mode (e.g. `gemini --acp`). Settings therefore carry
// an arbitrary binary + args, plus the conservative-by-default fs capability
// toggles (KTD6: writes default OFF) and an env allow-list (KTD6b).
import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, resolve } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
export const CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY = "claude-code-cli-acp";
export interface AcpBinaryResolution {
kind: "resolved" | "not_resolved";
requested: string;
path?: string;
reason?: string;
}
export interface AcpCliSettings {
/** Agent binary to spawn (e.g. "gemini", "npx", an absolute path). */
binaryPath: string;
/** Arguments that launch the agent in ACP/stdio mode (e.g. ["--acp"]). */
args: string[];
/** Optional model identifier reported via describeModel. */
model?: string;
/** Advertise `fs/read_text_file` capability. Default: false (opt-in). */
fsRead: boolean;
/** Advertise `fs/write_text_file` capability. Default: false (opt-in, KTD6). */
fsWrite: boolean;
/**
* Environment variables to forward to the agent subprocess (KTD6b allow-list).
* The agent is untrusted; inherited `process.env` is NOT forwarded. Empty by
* default — callers opt specific vars in by name.
*/
envAllowList: string[];
/** Env allow-list entries that must be present before spawning this profile. */
requiredEnv: string[];
/**
* Risk S1 acknowledgement. The shipped default permission policy is
* `unrestricted` (every category → allow). Because the ACP agent is an
* untrusted subprocess, the permission floor refuses to auto-approve a
* *sensitive* category on a blanket `allow` disposition unless the user has
* explicitly acknowledged that risk by setting this true — otherwise such
* calls are escalated to approval (or denied when no approver exists).
* Default: false (safe).
*/
allowUnrestricted: boolean;
/** Bundled bridge resolution status when `acpBinaryPath` asks for it. */
binaryResolution?: AcpBinaryResolution;
/**
* FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-15:00:
* When set, call ACP authenticate after initialize (Claude headless scripting
* contract). preferMethods are tried in order against advertised authMethods.
*/
authenticate?: {
preferMethods?: string[];
methodId?: string;
meta?: Record<string, unknown>;
require?: boolean;
};
}
function asTrimmedString(value: unknown): string | undefined {
return typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0 ? value.trim() : undefined;
}
function asStringArray(value: unknown): string[] | undefined {
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;
const out = value.filter((v): v is string => typeof v === "string");
return out.length === value.length ? out : undefined;
}
function asBool(value: unknown): boolean {
return value === true;
}
function pluginRootDir(): string {
return resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..");
}
export interface ResolveBundledClaudeBridgeOptions {
pluginRoot?: string;
exists?: (path: string) => boolean;
}
export function bundledClaudeBridgeBinPath(pluginRoot = pluginRootDir()): string {
const extension = process.platform === "win32" ? ".cmd" : "";
return join(pluginRoot, "node_modules", ".bin", `${CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY}${extension}`);
}
export function resolveBundledClaudeBridgeBinary(
options: ResolveBundledClaudeBridgeOptions = {},
): AcpBinaryResolution {
const root = options.pluginRoot ?? pluginRootDir();
const exists = options.exists ?? existsSync;
const candidate = bundledClaudeBridgeBinPath(root);
/*
FNXC:ACP-RouteB 2026-06-14-19:47:
The Claude ACP bridge is a pinned plugin dependency, not a PATH-selected executable. Resolve the sentinel to the plugin-owned node_modules/.bin shim so a same-named global binary cannot replace the reviewed bridge.
*/
if (!exists(candidate)) {
return {
kind: "not_resolved",
requested: CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY,
path: candidate,
reason: `Bundled ${CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY} binary was not found at ${candidate}`,
};
}
if (!isAbsolute(candidate)) {
return {
kind: "not_resolved",
requested: CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY,
path: candidate,
reason: `Bundled ${CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY} path is not absolute`,
};
}
return { kind: "resolved", requested: CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY, path: candidate };
}
export function resolveCliSettings(settings?: Record<string, unknown>): AcpCliSettings {
const requestedBinaryPath = asTrimmedString(settings?.acpBinaryPath);
let binaryPath = requestedBinaryPath ?? "acp-agent";
let binaryResolution: AcpBinaryResolution | undefined;
if (requestedBinaryPath === CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY) {
binaryResolution = resolveBundledClaudeBridgeBinary();
if (binaryResolution.kind === "resolved" && binaryResolution.path) {
binaryPath = binaryResolution.path;
}
}
const args = asStringArray(settings?.acpArgs) ?? [];
const model = asTrimmedString(settings?.acpModel);
const fsRead = asBool(settings?.acpFsRead);
const fsWrite = asBool(settings?.acpFsWrite);
const envAllowList = asStringArray(settings?.acpEnvAllowList) ?? [];
const allowUnrestricted = asBool(settings?.acpAllowUnrestricted);
const authenticate = asAuthenticateSettings(settings?.acpAuthenticate);
return {
binaryPath,
args,
model,
fsRead,
fsWrite,
envAllowList,
requiredEnv: [],
allowUnrestricted,
binaryResolution,
authenticate,
};
}
function asAuthenticateSettings(value: unknown): AcpCliSettings["authenticate"] {
if (value === true) {
return { preferMethods: ["xai.api_key", "cached_token"], meta: { headless: true }, require: true };
}
if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;
const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;
const preferMethods = asStringArray(obj.preferMethods);
const methodId = asTrimmedString(obj.methodId);
const meta =
obj.meta && typeof obj.meta === "object" && !Array.isArray(obj.meta)
? (obj.meta as Record<string, unknown>)
: { headless: true };
const require = obj.require === true;
if (!preferMethods && !methodId && !require) return undefined;
return {
...(preferMethods ? { preferMethods } : {}),
...(methodId ? { methodId } : {}),
meta,
require,
};
}
export function resolveClaudeBridgeAskSettings(settings?: Record<string, unknown>): AcpCliSettings {
const resolved = resolveCliSettings({
...settings,
acpBinaryPath: CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY,
acpArgs: [],
acpFsRead: false,
acpFsWrite: false,
acpEnvAllowList: ["HOME", "PATH"],
acpAllowUnrestricted: false,
});
return { ...resolved, requiredEnv: ["HOME"] };
}

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// U5 — the SECURITY FLOOR for `session/request_permission`.
//
// The ACP agent is an UNTRUSTED subprocess. When it asks permission to run a
// tool call, this resolver classifies the call PER-CATEGORY against Fusion's
// live action gate and answers `allow_once` / `reject_once` / `cancelled`.
//
// Why per-category and not per-preset (S1 / KTD3a): Fusion's shipped default
// policy preset is `unrestricted` (every category → allow). Mapping a preset id
// straight to an outcome would auto-approve EVERY tool call of an untrusted
// agent the instant a user selects the ACP runtime. So we classify the call's
// `kind` into a Fusion category and read `gate.permissionPolicy.rules[category]`.
//
// Default-deny is the floor everywhere a decision can't be made safely:
// - no gate / no permissionPolicy → deny
// - an unmappable / missing / `other` kind → deny (most-restrictive)
// - `require-approval` with no HITL machinery → deny
// - the `allow_once` option isn't offered → reject (never `*_always`, S2)
import type {
PermissionOption,
RequestPermissionResponse,
ToolCallUpdate,
ToolKind,
} from "@agentclientprotocol/sdk";
import type {
ApprovalStatus,
FusionCategory,
GateDisposition,
PermissionGate,
} from "./types.js";
/** Sentinel returned by `classifyToolKind` for an unmappable kind → force deny. */
export const DENY = "deny" as const;
/**
* Map an ACP `toolCall.kind` to a Fusion action-gate category (KTD3a).
*
* Read-only / benign kinds map to the implicit `exempt` category (always allow).
* `other`, `undefined`, and any unknown kind map to the `DENY` sentinel — the
* most-restrictive outcome — and MUST NOT fall through to allow.
*/
export function classifyToolKind(kind: ToolKind | null | undefined): FusionCategory | "exempt" | typeof DENY {
switch (kind) {
case "execute":
return "command_execution";
case "edit":
case "delete":
case "move":
return "file_write_delete";
case "fetch":
return "network_api";
case "read":
case "search":
case "think":
case "switch_mode":
return "exempt";
// "other", undefined, null, or anything unknown → most-restrictive deny.
default:
return DENY;
}
}
/**
* Select the ACP option to answer with, honoring the allow_once-ONLY rule (S2).
*
* - `allow` → an option whose `kind === "allow_once"`. Never `allow_always`
* (delegating a blanket grant to untrusted code loses Fusion's per-call
* interception). If no `allow_once` option is offered → fall back to deny.
* - `deny` → an option whose `kind === "reject_once"`. If none is offered the
* caller answers `{ outcome: "cancelled" }`. Never `reject_always`.
*/
export function selectOption(
decision: "allow" | "deny",
options: PermissionOption[],
): { decision: "allow" | "deny"; optionId?: string } {
const list = Array.isArray(options) ? options : [];
if (decision === "allow") {
const allowOnce = list.find((o) => o?.kind === "allow_once");
if (allowOnce?.optionId) return { decision: "allow", optionId: allowOnce.optionId };
// No allow_once offered: do NOT up-grade to allow_always. Fall back to deny.
const rejectOnce = list.find((o) => o?.kind === "reject_once");
return { decision: "deny", optionId: rejectOnce?.optionId };
}
const rejectOnce = list.find((o) => o?.kind === "reject_once");
return { decision: "deny", optionId: rejectOnce?.optionId };
}
/** Build the ACP response for a resolved {decision, optionId}. */
function buildResponse(sel: {
decision: "allow" | "deny";
optionId?: string;
}): RequestPermissionResponse {
if (sel.optionId) {
return { outcome: { outcome: "selected", optionId: sel.optionId } };
}
// No usable option (e.g. deny with no reject_once offered) → cancelled.
return { outcome: { outcome: "cancelled" } };
}
/**
* Read the raw per-category disposition from the live policy (exempt → allow),
* before the Risk S1 acknowledgement escalation. Callers that gate untrusted
* actions should use `effectiveDisposition` (which applies the escalation); this
* is the unescalated primitive it builds on.
*/
export function dispositionFor(
category: FusionCategory | "exempt",
gate: PermissionGate,
): GateDisposition {
if (category === "exempt") return "allow";
const rules = gate.permissionPolicy?.rules;
const disposition = rules?.[category];
// A category with no explicit rule is treated as require-approval (not allow):
// never silently allow an unmapped category for an untrusted agent.
return disposition ?? "require-approval";
}
/** A stable dedupe key for an identical tool call (decision reuse). */
function dedupeKeyFor(toolCall: ToolCallUpdate, category: string): string {
return [toolCall.toolCallId ?? "", category, toolCall.title ?? ""].join("|");
}
/**
* Run the human-in-the-loop approval flow for a `require-approval` category.
*
* Requires `createApprovalRequest` (the one non-optional HITL closure). When it
* is absent there is no human channel → DEFAULT-DENY (never throw, never allow).
*
* Flow: reuse a prior decision via `findApprovalByDedupeKey` when present;
* otherwise register the request, block on `pauseForApproval`, re-read the final
* status, finalize via `markApprovalCompleted`. `approved` → allow; everything
* else (denied / pending / completed / lookup-failure) → deny.
*/
async function runApproval(
toolCall: ToolCallUpdate,
category: FusionCategory,
gate: PermissionGate,
): Promise<"allow" | "deny"> {
return runApprovalForCategory(gate, {
category,
toolName: toolCall.title ?? category,
dedupeKey: dedupeKeyFor(toolCall, category),
args:
toolCall.rawInput && typeof toolCall.rawInput === "object"
? (toolCall.rawInput as Record<string, unknown>)
: {},
});
}
/**
* Run the HITL approval flow for an arbitrary `require-approval` action,
* identified by a category + dedupe key (not necessarily an ACP `toolCall`).
*
* Exported so the fs `writeTextFile` path (U7) routes its `file_write_delete`
* gating through the IDENTICAL approval machinery as U5 — register, block on
* `pauseForApproval`, re-read the final status, finalize — with the same
* default-deny floor when no human channel exists. Never throws, never allows
* on failure.
*/
export async function runApprovalForCategory(
gate: PermissionGate,
req: {
category: FusionCategory;
toolName: string;
dedupeKey: string;
args?: Record<string, unknown>;
},
): Promise<"allow" | "deny"> {
const { category, dedupeKey } = req;
if (typeof gate.createApprovalRequest !== "function") {
// No human channel available → default-deny.
return "deny";
}
const decisionPayload = {
disposition: "require-approval" as const,
category,
toolName: req.toolName,
approvalDedupeKey: dedupeKey,
};
const mapStatus = (status: ApprovalStatus | undefined): "allow" | "deny" =>
status === "approved" ? "allow" : "deny";
try {
// Reuse a prior decision for an identical call when available.
if (typeof gate.findApprovalByDedupeKey === "function") {
const prior = await gate.findApprovalByDedupeKey(dedupeKey);
if (prior && (prior.status === "approved" || prior.status === "denied")) {
return mapStatus(prior.status);
}
}
// Default-deny BEFORE creating a request when the HITL round-trip cannot
// complete: without `pauseForApproval` we cannot block for a decision, and
// without `findApprovalByDedupeKey` we cannot READ the decision after the
// pause — a human approval would be silently discarded (mapStatus(undefined)
// → deny). Denying upfront never orphans a pending record and never wastes
// a human's approval on an outcome that would be denied anyway.
if (
typeof gate.pauseForApproval !== "function" ||
typeof gate.findApprovalByDedupeKey !== "function"
) {
return "deny";
}
const created = (await gate.createApprovalRequest(
decisionPayload,
req.args ?? {},
)) as { id?: string } | undefined;
const approvalRequestId = typeof created?.id === "string" ? created.id : dedupeKey;
await gate.pauseForApproval({ approvalRequestId, decision: decisionPayload });
// Re-read the final status after the pause resolves.
let finalStatus: ApprovalStatus | undefined;
if (typeof gate.findApprovalByDedupeKey === "function") {
const resolved = await gate.findApprovalByDedupeKey(dedupeKey);
finalStatus = resolved?.status;
}
if (typeof gate.markApprovalCompleted === "function") {
await gate.markApprovalCompleted(approvalRequestId);
}
return mapStatus(finalStatus);
} catch {
// Any HITL failure (timeout/dismiss/store error) → default-deny, no throw.
return "deny";
}
}
/**
* The full per-call security floor: classify → read the per-category
* disposition → run HITL for `require-approval` → select an `allow_once`-only
* option → build the ACP response.
*
* Default-deny on: missing gate, missing `permissionPolicy`, unmappable kind,
* `require-approval` without a resolvable approver, or a missing `allow_once`
* option.
*/
export interface ResolvePermissionOptions {
/**
* Risk S1 acknowledgement. When false (the safe default), a blanket `allow`
* disposition on a *sensitive* category is escalated to `require-approval`
* rather than auto-approved — so the shipped `unrestricted` default policy
* does not silently green-light an untrusted agent's command/file/network
* calls. The user opts out of the escalation by acknowledging the risk.
*/
allowUnrestricted?: boolean;
}
/**
* Per-category disposition with the Risk S1 acknowledgement escalation applied:
* a *sensitive* category the policy would `allow` is upgraded to
* `require-approval` unless `allowUnrestricted` is set. `exempt` (read-only)
* never escalates. Exported so the fs write path applies the identical rule.
*/
export function effectiveDisposition(
category: FusionCategory | "exempt",
gate: PermissionGate,
opts?: ResolvePermissionOptions,
): GateDisposition {
const disposition = dispositionFor(category, gate);
if (disposition === "allow" && category !== "exempt" && opts?.allowUnrestricted !== true) {
return "require-approval";
}
return disposition;
}
export async function resolvePermission(
toolCall: ToolCallUpdate,
options: PermissionOption[],
gate: PermissionGate | undefined,
opts?: ResolvePermissionOptions,
): Promise<RequestPermissionResponse> {
// No gate / no policy → default-deny.
if (!gate || !gate.permissionPolicy) {
return buildResponse(selectOption("deny", options));
}
const category = classifyToolKind(toolCall?.kind);
// Unmappable / missing / `other` kind → most-restrictive deny.
if (category === DENY) {
return buildResponse(selectOption("deny", options));
}
// Per-category disposition + S1 acknowledgement escalation.
const disposition = effectiveDisposition(category, gate, opts);
if (disposition === "allow") {
return buildResponse(selectOption("allow", options));
}
if (disposition === "block") {
return buildResponse(selectOption("deny", options));
}
// require-approval → HITL (or default-deny when no human channel exists).
const decision = await runApproval(toolCall, category as FusionCategory, gate);
return buildResponse(selectOption(decision, options));
}

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// Event bridge: translate ACP `session/update` notifications into Fusion's
// `AgentRuntime` callbacks (onText / onThinking / onToolStart / onToolEnd) so an
// ACP agent renders identically to existing runtimes.
//
// Scope (U4): mapping only. Output BYTE bounds + string sanitization are U6 — no
// caps are applied here. Permission requests are U5.
//
// Design notes:
// - Tolerant: every field except the `sessionUpdate` discriminator and
// `toolCallId` is optional/partial. The handler NEVER throws on a malformed or
// partial update; unknown/forward-compat tags are ignored silently.
// - Tool start/end correlation: a `tool_call` records `{ title, kind }` keyed by
// `toolCallId`; a later `tool_call_update` carries that metadata forward when
// the update omits it, then fires `onToolEnd` once the status reaches a
// terminal value (`completed` / `failed`).
// - Plans are FULL REPLACEMENTS: each `plan` (or `plan_update`) update replaces
// the prior snapshot wholesale; we never accumulate across updates.
import type {
SessionUpdate,
ContentBlock,
ToolKind,
PlanEntry,
} from "@agentclientprotocol/sdk";
import type { AcpCallbacks } from "./types.js";
import { toolDisplayName, normalizeToolArgs } from "./tool-mapping.js";
import { stripControlSequences, boundString, boundIdentifier } from "./sanitize.js";
// --- U6 untrusted-input bounds (Risk S5) -----------------------------------
//
// The agent is untrusted input. The high inactivity ceiling (KTD4) does NOT
// bound an *actively* flooding agent, so the bridge caps what it forwards.
/**
* Per-turn cumulative cap (chars) on forwarded text+thinking. Once exceeded, the
* bridge stops forwarding further text/thinking and emits ONE truncation flag.
* Cleared by `reset()` at the start of each prompt turn. ~5M chars ≈ 5 MB.
*/
export const PER_TURN_OUTPUT_CAP_CHARS = 5_000_000;
/** Per-chunk cap (chars) applied to a single content chunk before forwarding. */
export const PER_CHUNK_CAP_CHARS = 64_000;
/**
* Max number of distinct `toolCallId`s tracked in the correlation map. A flooding
* agent supplying unbounded unique ids must not grow the map without limit —
* oldest entries are evicted once the cap is exceeded (bounded memory).
*/
export const TOOL_CALL_MAP_CAP = 1000;
/**
* Max plan entries formatted into the plan log line. Entry size is bounded in
* formatPlan; this bounds the COUNT so one plan event cannot bypass the
* per-turn output budget with thousands of 64KB entries (Risk S5).
*/
export const MAX_PLAN_ENTRIES = 100;
/** Tracked metadata for an in-flight tool call, keyed by `toolCallId`. */
interface TrackedToolCall {
title?: string | null;
kind?: ToolKind | null;
/** Whether onToolEnd has already fired (terminal status seen). */
ended: boolean;
}
export interface EventBridge {
/** Process one `session/update` payload (`params.update`). Never throws. */
handleSessionUpdate(update: SessionUpdate): void;
/** Clear per-turn correlation state (tool calls, plan snapshot, last text). */
reset(): void;
}
/** Extract plain text from a `ContentBlock`, or `undefined` for non-text blocks. */
function extractText(content: ContentBlock | undefined): string | undefined {
if (content && content.type === "text" && typeof content.text === "string") {
return content.text;
}
return undefined;
}
/**
* Repair the specific "sentence punctuation + capitalized next sentence" case
* where an agent splits adjacent sentences across chunks without the separating
* space. Mirrors the droid runtime's `normalizeStreamingDelta` — conservative so
* code, domains, and lowercase continuations are left untouched.
*/
function normalizeStreamingDelta(previousText: string, nextDelta: string): string {
if (!previousText || !nextDelta) return nextDelta;
const previousChar = previousText.slice(-1);
const nextChar = nextDelta[0] ?? "";
if (/\s/.test(previousChar) || /\s/.test(nextChar)) return nextDelta;
if (/[.!?]/.test(previousChar) && /[A-Z0-9"'([]/.test(nextChar)) {
return ` ${nextDelta}`;
}
return nextDelta;
}
/** Format a plan snapshot into a single thinking/log line. */
function formatPlan(entries: PlanEntry[]): string {
const lines = entries.map((entry) => {
const status = typeof entry.status === "string" ? entry.status : "pending";
// Plan text is agent-supplied — sanitize control/ANSI before it reaches a
// log/UI line (Risk S7) and bound its length (Risk S5).
const rawText = typeof entry.content === "string" ? entry.content : "";
const text = boundString(stripControlSequences(rawText), PER_CHUNK_CAP_CHARS);
return `- [${stripControlSequences(status)}] ${text}`;
});
return `Plan:\n${lines.join("\n")}`;
}
export function createEventBridge(callbacks: AcpCallbacks): EventBridge {
// Start/end correlation across `tool_call` → `tool_call_update`. Insertion
// order is preserved by Map, so the oldest key is the first iterator entry —
// used for FIFO eviction once TOOL_CALL_MAP_CAP is exceeded (Risk S5).
const toolCalls = new Map<string, TrackedToolCall>();
// Running text/thinking accumulators for delta-space repair across chunks.
let textSoFar = "";
let thinkingSoFar = "";
// Cumulative chars forwarded (text+thinking) this turn (Risk S5).
let cumulativeOutputChars = 0;
// Whether the per-turn cap was hit and the single flag line already emitted.
let outputCapFlagged = false;
function reset(): void {
toolCalls.clear();
textSoFar = "";
thinkingSoFar = "";
cumulativeOutputChars = 0;
outputCapFlagged = false;
}
/**
* Track a bounded toolCallId for use as a Map key, evicting the oldest entry
* when the cap is exceeded so a flood of unique ids cannot grow memory without
* limit. Returns the normalized id, or `undefined` when the id is empty.
*/
function setTracked(rawId: string, tracked: TrackedToolCall): string | undefined {
const id = boundIdentifier(rawId);
if (id === "") return undefined;
// Re-insert moves an existing key to the tail (refresh recency); for a new
// key, evict the oldest first so size stays bounded.
if (!toolCalls.has(id) && toolCalls.size >= TOOL_CALL_MAP_CAP) {
const oldest = toolCalls.keys().next().value;
if (oldest !== undefined) toolCalls.delete(oldest);
}
toolCalls.set(id, tracked);
return id;
}
/**
* Forward one sanitized + bounded delta through `emit`, honoring the per-turn
* cumulative cap. Once the cap is exceeded, forwarding stops and a single
* truncation flag line is emitted via `onThinking`.
*/
function forwardBounded(
raw: string,
prior: string,
emit: (delta: string) => void,
): string {
if (outputCapFlagged) return prior;
if (cumulativeOutputChars >= PER_TURN_OUTPUT_CAP_CHARS) {
outputCapFlagged = true;
callbacks.onThinking?.(
"[output truncated: per-turn limit reached — further agent output suppressed]",
);
return prior;
}
// Sanitize control/ANSI (Risk S7) and bound the single chunk (Risk S5).
const sanitized = boundString(stripControlSequences(raw), PER_CHUNK_CAP_CHARS);
if (sanitized === "") return prior;
const delta = normalizeStreamingDelta(prior, sanitized);
cumulativeOutputChars += delta.length;
emit(delta);
return prior + delta;
}
function emitText(content: ContentBlock | undefined): void {
const raw = extractText(content);
if (raw === undefined || raw === "") return;
textSoFar = forwardBounded(raw, textSoFar, (delta) => callbacks.onText?.(delta));
}
function emitThinking(content: ContentBlock | undefined): void {
const raw = extractText(content);
if (raw === undefined || raw === "") return;
thinkingSoFar = forwardBounded(raw, thinkingSoFar, (delta) =>
callbacks.onThinking?.(delta),
);
}
/** Sanitize an agent-supplied tool title before it reaches a callback/log (S7). */
function safeTitle(title: string | null | undefined): string | null | undefined {
if (typeof title !== "string") return title;
return boundString(stripControlSequences(title), PER_CHUNK_CAP_CHARS);
}
function handleToolCall(update: Extract<SessionUpdate, { sessionUpdate: "tool_call" }>): void {
if (typeof update.toolCallId !== "string") return;
const title = safeTitle(update.title);
const id = setTracked(update.toolCallId, { title, kind: update.kind, ended: false });
if (id === undefined) return;
const name = toolDisplayName({ title, kind: update.kind });
callbacks.onToolStart?.(name, normalizeToolArgs(update.rawInput));
}
function handleToolCallUpdate(
update: Extract<SessionUpdate, { sessionUpdate: "tool_call_update" }>,
): void {
if (typeof update.toolCallId !== "string") return;
const id = boundIdentifier(update.toolCallId);
if (id === "") return;
const tracked = toolCalls.get(id) ?? { ended: false };
// Carry forward title/kind from the prior `tool_call` when this update omits
// them (a partial update may only set status/output).
if (update.title != null) tracked.title = safeTitle(update.title);
if (update.kind != null) tracked.kind = update.kind;
// `id` is already bounded above; setTracked re-keys with the same value.
setTracked(id, tracked);
const status = update.status;
if (status !== "completed" && status !== "failed") {
// Intermediate (pending/in_progress) — tracking updated, no callback.
return;
}
if (tracked.ended) return; // already fired a terminal callback
tracked.ended = true;
const name = toolDisplayName({ title: tracked.title, kind: tracked.kind });
callbacks.onToolEnd?.(name, status === "failed", update.rawOutput);
}
function handlePlan(entries: PlanEntry[] | undefined): void {
// FULL REPLACEMENT: drop any prior snapshot, surface the new one once.
// Plan output is charged against the same per-turn budget as text/thinking
// (Risk S5): entry SIZE is bounded in formatPlan, but entry COUNT is
// agent-controlled — without the cap below, one plan event with thousands
// of entries bypasses the per-turn ceiling entirely.
if (outputCapFlagged) return;
// Enforce the ceiling on the plan path too: without this check a plan-ONLY
// stream (no text/thinking ever entering forwardBounded) would keep
// emitting forever after crossing the budget.
if (cumulativeOutputChars >= PER_TURN_OUTPUT_CAP_CHARS) {
outputCapFlagged = true;
callbacks.onThinking?.(
"[output truncated: per-turn limit reached — further agent output suppressed]",
);
return;
}
const list = Array.isArray(entries) ? entries : [];
const capped = list.slice(0, MAX_PLAN_ENTRIES);
let line = formatPlan(capped);
if (list.length > capped.length) {
line += `\n- … ${list.length - capped.length} more entries truncated`;
}
line = boundString(line, PER_CHUNK_CAP_CHARS);
cumulativeOutputChars += line.length;
callbacks.onThinking?.(line);
}
function handleSessionUpdate(update: SessionUpdate): void {
if (!update || typeof update !== "object") return;
try {
switch (update.sessionUpdate) {
case "agent_message_chunk":
emitText(update.content);
break;
case "agent_thought_chunk":
emitThinking(update.content);
break;
case "user_message_chunk":
// Echo of user input — ignored in v1.
break;
case "tool_call":
handleToolCall(update);
break;
case "tool_call_update":
handleToolCallUpdate(update);
break;
case "plan":
handlePlan(update.entries);
break;
case "plan_update":
// The (experimental) `PlanUpdate` variant carries a `plan` field, NOT a
// top-level `entries` array — so there is nothing here to map to our
// entries-based snapshot. v1 treats it as a NO-OP rather than wiping the
// prior plan: the full `plan` event remains the source of truth.
break;
case "plan_removed":
// Clearing the plan: surface nothing.
break;
case "available_commands_update":
case "current_mode_update":
case "config_option_update":
case "session_info_update":
case "usage_update":
// Stored/ignored in v1 — no callback surface.
break;
default:
// Unknown/forward-compat tag — ignore without throwing.
break;
}
} catch {
// Tolerant: a malformed/partial update must never break the stream.
}
}
return { handleSessionUpdate, reset };
}

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// U7 — client filesystem capabilities behind the path jail (KTD6 / Risk S3/S4/S5).
//
// These handlers back the ACP `fs/read_text_file` / `fs/write_text_file` client
// methods. They exist ONLY when the resolved settings opt in (KTD6): reads are
// opt-in, writes default OFF and are additionally routed through the action gate
// as a `file_write_delete` category (reusing the U5 floor — never a free
// capability). Every path crosses `assertPathWithinCwd` (the symlink-resolving
// jail) before any byte is read or written, and the secret/git deny-lists apply
// regardless of cwd membership.
//
// On ANY rejection (jail / deny-list / policy / oversize) these THROW — the SDK
// surfaces the throw as a JSON-RPC error. They MUST NEVER silently succeed.
import { constants as fsConstants } from "node:fs";
import type {
ReadTextFileRequest,
ReadTextFileResponse,
WriteTextFileRequest,
WriteTextFileResponse,
} from "@agentclientprotocol/sdk";
import {
assertPathWithinCwd,
isGitInternal,
isSecretPath,
openWithinCwd,
PathJailError,
} from "./path-jail.js";
import { effectiveDisposition, runApprovalForCategory } from "./control-handler.js";
import type { PermissionGate } from "./types.js";
/** Hard ceiling on bytes returned from a read when `limit` is absent/huge (S5). */
export const DEFAULT_READ_MAX_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5 MiB
/** Hard ceiling on bytes accepted for a single write (S5). */
export const DEFAULT_WRITE_MAX_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5 MiB
/** Thrown when a write's content exceeds the size ceiling. */
export class FsContentTooLargeError extends Error {
readonly code = "content_too_large" as const;
constructor(readonly limitBytes: number) {
super(`fs write content exceeds the ${limitBytes}-byte ceiling`);
this.name = "FsContentTooLargeError";
}
}
/** Thrown when a gated write is blocked by the permission policy. */
export class FsWriteDeniedError extends Error {
readonly code = "write_denied" as const;
constructor(message: string) {
super(message);
this.name = "FsWriteDeniedError";
}
}
export interface FsHandlerOptions {
/** Confinement root — the task worktree (session cwd). */
cwd: string;
/** Per-run permission gate (U5). Required for write gating. */
gate?: PermissionGate;
/** Advertise/register `readTextFile`. */
allowRead: boolean;
/** Advertise/register `writeTextFile` (default OFF — KTD6). */
allowWrite: boolean;
/**
* Risk S1 acknowledgement. When false (default), a blanket `allow` on the
* `file_write_delete` category is escalated to `require-approval` for the
* untrusted agent rather than auto-approved.
*/
allowUnrestricted?: boolean;
/** Override the read byte ceiling (tests). */
readMaxBytes?: number;
/** Override the write byte ceiling (tests). */
writeMaxBytes?: number;
}
export interface FsHandlers {
readTextFile?: (params: ReadTextFileRequest) => Promise<ReadTextFileResponse>;
writeTextFile?: (params: WriteTextFileRequest) => Promise<WriteTextFileResponse>;
}
/**
* Apply the `line`/`limit` window AND the hard byte ceiling to file content.
*
* `line` is 1-based (per the ACP schema). `limit` caps the number of lines. When
* `limit` is absent or absurdly large the byte ceiling still bounds the result
* so a multi-GB file can't be slurped into memory (S5).
*/
export function applyReadWindow(
content: string,
line: number | null | undefined,
limit: number | null | undefined,
maxBytes: number,
): string {
let out = content;
const hasLine = typeof line === "number" && Number.isFinite(line) && line > 1;
const hasLimit = typeof limit === "number" && Number.isFinite(limit) && limit > 0;
if (hasLine || hasLimit) {
const lines = content.split("\n");
const start = hasLine ? Math.floor(line as number) - 1 : 0;
const end = hasLimit ? start + Math.floor(limit as number) : lines.length;
out = lines.slice(start, end).join("\n");
}
// Byte ceiling regardless of line/limit (truncate on a UTF-8 boundary-safe
// basis by slicing the buffer then decoding).
const buf = Buffer.from(out, "utf8");
if (buf.byteLength > maxBytes) {
out = buf.subarray(0, maxBytes).toString("utf8");
}
return out;
}
/**
* Build the fs handlers, returning ONLY the ones enabled by settings. The
* provider registers these on the `Client` impl iff the matching capability is
* advertised (consistency invariant — KTD6).
*/
export function createFsHandlers(opts: FsHandlerOptions): FsHandlers {
const readMaxBytes = opts.readMaxBytes ?? DEFAULT_READ_MAX_BYTES;
const writeMaxBytes = opts.writeMaxBytes ?? DEFAULT_WRITE_MAX_BYTES;
const handlers: FsHandlers = {};
if (opts.allowRead) {
handlers.readTextFile = async (
params: ReadTextFileRequest,
): Promise<ReadTextFileResponse> => {
const resolved = await assertPathWithinCwd(params.path, opts.cwd);
// Secrets that legitimately live inside the worktree are still denied.
if (isSecretPath(resolved)) {
throw new PathJailError(
"denied_secret",
`read of secret-pattern file denied: ${resolved}`,
);
}
// Reading git internals is also denied (config/token surface).
if (isGitInternal(resolved)) {
throw new PathJailError(
"denied_git",
`read of git-internal file denied: ${resolved}`,
);
}
// Atomic, symlink-safe open (TOCTOU defense), then read.
const handle = await openWithinCwd(resolved, opts.cwd, fsConstants.O_RDONLY);
try {
const hasLimit =
typeof params.limit === "number" &&
Number.isFinite(params.limit) &&
params.limit > 0;
// DoS guard (FIX 4): a multi-GB file would OOM if we `readFile` the whole
// thing before `applyReadWindow` truncates. When the file exceeds the byte
// ceiling AND no bounding `limit` was supplied, read at most ceiling+1
// bytes so memory stays bounded; the +1 still lets applyReadWindow apply
// its truncation marker logic identically to a full read. A `limit` is
// line-bounded and read in full (matches prior behavior).
const stat = await handle.stat();
let content: string;
if (!hasLimit && stat.size > readMaxBytes) {
const buf = Buffer.alloc(readMaxBytes + 1);
const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(buf, 0, readMaxBytes + 1, 0);
content = buf.subarray(0, bytesRead).toString("utf8");
} else {
content = await handle.readFile({ encoding: "utf8" });
}
return {
content: applyReadWindow(content, params.line, params.limit, readMaxBytes),
};
} finally {
await handle.close().catch(() => undefined);
}
};
}
if (opts.allowWrite) {
handlers.writeTextFile = async (
params: WriteTextFileRequest,
): Promise<WriteTextFileResponse> => {
const content = typeof params.content === "string" ? params.content : "";
// Size ceiling BEFORE any filesystem work (S5).
if (Buffer.byteLength(content, "utf8") > writeMaxBytes) {
throw new FsContentTooLargeError(writeMaxBytes);
}
const resolved = await assertPathWithinCwd(params.path, opts.cwd);
// HARD-reject writes to git internals (.git/**) — RCE/token surface (S3).
if (isGitInternal(resolved)) {
throw new PathJailError(
"denied_git",
`write to git-internal path hard-rejected: ${resolved}`,
);
}
// Never let an agent overwrite a secret either.
if (isSecretPath(resolved)) {
throw new PathJailError(
"denied_secret",
`write to secret-pattern file denied: ${resolved}`,
);
}
// Route the write through the action gate as `file_write_delete` (U5):
// allow → proceed, block → reject, require-approval → HITL (or
// default-deny when no human channel). Reuses the U5 helpers so the
// security floor stays single-sourced.
const gate = opts.gate;
const disposition = gate?.permissionPolicy
? effectiveDisposition("file_write_delete", gate, {
allowUnrestricted: opts.allowUnrestricted,
})
: "require-approval";
if (disposition === "block") {
throw new FsWriteDeniedError(
`file_write_delete is blocked by policy: ${resolved}`,
);
}
if (disposition === "require-approval") {
const decision = gate
? await runApprovalForCategory(gate, {
category: "file_write_delete",
toolName: "fs/write_text_file",
dedupeKey: `fs_write|${resolved}`,
args: { path: resolved },
})
: "deny";
if (decision !== "allow") {
throw new FsWriteDeniedError(
`file_write_delete write requires approval and was not granted: ${resolved}`,
);
}
}
// disposition === "allow" → proceed.
// Atomic, symlink-safe create within cwd. O_NOFOLLOW (in openWithinCwd)
// guards ONLY the FINAL component; an intermediate dir swapped to a symlink
// is still followed. We therefore must NOT pass O_TRUNC into open(): doing
// so would TRUNCATE an escaped target BEFORE openWithinCwd's post-open
// realpath re-validation gets to reject it (write-path TOCTOU, FIX 3).
// Instead open create+write WITHOUT truncate, let openWithinCwd run its
// re-validation, and ONLY truncate (via the fd) AFTER it has proven the
// opened inode is still inside the jail.
const handle = await openWithinCwd(
resolved,
opts.cwd,
fsConstants.O_WRONLY | fsConstants.O_CREAT,
0o644,
);
try {
// Truncate-AFTER-validate: openWithinCwd returned only because the
// re-validation passed, so it is now safe to empty the file and write.
await handle.truncate(0);
await handle.writeFile(content, { encoding: "utf8" });
} finally {
await handle.close().catch(() => undefined);
}
return {};
};
}
return handlers;
}

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/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00:
Vendored ACP client implementation for the Claude runtime. Copied from
plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime/src (not imported) so the bundled Claude plugin
is self-contained and does not depend on the experimental/on-demand
fusion-plugin-acp-runtime package at runtime. Keep this tree focused on the
JSON-RPC/stdio client (connect, session, event bridge, permission floor,
process registry). Claude-specific spawn/auth/skills/MCP live outside this folder.
*/
export { AcpRuntimeAdapter } from "./runtime-adapter.js";
export { killAllProcesses } from "./process-manager.js";
export { authenticateAcpConnection, AcpAuthRequiredError, connect } from "./provider.js";
export { resolveCliSettings } from "./cli-spawn.js";
export type { AcpCliSettings } from "./cli-spawn.js";
export type { AcpMcpServer, AgentRuntimeOptions as AcpAgentRuntimeOptions } from "./types.js";

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// U7 — the SECURITY BOUNDARY for client filesystem capabilities (KTD6a / Risk S3).
//
// `project-root-guard.ts` is a `.fusion`-suffix / git-worktree STRING check, NOT
// a path jail — it is deliberately NOT used here. This module is a real
// symlink-resolving confinement jail. The ACP agent is an untrusted subprocess;
// every path it hands to `fs/read_text_file` / `fs/write_text_file` is hostile
// input and must be proven to resolve INSIDE the session `cwd` before any open.
//
// Threats defended (each has a test):
// 1. Lexical escape — `../../etc/passwd` normalized against cwd → reject.
// 2. Symlink escape — a symlink INSIDE cwd pointing at /etc: lexical
// normalization passes but the REAL target is outside.
// We resolve realpath (follow symlinks) and require it
// within realpath(cwd). New files: validate realpath of
// the PARENT, then lstat the final component and reject
// if it is itself a symlink.
// 3. TOCTOU — `openWithinCwd` opens with O_NOFOLLOW on the final
// component and re-validates the opened fd, so a
// component cannot be swapped for a symlink between
// check and open.
// 4. Secret reads — `.env*`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, `.npmrc`, `.netrc`,
// `id_*`, `credentials` (by basename) → denied.
// 5. Git-internals write — anything under a `.git/` dir → hard-reject.
// 6. NUL bytes / absolute-escape / separator tricks → reject.
import { constants as fsConstants } from "node:fs";
import { open, realpath, lstat } from "node:fs/promises";
import type { FileHandle } from "node:fs/promises";
import * as path from "node:path";
/** Typed jail rejection. `code` lets callers map to the right JSON-RPC error. */
export type PathJailErrorCode =
| "path_outside_cwd"
| "denied_secret"
| "denied_git"
| "invalid_path";
export class PathJailError extends Error {
readonly code: PathJailErrorCode;
constructor(code: PathJailErrorCode, message: string) {
super(message);
this.code = code;
this.name = "PathJailError";
}
}
/** Secret-bearing basenames/patterns that must never be read even inside cwd. */
const SECRET_BASENAME_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
/^\.env($|\..*$)/i, // .env, .env.local, .env.production, ...
/\.pem$/i,
/\.key$/i,
/^\.npmrc$/i,
/^\.netrc$/i,
/^id_.+$/i, // id_rsa, id_ed25519, id_rsa.pub, ...
/^credentials$/i,
/^\.git-credentials$/i, // git stored plaintext credentials
/\.p12$/i, // PKCS#12 keystore
/\.pfx$/i, // PKCS#12 keystore (Windows)
/\.(keystore|jks)$/i, // Java keystore
/^\.dockercfg$/i, // legacy docker registry auth
/^\.pgpass$/i, // PostgreSQL password file
/^\.htpasswd$/i, // Apache basic-auth credentials
];
/**
* Is `resolved` a secret file by basename? Confinement-independent: secrets that
* legitimately live inside the worktree are still denied (KTD6a deny-list).
*/
export function isSecretPath(resolved: string): boolean {
const base = path.basename(resolved);
return SECRET_BASENAME_PATTERNS.some((re) => re.test(base));
}
/**
* Is `resolved` inside a `.git/` directory (git internals)? Writing here yields
* RCE (`.git/hooks/pre-commit`) or token theft (`.git/config`) — hard-reject
* writes regardless of cwd membership (KTD6a deny-list).
*/
export function isGitInternal(resolved: string): boolean {
const segments = resolved.split(path.sep);
return segments.includes(".git");
}
/** Reject a raw request path with NUL bytes or that is empty/non-string. */
function rejectMalformed(requestedPath: string): void {
if (typeof requestedPath !== "string" || requestedPath.length === 0) {
throw new PathJailError("invalid_path", "empty or non-string path");
}
if (requestedPath.includes("\0")) {
throw new PathJailError("invalid_path", "path contains a NUL byte");
}
}
/** True iff `child` is `parent` or a descendant of it (both already real). */
function isWithin(parent: string, child: string): boolean {
if (child === parent) return true;
const withSep = parent.endsWith(path.sep) ? parent : parent + path.sep;
return child.startsWith(withSep);
}
/**
* Resolve `requestedPath` (relative to `cwd`, or absolute) to a SAFE absolute
* path proven to live inside the realpath of `cwd`, or throw `PathJailError`.
*
* - Existing target: resolve realpath of the target (follows all symlinks) and
* require it within realpath(cwd).
* - Non-existent target (a new file to write): resolve realpath of the PARENT
* dir, require THAT within realpath(cwd), then `lstat` the final component and
* reject if it is a symlink (a dangling symlink would otherwise let a later
* open follow it out of the jail).
*
* The returned path is `realpath(parent) + basename` — safe to hand to
* `openWithinCwd`, which re-validates atomically (O_NOFOLLOW) to close TOCTOU.
*/
export async function assertPathWithinCwd(
requestedPath: string,
cwd: string,
): Promise<string> {
rejectMalformed(requestedPath);
// Realpath of the confinement root. If cwd itself can't be resolved, nothing
// can be confined — treat as invalid.
let realCwd: string;
try {
realCwd = await realpath(cwd);
} catch {
throw new PathJailError("invalid_path", `cwd does not resolve: ${cwd}`);
}
// Resolve the requested path lexically against cwd FIRST (handles `../`).
const absRequested = path.resolve(realCwd, requestedPath);
// Try to realpath the target itself (exists case).
let resolved: string;
let targetExists = true;
try {
resolved = await realpath(absRequested);
} catch {
targetExists = false;
// Non-existent target: validate the parent dir's realpath, keep the final
// component name. The parent MUST exist and resolve inside cwd.
const parent = path.dirname(absRequested);
let realParent: string;
try {
realParent = await realpath(parent);
} catch {
throw new PathJailError(
"path_outside_cwd",
`parent directory does not resolve: ${parent}`,
);
}
if (!isWithin(realCwd, realParent)) {
throw new PathJailError(
"path_outside_cwd",
`resolved parent escapes cwd: ${realParent}`,
);
}
resolved = path.join(realParent, path.basename(absRequested));
}
if (!isWithin(realCwd, resolved)) {
throw new PathJailError(
"path_outside_cwd",
`resolved path escapes cwd: ${resolved}`,
);
}
// For a non-existent target, the final component must not already be a
// (dangling) symlink that a later open could follow out of the jail.
if (!targetExists) {
try {
const st = await lstat(resolved);
if (st.isSymbolicLink()) {
throw new PathJailError(
"path_outside_cwd",
`final component is a symlink: ${resolved}`,
);
}
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof PathJailError) throw err;
// ENOENT for a not-yet-created file is expected — fine to proceed.
}
}
return resolved;
}
/**
* Open a jail-validated path atomically (TOCTOU defense, Risk S3 threat 3).
*
* `safePath` MUST be the output of `assertPathWithinCwd`. We open with
* `O_NOFOLLOW` so the FINAL component is never followed if it was swapped for a
* symlink between check and open, then `fstat` + realpath-via-fd re-validate the
* actually-opened inode is still inside `realCwd`. On any mismatch we close and
* throw rather than operate on an escaped handle.
*/
export async function openWithinCwd(
safePath: string,
cwd: string,
flags: number,
mode?: number,
): Promise<FileHandle> {
let realCwd: string;
try {
realCwd = await realpath(cwd);
} catch {
throw new PathJailError("invalid_path", `cwd does not resolve: ${cwd}`);
}
const handle = await open(safePath, flags | fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW, mode);
try {
// Re-validate the opened inode's real path is still within the jail. On
// Linux `/proc/self/fd/<fd>` would work; portably we realpath the safePath
// again now that O_NOFOLLOW proved the final component isn't a symlink — any
// intermediate swap would change this resolution.
const reReal = await realpath(safePath);
if (!isWithin(realCwd, reReal)) {
throw new PathJailError(
"path_outside_cwd",
`opened path escapes cwd after open: ${reReal}`,
);
}
return handle;
} catch (err) {
await handle.close().catch(() => undefined);
throw err;
}
}

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// port-4040-allowlist: this file documents the reserved dashboard port in kill-guard comments only; no kill targets it.
// Subprocess lifecycle for the ACP runtime.
//
// Mirrors the hardening conventions in
// `plugins/fusion-plugin-droid-runtime/src/process-manager.ts`: a self-cleaning
// process registry, SIGKILL teardown scoped to agent subprocesses only (never
// the dashboard/port-4040 — KTD4), bounded stderr capture with secret redaction
// (Risk S8), and a high inactivity ceiling (the engine's StuckTaskDetector is
// the authoritative aborter — KTD4).
//
// The ACP agent is UNTRUSTED. The spawn env is built from an explicit allow-list
// (KTD6b), never inherited `process.env`, so secret-bearing vars are not handed
// to the agent.
import { spawn, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";
import { redactSecrets } from "@fusion/core";
function debugLog(message: string): void {
if (process.env.PI_ACP_DEBUG !== "1" && process.env.FUSION_GROK_ACP_DEBUG !== "1") return;
console.error(`[claude-acp] ${message}`);
}
/*
FNXC:ProcessLifecycle 2026-07-16-07:00:
Vitest resets the Claude plugin module graph while retaining the worker's `process`.
Keep the ACP child registry on `process` so the one guarded exit listener also
reaps children registered by later module evaluations; adding one listener per
evaluation causes MaxListenersExceededWarning in the dashboard backfill lane.
*/
const ACTIVE_PROCESSES_KEY = Symbol.for("fusion.plugin.claude-runtime.activeProcesses");
const processWithActiveProcesses = process as typeof process & {
[key: symbol]: Set<ChildProcess> | undefined;
};
/** Registry of active agent subprocesses for teardown. Self-cleans on exit. */
const activeProcesses =
processWithActiveProcesses[ACTIVE_PROCESSES_KEY] ??
(processWithActiveProcesses[ACTIVE_PROCESSES_KEY] = new Set<ChildProcess>());
/**
* Register a subprocess in the agent process registry.
* Auto-removed from the registry when it exits.
*/
export function registerProcess(child: ChildProcess): void {
activeProcesses.add(child);
child.on("exit", () => activeProcesses.delete(child));
}
/** Remove a subprocess from the registry (idempotent). */
export function unregisterProcess(child: ChildProcess): void {
activeProcesses.delete(child);
}
/** Number of registered (presumed-live) agent subprocesses — for diagnostics/tests. */
export function activeProcessCount(): number {
return activeProcesses.size;
}
/**
* Force-kill a subprocess via SIGKILL. No-op if already dead (killed or exited).
* Cross-platform safe: Node treats SIGKILL as forceful termination on Windows.
*/
export function forceKill(child: ChildProcess): void {
if (child.killed || child.exitCode !== null) return;
try {
child.kill("SIGKILL");
} catch {
// already gone
}
}
/**
* Force-kill every registered agent subprocess and clear the registry.
*
* Scoped to agent subprocesses tracked here only — never the dashboard / port
* 4040 / any other process (KTD4 / kill-guard conventions). Safe to call
* repeatedly; no-ops on already-dead processes.
*/
export function killAllProcesses(): void {
for (const child of activeProcesses) {
forceKill(child);
}
activeProcesses.clear();
}
export class MissingAcpEnvError extends Error {
readonly code = "ACP_MISSING_ENV";
constructor(readonly missingKeys: string[]) {
super(`Missing required ACP environment variable(s): ${missingKeys.join(", ")}`);
this.name = "MissingAcpEnvError";
}
}
export interface BuildSpawnEnvOptions {
required?: string[];
sourceEnv?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
}
/**
* Build the subprocess environment from an explicit allow-list (KTD6b).
*
* Returns ONLY allow-listed vars copied from `process.env`. The full env is
* never inherited — the agent is untrusted and must not receive secret-bearing
* vars. Returns an empty env by default (empty allow-list).
*/
export function buildSpawnEnv(allowList: string[], options: BuildSpawnEnvOptions = {}): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
/*
FNXC:ACP-RouteB 2026-06-14-19:52:
Claude bridge subprocesses may receive HOME so the real `claude` can read ~/.claude auth and PATH so the bridge can locate sub-executables. Do not forward ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN, or inherited process.env because the bridge is an untrusted external process.
*/
const sourceEnv = options.sourceEnv ?? process.env;
const env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {};
for (const key of allowList) {
const value = sourceEnv[key];
if (typeof value === "string") env[key] = value;
}
const missing = (options.required ?? []).filter((key) => typeof env[key] !== "string");
if (missing.length > 0) {
throw new MissingAcpEnvError(missing);
}
return env;
}
export interface SpawnAgentOptions {
binaryPath: string;
args: string[];
cwd: string;
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
}
/**
* Spawn the ACP agent subprocess with piped stdio.
*
* Registers the child on spawn and unregisters it on exit. The caller wraps
* stdin/stdout into a web stream for `ndJsonStream`.
*/
export function spawnAgent(options: SpawnAgentOptions): ChildProcess {
const child = spawn(options.binaryPath, options.args, {
stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
cwd: options.cwd,
env: options.env,
});
registerProcess(child);
debugLog(`spawnAgent: pid=${child.pid} binary=${options.binaryPath}`);
return child;
}
// --- stderr capture + secret redaction (Risk S8) --------------------------
/** Maximum stderr bytes retained; older output is dropped to bound memory. */
const STDERR_BUFFER_CEILING = 64 * 1024;
// Secret redaction (Risk S8) lives in @fusion/core so PTY/process owners share
// one implementation; re-exported here to preserve this module's public surface.
export { redactSecrets };
/**
* Accumulate stderr into a bounded, secret-redacted buffer.
* Returns a getter for the current (redacted) buffer contents.
*/
export function captureStderr(child: ChildProcess): () => string {
// FIX 5: redacting each chunk in isolation leaks a secret that straddles a
// chunk boundary (the token is split across two `data` events so neither half
// matches a pattern). Accumulate the RAW bytes into a bounded buffer first,
// then redact across the whole (bounded) buffer after each append so a
// boundary-spanning secret is caught. The buffer stays bounded by the existing
// ceiling; the returned getter always reports the redacted view.
let raw = "";
child.stderr?.on("data", (data: Buffer) => {
raw += data.toString();
if (raw.length > STDERR_BUFFER_CEILING) {
raw = raw.slice(raw.length - STDERR_BUFFER_CEILING);
}
});
return () => redactSecrets(raw);
}

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// Builds ACP `ContentBlock[]` from a Fusion prompt.
//
// U3 core path: a plain string prompt becomes a single `{ type: "text", text }`
// block. The runtime may later pass structured content (e.g. an attached image);
// when present we emit the matching block. Keep this small and pure.
import type { ContentBlock } from "@agentclientprotocol/sdk";
/** Optional structured content the runtime may attach alongside the text prompt. */
export interface PromptImage {
/** Base64-encoded image data (no data: prefix). */
data: string;
/** MIME type, e.g. "image/png". */
mimeType: string;
/** Optional source URI for the image. */
uri?: string;
}
export interface BuildPromptOptions {
/** Image content to append as image block(s) after the text. */
images?: PromptImage[];
}
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-12-07:15:
Dashboard chat forwards attachments as promptWithFallback options
`{ images: ChatImageContent[] }` where each item is
`{ type: "image", data: base64, mimeType }`. ACP session/prompt needs
ContentBlock image variants. Extract defensively so pi-style ImageContent
and PromptImage shapes both work; ignore malformed entries.
*/
/**
* Pull image attachments from Fusion `promptWithFallback` options.
* Accepts `{ images: Array<{ data, mimeType, uri? }> }` (chat / pi ImageContent).
*/
export function extractPromptImagesFromOptions(options: unknown): PromptImage[] | undefined {
if (!options || typeof options !== "object" || Array.isArray(options)) {
return undefined;
}
const raw = (options as { images?: unknown }).images;
if (!Array.isArray(raw) || raw.length === 0) {
return undefined;
}
const images: PromptImage[] = [];
for (const item of raw) {
if (!item || typeof item !== "object" || Array.isArray(item)) continue;
const rec = item as Record<string, unknown>;
const data = typeof rec.data === "string" ? rec.data : undefined;
const mimeType = typeof rec.mimeType === "string" ? rec.mimeType : undefined;
if (!data || !mimeType || data.length === 0 || mimeType.length === 0) continue;
// Prefer explicit uri; else map absolute filesystem `path` to file:// for agents.
let uri = typeof rec.uri === "string" && rec.uri.length > 0 ? rec.uri : undefined;
if (!uri && typeof rec.path === "string" && rec.path.length > 0) {
uri = rec.path.startsWith("file:") ? rec.path : `file://${rec.path}`;
}
images.push({ data, mimeType, ...(uri ? { uri } : {}) });
}
return images.length > 0 ? images : undefined;
}
/**
* Build the ACP prompt content blocks for a turn.
*
* A non-empty string yields one text block. An empty/whitespace-only string
* yields no text block (but any attached images are still included), so we never
* send a meaningless empty text block. Images, when supplied, are appended as
* `image` blocks (passthrough — KTD ContentBlock image variant).
*/
export function buildPromptBlocks(prompt: string, opts?: BuildPromptOptions): ContentBlock[] {
const blocks: ContentBlock[] = [];
if (typeof prompt === "string" && prompt.trim().length > 0) {
blocks.push({ type: "text", text: prompt });
}
for (const image of opts?.images ?? []) {
blocks.push({
type: "image",
data: image.data,
mimeType: image.mimeType,
...(image.uri ? { uri: image.uri } : {}),
});
}
return blocks;
}

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// ACP connection layer: spawn → ClientSideConnection → initialize handshake.
//
// U2 establishes the transport and completes the `initialize` handshake with
// integer protocol-version negotiation (KTD2) and a readiness timeout. Session
// driving (`session/new`, `session/prompt`, cancel, load) is U3 — this unit only
// exposes the live `conn` on the returned handle so later units can drive it.
//
// Security posture (KTD6): filesystem client capabilities are advertised ONLY
// when the caller's `advertiseFs` toggle is true — never hardcoded. Teardown is
// registry-SIGKILL-authoritative (KTD4a): `dispose()` force-kills the child via
// the process registry; that kill is the no-orphan guarantee, not a graceful
// round-trip.
import { Readable, Writable } from "node:stream";
import type { ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";
import {
ClientSideConnection,
ndJsonStream,
PROTOCOL_VERSION,
type Agent,
type AgentCapabilities,
type Client,
type ContentBlock,
type RequestPermissionResponse,
type StopReason,
} from "@agentclientprotocol/sdk";
import { spawnAgent, captureStderr, forceKill, unregisterProcess } from "./process-manager.js";
import { createEventBridge } from "./event-bridge.js";
import { resolvePermission, type ResolvePermissionOptions } from "./control-handler.js";
import { createFsHandlers } from "./fs-capabilities.js";
import { boundIdentifier } from "./sanitize.js";
import type { AcpCallbacks, AcpMcpServer, PermissionGate } from "./types.js";
/** Options enabling the U7 fs client capabilities on the bridging handler. */
export interface FsHandlerBuildOptions {
/** Confinement root — the session cwd / task worktree. */
cwd: string;
/** Register `readTextFile` (advertised iff true). */
allowRead: boolean;
/** Register `writeTextFile` (default OFF — KTD6; advertised iff true). */
allowWrite: boolean;
}
/** Default bound for the `initialize` handshake. */
export const DEFAULT_INITIALIZE_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
/** Thrown when the agent negotiates an integer protocol version we don't support. */
export class IncompatibleProtocolError extends Error {
readonly code = "incompatible_protocol" as const;
constructor(
readonly agentProtocolVersion: number,
readonly expected: number = PROTOCOL_VERSION,
) {
super(
`ACP agent negotiated incompatible protocol version ${agentProtocolVersion} (client supports ${expected})`,
);
this.name = "IncompatibleProtocolError";
}
}
/** Thrown when the `initialize` handshake does not complete within the bound. */
export class HandshakeTimeoutError extends Error {
readonly code = "handshake_timeout" as const;
constructor(readonly timeoutMs: number) {
super(`ACP initialize handshake timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`);
this.name = "HandshakeTimeoutError";
}
}
/**
* Minimal default client handler. Later units (U3/U4/U5/U7) supply the real one
* that bridges `session/update` into Fusion callbacks and routes permission
* requests through the action gate. The default cancels every permission request
* (never auto-allows an untrusted agent) and ignores updates.
*/
export function createDefaultClientHandler(): Client {
return {
async sessionUpdate() {
// no-op until the U4 event bridge is wired
},
async requestPermission() {
return { outcome: { outcome: "cancelled" } };
},
};
}
/** A bridging client handler plus a drain control for its in-flight permissions. */
export interface BridgingClientHandler {
/** The ACP `Client` impl handed to `ClientSideConnection`. */
handler: Client;
/**
* Resolve every in-flight `requestPermission` with `{ cancelled }` and mark the
* handler cancelled so any request arriving afterward is answered cancelled
* immediately (U5 cancel-drain — KTD4a). Idempotent.
*/
cancelPending(): void;
/**
* Reset the event bridge's PER-TURN state (tool correlation, delta
* accumulators, cumulative-output counter, output-cap latch). MUST be called
* at the start of each prompt turn so a turn that trips the per-turn output cap
* does not silently suppress every subsequent turn (FIX 1).
*/
resetTurn(): void;
}
/**
* The real client handler (U4 + U5): bridges every `session/update` notification
* into the engine callbacks, AND answers `session/request_permission` through the
* per-category action gate (U5 — the SECURITY FLOOR).
*
* Permission requests are routed to `resolvePermission`, which classifies each
* call per-category against the live `gate` and selects `allow_once` only (never
* `*_always`). When no `gate` is supplied the resolver default-denies.
*
* Cancel-drain (KTD4a / Risk: in-flight permission deadlock): every pending
* `requestPermission` promise is tracked; `cancelPending()` resolves them all
* with `{ cancelled }`. A request that arrives AFTER cancel is answered
* `{ cancelled }` immediately so the agent never blocks on teardown.
*/
export function createBridgingClientHandler(
callbacks: AcpCallbacks,
gate?: PermissionGate,
fsOpts?: FsHandlerBuildOptions,
permissionOpts?: ResolvePermissionOptions,
): BridgingClientHandler {
const bridge = createEventBridge(callbacks);
// U7: build the fs handlers, returning only the enabled ones. They are added
// to the handler below ONLY when present, keeping the advertised-capability /
// registered-handler invariant consistent (KTD6).
const fsHandlers = fsOpts
? createFsHandlers({
cwd: fsOpts.cwd,
gate,
allowRead: fsOpts.allowRead,
allowWrite: fsOpts.allowWrite,
allowUnrestricted: permissionOpts?.allowUnrestricted,
})
: {};
const cancelledResponse: RequestPermissionResponse = {
outcome: { outcome: "cancelled" },
};
let cancelled = false;
// Each entry resolves its pending requestPermission with a cancelled outcome.
const pending = new Set<(response: RequestPermissionResponse) => void>();
function cancelPending(): void {
cancelled = true;
for (const resolveCancelled of [...pending]) {
resolveCancelled(cancelledResponse);
}
pending.clear();
}
const handler: Client = {
async sessionUpdate(params) {
bridge.handleSessionUpdate(params.update);
},
async requestPermission(params): Promise<RequestPermissionResponse> {
// A request arriving after cancel is answered cancelled immediately.
if (cancelled) return cancelledResponse;
// Race the real gate resolution against a cancel-drain so an in-flight
// request is answered the moment teardown drains it (never deadlocks).
return await new Promise<RequestPermissionResponse>((resolve) => {
let settled = false;
const finish = (response: RequestPermissionResponse) => {
if (settled) return;
settled = true;
pending.delete(drain);
resolve(response);
};
const drain = (response: RequestPermissionResponse) => finish(response);
pending.add(drain);
resolvePermission(params.toolCall, params.options, gate, permissionOpts).then(
(response) => finish(response),
// resolvePermission never rejects, but stay safe: deny-by-cancel.
() => finish(cancelledResponse),
);
});
},
// FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-12-07:00: swallow `_x.ai/*` extension notifications
// (hook_execution, session admin, …) so ACP SDK does not log -32601.
};
// Register fs handlers ONLY when enabled, so the advertised capability and the
// present handler stay consistent (KTD6). If a capability is disabled the
// method is absent → an agent calling it gets a JSON-RPC method-not-found
// error (never a silent success).
if (fsHandlers.readTextFile) handler.readTextFile = fsHandlers.readTextFile;
if (fsHandlers.writeTextFile) handler.writeTextFile = fsHandlers.writeTextFile;
return { handler, cancelPending, resetTurn: () => bridge.reset() };
}
export interface AcpConnection {
/** Live ACP connection — later units drive session/new, prompt, cancel, load. */
conn: ClientSideConnection;
child: ChildProcess;
agentCapabilities?: AgentCapabilities;
/** Auth methods the agent advertised; non-empty means auth is required. */
authMethods: Array<{ id: string }>;
/** Current redacted stderr buffer. */
stderr(): string;
/** Force-kill the agent via the registry (KTD4a — SIGKILL is authoritative). */
dispose(): void;
}
export interface ConnectOptions {
binaryPath: string;
args: string[];
cwd: string;
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
clientHandler?: Client;
/** Advertise fs capabilities ONLY where the toggle is true (KTD6). */
advertiseFs: { read: boolean; write: boolean };
initializeTimeoutMs?: number;
/**
* FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-15:00:
* Optional post-initialize authenticate (xAI Claude docs: initialize → authenticate
* → session/new). Prefer methods listed in preferMethods that the agent
* advertised; when require is true, missing auth fails closed.
* See https://docs.x.ai/build/cli/headless-scripting#acp
*/
authenticate?: {
preferMethods?: string[];
methodId?: string;
meta?: Record<string, unknown>;
require?: boolean;
};
}
function withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, ms: number, onTimeout: () => Error): Promise<T> {
return new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(onTimeout()), ms);
timer.unref?.();
promise.then(
(value) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve(value);
},
(err) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
reject(err);
},
);
});
}
/**
* Spawn the agent, establish a `ClientSideConnection` over its stdio, and
* complete the `initialize` handshake under a timeout.
*
* Throws `HandshakeTimeoutError` on timeout, `IncompatibleProtocolError` when
* the negotiated integer protocol version mismatches — in both cases the
* subprocess is force-killed before throwing (no orphans, KTD4a). On `initialize`
* the fs capability flags are gated by `advertiseFs` and never hardcoded (KTD6).
*/
export async function connect(opts: ConnectOptions): Promise<AcpConnection> {
const timeoutMs = opts.initializeTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_INITIALIZE_TIMEOUT_MS;
const child = spawnAgent({
binaryPath: opts.binaryPath,
args: opts.args,
cwd: opts.cwd,
env: opts.env,
});
const stderr = captureStderr(child);
let disposed = false;
const dispose = () => {
if (disposed) return;
disposed = true;
forceKill(child);
unregisterProcess(child);
};
// If the binary is missing, spawn emits "error" asynchronously. Surface that
// as a rejection of the handshake rather than an unhandled event-loop error.
let spawnError: Error | undefined;
const spawnErrored = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {
child.once("error", (err: Error) => {
spawnError = err;
reject(err);
});
});
// Avoid an unhandled rejection if the handshake resolves/throws first.
spawnErrored.catch(() => undefined);
// output = the agent's stdin; input = the agent's stdout.
const stream = ndJsonStream(
Writable.toWeb(child.stdin!) as unknown as WritableStream<Uint8Array>,
Readable.toWeb(child.stdout!) as unknown as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>,
);
const handler = opts.clientHandler ?? createDefaultClientHandler();
const conn = new ClientSideConnection((_agent: Agent) => handler, stream);
let initResult: Awaited<ReturnType<ClientSideConnection["initialize"]>>;
try {
initResult = await Promise.race([
withTimeout(
conn.initialize({
protocolVersion: PROTOCOL_VERSION,
clientCapabilities: {
fs: {
readTextFile: opts.advertiseFs.read === true,
writeTextFile: opts.advertiseFs.write === true,
},
},
}),
timeoutMs,
() => new HandshakeTimeoutError(timeoutMs),
),
spawnErrored,
]);
} catch (err) {
dispose();
if (spawnError && err === spawnError) throw spawnError;
throw err;
}
// Compare the negotiated integer protocol version; do NOT assume the agent
// errors first (KTD2).
if (initResult.protocolVersion !== PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
dispose();
throw new IncompatibleProtocolError(initResult.protocolVersion);
}
const authMethods = Array.isArray(initResult.authMethods)
? initResult.authMethods.map((m) => ({ id: m.id }))
: [];
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-15:00:
Official Claude ACP scripting requires authenticate after initialize (method
xai.api_key when XAI_API_KEY is set, else cached_token) with
`_meta: { headless: true }` before session/new. Generic ACP agents that
advertise no preferred methods skip this step.
*/
if (opts.authenticate) {
try {
await authenticateAcpConnection(
{ conn, authMethods },
opts.authenticate,
);
} catch (err) {
dispose();
throw err;
}
}
return {
conn,
child,
agentCapabilities: initResult.agentCapabilities,
authMethods,
stderr,
dispose,
};
}
export class AcpAuthRequiredError extends Error {
readonly code = "acp_auth_required" as const;
constructor(readonly availableMethodIds: string[]) {
super(
availableMethodIds.length > 0
? `ACP agent requires authentication but no preferred method matched (available: ${availableMethodIds.join(", ")})`
: "ACP agent requires authentication but advertised no auth methods",
);
this.name = "AcpAuthRequiredError";
}
}
/**
* Call ACP `authenticate` with the first preferred method the agent advertised.
* No-ops when neither methodId nor a preferred method is available and require
* is false.
*/
export async function authenticateAcpConnection(
connection: Pick<AcpConnection, "conn" | "authMethods">,
opts: {
preferMethods?: string[];
methodId?: string;
meta?: Record<string, unknown>;
require?: boolean;
},
): Promise<{ methodId: string } | undefined> {
const available = connection.authMethods.map((m) => m.id);
const availableSet = new Set(available);
let methodId = opts.methodId?.trim();
if (methodId && !availableSet.has(methodId)) {
methodId = undefined;
}
if (!methodId) {
for (const candidate of opts.preferMethods ?? []) {
if (availableSet.has(candidate)) {
methodId = candidate;
break;
}
}
}
if (!methodId) {
if (opts.require) {
throw new AcpAuthRequiredError(available);
}
return undefined;
}
await connection.conn.authenticate({
methodId,
_meta: opts.meta ?? { headless: true },
});
return { methodId };
}
// --- U3: session driving on top of connect() -------------------------------
//
// These helpers wrap the `ClientSideConnection` session methods so the runtime
// adapter drives one shape (open → prompt → cancel/resume) without touching SDK
// types directly. v1 always sends an empty `mcpServers` (KTD5).
function readsLoadSession(connection: AcpConnection): boolean {
// `agentCapabilities` is already typed as `AgentCapabilities | undefined`.
return connection.agentCapabilities?.loadSession === true;
}
export interface NewAcpSessionResult {
sessionId: string;
/** Initial session mode state, when the agent reports one. */
modes?: unknown;
}
/**
* Open a fresh ACP session via `session/new`. Forwards `opts.mcpServers` (U10 —
* Route A): when present and non-empty, the agent can call those Fusion tools and
* each call still routes through the U5 permission floor. Defaults to `[]` so
* Route B read-only ask turns keep their no-tools posture.
*/
export async function newAcpSession(
connection: AcpConnection,
opts: {
cwd: string;
mcpServers?: AcpMcpServer[];
/**
* FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-14:00:
* Optional ACP `_meta` bag for agent-specific session setup (Claude uses
* `pluginDirs`, `rules`, `systemPromptOverride`). Opaque to the generic
* ACP client — agents interpret their own keys.
*/
meta?: Record<string, unknown>;
},
): Promise<NewAcpSessionResult> {
const res = await connection.conn.newSession({
cwd: opts.cwd,
mcpServers: (opts.mcpServers ?? []) as never,
...(opts.meta && Object.keys(opts.meta).length > 0 ? { _meta: opts.meta } : {}),
});
// `sessionId` is agent-supplied/untrusted (U6/Risk S7): bound its length and
// strip path separators / NUL bytes before it is stored on the session or
// could ever touch a resume-file path.
return { sessionId: boundIdentifier(res.sessionId), modes: res.modes ?? undefined };
}
/**
* Send a prompt turn via `session/prompt` and return the terminal `stopReason`.
*
* The SDK prompt promise resolves only AFTER every `session/update` for the turn
* has been delivered to the client handler — so resolving here is the correct
* "turn complete" signal (no extra draining required).
*/
export async function promptAcpSession(
connection: AcpConnection,
sessionId: string,
blocks: ContentBlock[],
): Promise<StopReason> {
const res = await connection.conn.prompt({ sessionId, prompt: blocks });
return res.stopReason;
}
/**
* Best-effort cancel of the active turn via the `session/cancel` notification.
*
* This is fire-and-forget (no ack in the protocol). Errors are swallowed — it
* runs during teardown where the registry SIGKILL is the authoritative guarantee
* (KTD4a).
*/
/** Upper bound on how long `cancelAcpSession` waits on the cancel write (FIX 7). */
const CANCEL_TIMEOUT_MS = 2_000;
export async function cancelAcpSession(
connection: AcpConnection,
sessionId: string,
): Promise<void> {
// `conn.cancel` writes to the agent's stdin pipe; a dead or full pipe can
// back-pressure and stall teardown (the adapter awaits this BEFORE the
// authoritative registry SIGKILL). Bound it so the kill still runs promptly
// (FIX 7). Errors are swallowed — this is already best-effort.
try {
await Promise.race([
connection.conn.cancel({ sessionId }),
new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
const timer = setTimeout(resolve, CANCEL_TIMEOUT_MS);
timer.unref?.();
}),
]);
} catch {
// fire-and-forget; teardown's SIGKILL is authoritative
}
}
/**
* Resume a session. Prefers `session/load` (history replay) when the agent
* advertised the `loadSession` capability; otherwise falls back to opening a
* fresh `session/new`. There is no separate `resume` method in this SDK build —
* `loadSession` IS the resume path.
*
* NOTE (v1): engine-driven resume wiring is intentionally deferred — the
* runtime adapter always opens a fresh session via `newAcpSession`. This helper
* exists (and is unit-tested for the id-sanitization invariant) so resume can be
* wired in by passing a `sessionId` through `AgentRuntimeOptions` later without
* building new resume machinery.
*/
export async function loadAcpSession(
connection: AcpConnection,
opts: { sessionId: string; cwd: string },
): Promise<NewAcpSessionResult> {
if (readsLoadSession(connection)) {
// Bound the (agent-originated) resume id before it is used as a protocol /
// potential path component (U6/Risk S7).
const safeId = boundIdentifier(opts.sessionId);
const res = await connection.conn.loadSession({
sessionId: safeId,
cwd: opts.cwd,
mcpServers: [],
});
return { sessionId: safeId, modes: res.modes ?? undefined };
}
return newAcpSession(connection, { cwd: opts.cwd });
}

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// AgentRuntime adapter for the ACP runtime.
//
// U3 implements the real session lifecycle: createSession spawns + handshakes
// (U2 connect()) then opens a `session/new`; promptWithFallback drives one
// prompt turn to its terminal stopReason; dispose tears down the connection
// (KTD4a — registry SIGKILL is authoritative). The `session/update` event
// bridge (U4) and the permission gate (U5) are wired in later units; for U3 the
// default client handler from U2 is used and a turn still resolves with a
// stopReason.
import { resolveCliSettings, type AcpCliSettings } from "./cli-spawn.js";
import {
connect,
newAcpSession,
promptAcpSession,
cancelAcpSession,
createBridgingClientHandler,
} from "./provider.js";
import { buildSpawnEnv } from "./process-manager.js";
import { buildPromptBlocks, extractPromptImagesFromOptions } from "./prompt-builder.js";
import type {
AgentRuntime,
AgentRuntimeOptions,
AgentSession,
AgentSessionResult,
AcpSession,
} from "./types.js";
export class AcpRuntimeAdapter implements AgentRuntime {
readonly id = "acp";
readonly name = "ACP Runtime";
private readonly settings: AcpCliSettings;
constructor(settings?: Record<string, unknown>) {
this.settings = resolveCliSettings(settings);
}
async createSession(options: AgentRuntimeOptions): Promise<AgentSessionResult> {
const model = this.settings.model ?? options.defaultModelId ?? "acp";
// Bridge streamed `session/update` notifications onto the engine callbacks
// (U4) so ACP agents render like existing runtimes.
const callbacks = {
onText: options.onText,
onThinking: options.onThinking,
onToolStart: options.onToolStart,
onToolEnd: options.onToolEnd,
};
// Build the bridging client handler with the per-run permission gate (U5):
// its `requestPermission` classifies each call per-category against the live
// gate (KTD3a) and selects `allow_once` only (S2). `cancelPending` drains
// in-flight permission requests on teardown so the agent never deadlocks.
// fs client capabilities (U7) are gated by settings — reads opt-in, writes
// default OFF (KTD6) — and confined to the task cwd by the path jail. The
// same toggles drive the advertised `fs` capability in connect() below, so
// advertisement and registered handlers stay consistent.
const { handler: clientHandler, cancelPending, resetTurn } = createBridgingClientHandler(
callbacks,
options.actionGateContext,
{
cwd: options.cwd,
allowRead: this.settings.fsRead,
allowWrite: this.settings.fsWrite,
},
// Risk S1: unless the user acknowledged the untrusted-agent risk, a blanket
// `allow` on a sensitive category is escalated to approval rather than
// auto-approved — so the default `unrestricted` policy can't silently
// green-light this untrusted subprocess.
{ allowUnrestricted: this.settings.allowUnrestricted },
);
// Spawn + initialize (U2). fs capabilities are advertised only where the
// resolved settings enable them (KTD6); the subprocess env is built from the
// allow-list, never inherited process.env (KTD6b).
// Optional authenticate (Claude headless ACP: initialize → authenticate → session/new).
const connection = await connect({
binaryPath: this.settings.binaryPath,
args: this.settings.args,
cwd: options.cwd,
env: buildSpawnEnv(this.settings.envAllowList, { required: this.settings.requiredEnv }),
advertiseFs: { read: this.settings.fsRead, write: this.settings.fsWrite },
clientHandler,
...(this.settings.authenticate ? { authenticate: this.settings.authenticate } : {}),
});
// Open the ACP session over the task worktree. Forward MCP servers when the
// caller supplied them (U10 — Route A); absent/empty keeps the Route B
// read-only ask posture. Tool calls still route through the U5 permission floor.
//
// FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-14:00:
// Callers (Claude runtime) may also pass `_meta` (pluginDirs / rules /
// systemPromptOverride) via options.sessionMeta so agent-specific skill and
// prompt setup rides on session/new without a second protocol hop.
let sessionId: string;
try {
const sessionMeta =
options && typeof options === "object" && "sessionMeta" in options
? (options as { sessionMeta?: Record<string, unknown> }).sessionMeta
: undefined;
const opened = await newAcpSession(connection, {
cwd: options.cwd,
mcpServers: options.mcpServers,
meta: sessionMeta,
});
sessionId = opened.sessionId;
} catch (err) {
// Don't leak the subprocess if session/new fails after a good handshake.
connection.dispose();
throw err;
}
let disposed = false;
const session: AcpSession = {
model,
systemPrompt: options.systemPrompt,
sessionId,
cwd: options.cwd,
lastModelDescription: `acp/${model}`,
callbacks,
// Persist the per-run gate (KTD3) so U5/U7 can reach the live action gate.
gate: options.actionGateContext,
connection,
// Reset the event bridge's per-turn state at the start of each turn so a
// turn that trips the per-turn output cap can't latch and suppress every
// subsequent turn (FIX 1).
resetTurn,
dispose: () => {
if (disposed) return;
disposed = true;
// Drain in-flight permission requests BEFORE the registry kill so a
// blocked agent is released (KTD4a — the SIGKILL is still authoritative).
cancelPending();
connection.dispose();
},
};
return { session };
}
async promptWithFallback(
session: AgentSession,
prompt: string,
options?: unknown,
): Promise<{ stopReason?: string }> {
const acp = session as AcpSession;
if (!acp.connection) {
throw new Error("ACP session has no live connection (createSession not completed)");
}
// Clear per-turn event-bridge state BEFORE driving the turn so tool
// correlation, delta accumulators, and the output-cap latch all start clean
// each turn (FIX 1). Without this, a turn that hit the per-turn output cap
// would silently suppress all later turns.
acp.resetTurn?.();
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-12-07:15:
Chat/triage pass `{ images: [{ type:"image", data, mimeType }] }` through
promptWithFallback. Previously options were ignored (`_options`) so Claude ACP
and generic ACP sessions never received image ContentBlocks on session/prompt.
*/
const images = extractPromptImagesFromOptions(options);
const blocks = buildPromptBlocks(prompt, images ? { images } : undefined);
// Resolve when the SDK prompt promise resolves — it already drains all
// session/update notifications for the turn before reporting the stopReason.
// The bridging client handler installed at createSession (U4) has already
// surfaced streamed text/thinking/tool updates onto session.callbacks.
/*
FNXC:ACP-RouteB 2026-06-14-20:09:
Route-B validation must distinguish clean end_turn answers from truncated or cancelled turns. Surface ACP stopReason to the engine runner instead of discarding it so callers can reject syntactically complete JSON recovered from incomplete output.
*/
const stopReason = await promptAcpSession(acp.connection, acp.sessionId, blocks);
return { stopReason };
}
describeModel(session: AgentSession): string {
return session.lastModelDescription || "acp";
}
async dispose(session: AgentSession): Promise<void> {
// KTD4a teardown: best-effort cancel of any in-flight turn, then force the
// connection down. The process-registry SIGKILL is the authoritative
// no-orphan guarantee, not the cancel round-trip. Idempotent.
const acp = session as AcpSession;
if (acp.connection && acp.sessionId) {
await cancelAcpSession(acp.connection, acp.sessionId);
}
session.dispose();
}
}

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// Untrusted-input sanitization helpers (U6 / Risk S7).
//
// Every string an ACP agent emits — text/thinking deltas, tool `title`, plan
// text, `sessionId`, `toolCallId` — is untrusted input. Before any such string
// reaches a Fusion callback, a log, the UI, or (worst) a filesystem path, it must
// be neutralized:
//
// - `stripControlSequences` removes ANSI/OSC escapes and C0/C1 control chars so
// a crafted string cannot inject terminal escapes / rewrite log lines.
// - `boundString` truncates oversized content (Risk S5) with a visible marker.
// - `boundIdentifier` bounds an agent-supplied id and strips path separators /
// NUL bytes so the id can never be interpolated into a filesystem path
// unsanitized.
/** Default cap for an agent-supplied identifier (sessionId, toolCallId). */
export const DEFAULT_IDENTIFIER_MAX = 256;
/** Marker appended when `boundString` truncates its input. */
export const TRUNCATION_MARKER = "…[truncated]";
// ANSI escape sequences:
// CSI / SGR: ESC [ ... <final byte>
// OSC: ESC ] ... (BEL | ST)
// other ESC-prefixed two-char sequences (e.g. ESC ( B)
const ANSI_PATTERN =
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
/\x1b\][^\x07\x1b]*(?:\x07|\x1b\\)|\x1b[@-Z\\-_]|\x1b\[[0-?]*[ -/]*[@-~]|\x1b[ -/]*[0-~]/g;
// Non-printable control chars to drop. C0 = \x00–\x1F, DEL = \x7F, C1 = \x80–\x9F.
// We KEEP \n (\x0A) and \t (\x09) — they are legitimate whitespace in agent text.
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
const CONTROL_CHARS_PATTERN = /[\x00-\x08\x0B-\x1F\x7F-\x9F]/g;
/**
* Remove ANSI escape sequences (CSI/SGR/OSC) and non-printable C0/C1 control
* characters from an untrusted string. Preserves `\n` and `\t`. Never throws —
* a non-string input yields an empty string.
*/
export function stripControlSequences(text: string): string {
if (typeof text !== "string" || text === "") return "";
return text.replace(ANSI_PATTERN, "").replace(CONTROL_CHARS_PATTERN, "");
}
/**
* Truncate `text` to at most `max` characters, appending a short truncation
* marker when the input is cut. A non-positive `max` yields an empty string; a
* non-string input yields an empty string. The returned string is never longer
* than `max` (the marker replaces the tail of the budget, it is not added on
* top).
*/
export function boundString(text: string, max: number): string {
if (typeof text !== "string" || text === "") return "";
if (!Number.isFinite(max) || max <= 0) return "";
if (text.length <= max) return text;
if (max <= TRUNCATION_MARKER.length) {
return text.slice(0, max);
}
return text.slice(0, max - TRUNCATION_MARKER.length) + TRUNCATION_MARKER;
}
/**
* Bound an agent-supplied identifier to a sane length and strip anything that
* could let it escape into a filesystem path: path separators (`/`, `\`), NUL
* bytes, control chars, and `..` traversal segments are removed. The result is
* a flat, length-bounded token safe to use as a Map key or a single path
* component. A non-string / empty input yields `""`.
*/
export function boundIdentifier(id: string, max: number = DEFAULT_IDENTIFIER_MAX): string {
if (typeof id !== "string" || id === "") return "";
const cap = Number.isFinite(max) && max > 0 ? max : DEFAULT_IDENTIFIER_MAX;
// Drop ANSI/control first, then path-dangerous characters, then traversal.
let cleaned = stripControlSequences(id)
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
.replace(/\x00/g, "")
.replace(/[/\\]/g, "_");
// Collapse any remaining `..` traversal tokens (after separators were removed
// a `..` cannot point anywhere, but normalize it away for defense in depth).
cleaned = cleaned.replace(/\.\.+/g, "_");
return cleaned.slice(0, cap);
}

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// Pure helpers mapping ACP `ToolCall` metadata into the display name + args
// shape Fusion's `onToolStart`/`onToolEnd` callbacks expect.
//
// ACP's `kind` is agent-defined, optional, and partial (U4). These helpers must
// never throw on missing/odd input — a missing title falls back to a label
// derived from `kind`, and a missing/non-object `rawInput` normalizes to `{}`.
import type { ToolKind } from "@agentclientprotocol/sdk";
/** Human-readable labels for each ACP `ToolKind`. */
const KIND_LABELS: Record<ToolKind, string> = {
read: "Read",
edit: "Edit",
delete: "Delete",
move: "Move",
search: "Search",
execute: "Execute",
think: "Think",
fetch: "Fetch",
switch_mode: "Switch Mode",
other: "Tool",
};
/**
* Resolve a display name for a tool call. Prefers the agent-supplied `title`;
* falls back to a label derived from `kind`; final fallback is `"tool"`.
*/
export function toolDisplayName(toolCall: { title?: string | null; kind?: ToolKind | null }): string {
const title = typeof toolCall.title === "string" ? toolCall.title.trim() : "";
if (title) return title;
const kind = toolCall.kind;
if (kind && kind in KIND_LABELS) return KIND_LABELS[kind];
return "tool";
}
/**
* Normalize a tool call's `rawInput` to a plain object. Returns `{}` when the
* input is undefined, null, or any non-object (arrays included) so downstream
* code can always treat args as a record.
*/
export function normalizeToolArgs(rawInput: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
if (rawInput === null || typeof rawInput !== "object" || Array.isArray(rawInput)) {
return {};
}
return rawInput as Record<string, unknown>;
}

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/* Vendored ACP client from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime — see ./VENDORED.md (FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00). */
// Local types for the ACP (Agent Client Protocol) runtime plugin.
//
// The wire protocol types come from `@agentclientprotocol/sdk` (the `schema`
// namespace). These local types describe (a) the Fusion `AgentRuntime` contract
// this plugin implements and (b) the ACP session state this plugin tracks.
//
// The `AgentRuntimeOptions` here is a plugin-local structural copy of the engine
// contract (`packages/engine/src/agent-runtime.ts`). It deliberately includes
// only the fields this runtime reads. `actionGateContext` is the engine-populated
// per-run permission gate — see `PermissionGate` below, the narrow structural
// view this plugin couples to instead of importing `@fusion/engine` internals.
import type { AcpConnection } from "./provider.js";
/** Callbacks the engine wires to surface streamed agent output into Fusion's UI/logs. */
export interface AcpCallbacks {
onText?: (text: string) => void;
onThinking?: (text: string) => void;
onToolStart?: (toolName: string, args?: unknown) => void;
onToolEnd?: (toolName: string, isError: boolean, result?: unknown) => void;
}
/**
* MCP servers forwarded to the agent on `session/new` (U10 — Route A).
* `env` / `headers` are explicit name/value pairs; inherited `process.env` is
* NEVER forwarded to the untrusted agent.
*
* FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-14:00:
* Widen beyond stdio so Claude ACP can receive Fusion operator MCP servers over
* http/sse (Claude advertises mcpCapabilities.http/sse) as well as the classic
* stdio custom-tools bridge used by Route A.
*/
export interface AcpMcpServerStdio {
name: string;
command: string;
args: string[];
env: { name: string; value: string }[];
}
export interface AcpMcpServerHttp {
type: "http";
name: string;
url: string;
headers: { name: string; value: string }[];
}
export interface AcpMcpServerSse {
type: "sse";
name: string;
url: string;
headers: { name: string; value: string }[];
}
export type AcpMcpServer = AcpMcpServerStdio | AcpMcpServerHttp | AcpMcpServerSse;
/** Per-category permission disposition (mirrors the engine policy shape). */
export type GateDisposition = "allow" | "block" | "require-approval";
/**
* Fusion action-gate categories — the full policy-rule keyspace, used to read
* `permissionPolicy.rules[category]`. `"exempt"` is implicit (read-only / benign)
* and always allows.
*
* Note: ACP's `ToolKind` has no git/task discriminator, so `classifyToolKind`
* only ever produces `file_write_delete` / `command_execution` / `network_api`
* (+ exempt). `git_write` and `task_agent_mutation` remain part of the category
* type because the policy rules are keyed by all categories — git writes in
* particular route through `file_write_delete` gating PLUS the path-jail's hard
* `.git/**` reject (KTD6a), not a dedicated `git_write` classification.
*/
export type FusionCategory =
| "git_write"
| "file_write_delete"
| "command_execution"
| "network_api"
| "task_agent_mutation";
/** Approval lifecycle status as returned by the gate's lookup closure. */
export type ApprovalStatus = "pending" | "approved" | "denied" | "completed";
/**
* Narrow structural view of the engine's `AgentActionGateContext`
* (`packages/engine/src/agent-action-gate.ts`). The plugin reads only these
* members; typing them locally avoids a hard dependency on `@fusion/engine`.
*
* `permissionPolicy.rules` is the per-category disposition map the U5 floor
* consults — NEVER a preset id (S1/KTD3a). All HITL closures except
* `createApprovalRequest` are optional: when the HITL machinery is absent, the
* permission floor (U5) default-denies `require-approval` categories rather than
* throwing (Risk S1).
*/
export interface PermissionGate {
permissionPolicy?: {
rules?: Record<string, GateDisposition>;
};
/** Register an approval request; returns the created record (with an `id`). */
createApprovalRequest?: (
decision: unknown,
args: Record<string, unknown>,
) => Promise<unknown> | unknown;
/** Look up a prior decision by dedupe key (decision reuse). */
findApprovalByDedupeKey?: (
dedupeKey: string,
) => Promise<{ id: string; status: ApprovalStatus } | null> | { id: string; status: ApprovalStatus } | null;
/** Block until the human resolves the referenced approval request. */
pauseForApproval?: (info: {
approvalRequestId: string;
decision: unknown;
}) => Promise<void> | void;
/** Mark an approval request finalized after the decision is consumed. */
markApprovalCompleted?: (approvalRequestId: string) => Promise<void> | void;
}
/** Plugin-local copy of the engine's AgentRuntimeOptions (subset this runtime reads). */
export interface AgentRuntimeOptions {
cwd: string;
systemPrompt: string;
tools?: "coding" | "readonly";
onText?: (text: string) => void;
onThinking?: (text: string) => void;
onToolStart?: (toolName: string, args?: unknown) => void;
onToolEnd?: (toolName: string, isError: boolean, result?: unknown) => void;
defaultProvider?: string;
defaultModelId?: string;
defaultThinkingLevel?: string;
/** Per-run permission gate, populated by the engine. See PermissionGate. */
actionGateContext?: PermissionGate;
/**
* MCP servers to forward on `session/new` (U10 — Route A). When present and
* non-empty, the agent can call these tools (each call still routes through the
* U5 permission floor). Absent/empty preserves Route B's read-only ask posture.
*/
mcpServers?: AcpMcpServer[];
/**
* FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-14:00:
* Opaque ACP `session/new._meta` for agent-specific setup (Claude pluginDirs /
* rules / systemPromptOverride). Ignored by agents that do not read `_meta`.
*/
sessionMeta?: Record<string, unknown>;
}
/** Live ACP session state tracked by the runtime adapter. */
export interface AcpSession {
/** Model/agent identifier resolved for this session. */
model: string;
systemPrompt: string;
/** ACP session id returned by `session/new` (empty until established). */
sessionId: string;
/** Working directory the agent operates over (the task worktree). */
cwd: string;
lastModelDescription: string;
callbacks: AcpCallbacks;
/** Per-run permission gate captured at createSession (U5/U7 read this). */
gate?: PermissionGate;
/**
* Live ACP connection backing this session (U3). Prompt/dispose reach the
* agent through it. Undefined only for the bare session shell used in tests.
*/
connection?: AcpConnection;
/**
* Reset the event bridge's per-turn state (tool correlation, delta
* accumulators, output-cap latch). Called by `promptWithFallback` at the start
* of each turn (FIX 1). Undefined for the bare session shell used in tests.
*/
resetTurn?: () => void;
dispose(): void;
}
export type AgentSession = AcpSession;
export interface AgentPromptResult {
stopReason?: string;
}
export interface AgentSessionResult {
session: AgentSession;
sessionFile?: string;
}
/** The Fusion runtime contract this plugin implements (mirrors the engine interface). */
export interface AgentRuntime {
id: string;
name: string;
createSession(options: AgentRuntimeOptions): Promise<AgentSessionResult>;
promptWithFallback(session: AgentSession, prompt: string, options?: unknown): Promise<void | AgentPromptResult>;
describeModel(session: AgentSession): string;
dispose?(session: AgentSession): Promise<void>;
}

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import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, resolve } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
export const CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY = "claude-code-cli-acp";
export interface ClaudeBridgeResolution { kind: "resolved" | "not_resolved"; requested: string; path?: string; reason?: string }
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-18-11:55:
The plugin runs both from source (`src/`), a standalone build (`dist/`), and
Fusion's single-file `bundled.js`. Only the first two sit one directory below the
plugin root; bundled.js sits at the root. Resolve the staged bridge relative to
that layout so published CLI sessions do not look in `dist/plugins/bridge`.
*/
function pluginRootDir(): string {
const moduleDir = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
return ["src", "dist"].includes(basename(moduleDir)) ? resolve(moduleDir, "..") : moduleDir;
}
/** Resolve only the identity-pinned bridge staged beside this bundled plugin. */
export function bundledClaudeBridgeBinPath(pluginRoot = pluginRootDir()): string {
return join(pluginRoot, "bridge", `${CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY}${process.platform === "win32" ? ".cmd" : ""}`);
}
export function resolveBundledClaudeBridgeBinary(options: { pluginRoot?: string; exists?: (path: string) => boolean } = {}): ClaudeBridgeResolution {
const candidate = bundledClaudeBridgeBinPath(options.pluginRoot ?? pluginRootDir());
const exists = options.exists ?? existsSync;
if (!exists(candidate) || !isAbsolute(candidate)) return { kind: "not_resolved", requested: CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY, path: candidate, reason: `Staged ${CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY} bridge was not found at ${candidate}` };
return { kind: "resolved", requested: CLAUDE_CODE_CLI_ACP_BINARY, path: candidate };
}
export async function runClaudeCommand(binary: string, args: string[], timeoutMs: number): Promise<{ code: number | null; stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
return new Promise((done) => { let stdout="", stderr="", settled=false; const finish=(r:{code:number|null;stdout:string;stderr:string})=>{if(!settled){settled=true;clearTimeout(timer);done(r)}}; const child=spawn(binary,args,{stdio:["ignore","pipe","pipe"],shell:process.platform==="win32"}); const timer=setTimeout(()=>{try{child.kill("SIGKILL")}catch{ /* process already exited */ } finish({code:124,stdout,stderr})},timeoutMs); child.stdout?.on("data",c=>stdout+=String(c)); child.stderr?.on("data",c=>stderr+=String(c)); child.once("error",e=>finish({code:127,stdout,stderr:`${stderr}${e.message}`})); child.once("close",code=>finish({code,stdout,stderr})); });
}

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import { definePlugin } from "@fusion/plugin-sdk";
import type { FusionPlugin } from "@fusion/plugin-sdk";
import { killAllProcesses } from "./acp/index.js";
import { probeClaudeBinary } from "./probe.js";
import { discoverClaudeProviderModels } from "./provider.js";
import { ClaudeRuntimeAdapter } from "./runtime-adapter.js";
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcpRuntime 2026-07-17-12:00:
FN-8224 adds a first-class Claude ACP runtime. It composes the reviewed,
identity-pinned claude-code-cli-acp bridge, mirrors the bundled Grok runtime,
and is additive to the existing experimental pi-claude-cli Route A.
*/
/*
FNXC:ProcessLifecycle 2026-07-16-07:00:
The dashboard backfill worker repeatedly evaluates this plugin through
`vi.resetModules()` while retaining the process singleton. Install one exit
listener per Claude lifecycle owner and use the process-shared registry in the
ACP manager so it reaps children from every evaluation. Do not appease this
with `setMaxListeners`; the listener must stay bounded.
*/
const PROCESS_EXIT_HOOK_KEY = Symbol.for("fusion.plugin.claude-runtime.exitCleanup");
const processWithExitHook = process as typeof process & { [key: symbol]: boolean | undefined };
if (!processWithExitHook[PROCESS_EXIT_HOOK_KEY]) {
process.on("exit", killAllProcesses);
processWithExitHook[PROCESS_EXIT_HOOK_KEY] = true;
}
const plugin: FusionPlugin = definePlugin({
manifest: {
id: "fusion-plugin-claude-runtime",
name: "Claude Runtime Plugin",
version: "0.1.0",
description: "Claude CLI runtime support for Fusion (ACP agent stdio)",
runtime: {
runtimeId: "claude",
name: "Claude Runtime",
version: "0.1.0",
},
},
state: "installed",
hooks: {
onLoad: (ctx) => {
ctx.logger.info(
"Claude Runtime Plugin loaded — transport=ACP (claude-code-cli-acp); probe uses claude --version",
);
},
},
runtime: {
metadata: {
runtimeId: "claude",
name: "Claude Runtime",
version: "0.1.0",
},
factory: async () => new ClaudeRuntimeAdapter(),
},
cliProviders: [
{
providerId: "claude-cli",
displayName: "Claude CLI",
binaryName: "claude",
providerType: "cli",
statusRoute: "/providers/claude-cli/status",
authRoute: "/auth/claude-cli",
actions: [
{ actionId: "enable", label: "Enable", actionType: "enable", method: "POST", route: "/auth/claude-cli" },
{ actionId: "disable", label: "Disable", actionType: "disable", method: "POST", route: "/auth/claude-cli" },
{ actionId: "test", label: "Test", actionType: "test", method: "GET", route: "/providers/claude-cli/status" }
],
probe: async () => {
const status = await probeClaudeBinary();
return {
available: status.available,
authenticated: status.authenticated,
binaryPath: status.binaryPath,
binaryName: status.binaryName,
version: status.version,
reason: status.reason,
};
},
discoverModels: discoverClaudeProviderModels,
runtime: {
runtimeId: "claude",
createAdapter: async () => new ClaudeRuntimeAdapter(),
},
},
],
});
export default plugin;
export { probeClaudeBinary } from "./probe.js";
export { discoverClaudeProviderModels } from "./provider.js";
export { ClaudeRuntimeAdapter } from "./runtime-adapter.js";
export type { ClaudeBinaryStatus } from "./types.js";

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/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-14:00:
Convert engine-resolved MCP server definitions (FN-7022 three-transport shape)
into ACP `session/new.mcpServers` entries so Claude agent stdio receives the same
operator-approved MCP set as other Fusion AI lanes. Env/header secrets are
already materialized by the engine; this module only reshapes them and never logs
server contents.
*/
export type AcpMcpServer =
| {
name: string;
command: string;
args: string[];
env: { name: string; value: string }[];
}
| {
type: "http";
name: string;
url: string;
headers: { name: string; value: string }[];
}
| {
type: "sse";
name: string;
url: string;
headers: { name: string; value: string }[];
};
function asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {
return value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value)
? (value as Record<string, unknown>)
: undefined;
}
function mapEntries(map: Record<string, string> | undefined): { name: string; value: string }[] {
if (!map) return [];
return Object.entries(map)
.filter((entry): entry is [string, string] => typeof entry[0] === "string" && typeof entry[1] === "string")
.map(([name, value]) => ({ name, value }));
}
/**
* Normalize engine `mcpServers` (ResolvedMcpServerDefinition or legacy ACP
* stdio shape) into the ACP wire format Claude accepts.
*/
export function toAcpMcpServers(servers: unknown): AcpMcpServer[] {
if (!Array.isArray(servers) || servers.length === 0) return [];
const out: AcpMcpServer[] = [];
for (const raw of servers) {
const server = asRecord(raw);
if (!server) continue;
const name = typeof server.name === "string" ? server.name.trim() : "";
if (!name || server.enabled === false) continue;
// Legacy ACP stdio shape: { name, command, args, env: [{name,value}] }
if (typeof server.command === "string" && server.command.trim() && !("transport" in server) && !("type" in server) && !("url" in server)) {
const envPairs = Array.isArray(server.env)
? server.env
.map((entry) => asRecord(entry))
.filter((entry): entry is Record<string, unknown> => Boolean(entry))
.filter((entry) => typeof entry.name === "string" && typeof entry.value === "string")
.map((entry) => ({ name: String(entry.name), value: String(entry.value) }))
: mapEntries(asRecord(server.env) as Record<string, string> | undefined);
out.push({
name,
command: server.command.trim(),
args: Array.isArray(server.args) ? server.args.filter((a): a is string => typeof a === "string") : [],
env: envPairs,
});
continue;
}
const transport = typeof server.transport === "string" ? server.transport : typeof server.type === "string" ? server.type : "stdio";
if (transport === "stdio") {
const command = typeof server.command === "string" ? server.command.trim() : "";
if (!command) continue;
out.push({
name,
command,
args: Array.isArray(server.args) ? server.args.filter((a): a is string => typeof a === "string") : [],
env: mapEntries(asRecord(server.env) as Record<string, string> | undefined),
});
continue;
}
if (transport === "http" || transport === "streamable-http") {
const url = typeof server.url === "string" ? server.url.trim() : "";
if (!url) continue;
out.push({
type: "http",
name,
url,
headers: mapEntries(asRecord(server.headers) as Record<string, string> | undefined),
});
continue;
}
if (transport === "sse") {
const url = typeof server.url === "string" ? server.url.trim() : "";
if (!url) continue;
out.push({
type: "sse",
name,
url,
headers: mapEntries(asRecord(server.headers) as Record<string, string> | undefined),
});
}
}
return out;
}

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#!/usr/bin/env node
/*
FNXC:GrokAcp 2026-07-11-14:00:
Executable MCP bridge for Fusion custom tools (fn_*) on the Grok ACP path.
tools/list is served from a schema file; tools/call POSTs to a localhost bridge
owned by GrokRuntimeAdapter so ToolDefinition.execute runs in-process with the
engine's closures. Unlike the Claude/Droid schema-only break-early servers,
Grok actually invokes MCP tools/call itself.
*/
"use strict";
const fs = require("fs");
const http = require("http");
const readline = require("readline");
// FNXC:GrokAcp 2026-07-11-18:30: CJS has no global URL under eslint no-undef; use node:url.
const { URL } = require("node:url");
const schemaPath = process.argv[2];
const bridgeUrl = process.env.FUSION_GROK_TOOL_BRIDGE_URL;
const capabilityToken = process.env.FUSION_TOOL_BRIDGE_CAPABILITY;
if (!schemaPath || !bridgeUrl || !capabilityToken) {
process.stderr.write("fusion-tools-mcp-server: missing schema path, bridge URL, or capability\n");
process.exit(1);
}
let tools = [];
try {
tools = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(schemaPath, "utf-8"));
if (!Array.isArray(tools)) tools = [];
} catch {
process.exit(1);
}
function write(msg) {
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(msg) + "\n");
}
function callBridge(toolName, args) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const body = JSON.stringify({ name: toolName, arguments: args ?? {} });
const url = new URL("/tool-call", bridgeUrl);
const req = http.request(
{
hostname: url.hostname,
port: url.port,
path: url.pathname,
method: "POST",
headers: {
"content-type": "application/json",
"content-length": Buffer.byteLength(body),
authorization: `Bearer ${capabilityToken}`,
},
timeout: 120_000,
},
(res) => {
let data = "";
res.on("data", (chunk) => {
data += chunk;
});
res.on("end", () => {
try {
resolve(JSON.parse(data || "{}"));
} catch (err) {
reject(err);
}
});
},
);
req.on("error", reject);
req.on("timeout", () => {
req.destroy(new Error("tool bridge timeout"));
});
req.write(body);
req.end();
});
}
const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: process.stdin });
rl.on("line", (line) => {
let msg;
try {
msg = JSON.parse(line);
} catch {
return;
}
if (msg.method === "initialize") {
write({
jsonrpc: "2.0",
id: msg.id,
result: {
protocolVersion: "2024-11-05",
capabilities: { tools: {} },
serverInfo: { name: "fusion-custom-tools", version: "1.0.0" },
},
});
return;
}
if (msg.method === "notifications/initialized" || msg.method === "initialized") {
return;
}
if (msg.method === "tools/list") {
write({
jsonrpc: "2.0",
id: msg.id,
result: {
tools: tools.map((tool) => ({
name: tool.name,
description: tool.description ?? "",
inputSchema: tool.inputSchema ?? { type: "object", properties: {} },
})),
},
});
return;
}
if (msg.method === "tools/call") {
const toolName = msg.params?.name;
const args = msg.params?.arguments ?? {};
callBridge(toolName, args)
.then((result) => {
write({
jsonrpc: "2.0",
id: msg.id,
result: {
content: Array.isArray(result.content)
? result.content
: [{ type: "text", text: typeof result.text === "string" ? result.text : JSON.stringify(result) }],
isError: result.isError === true,
},
});
})
.catch((err) => {
write({
jsonrpc: "2.0",
id: msg.id,
result: {
content: [{ type: "text", text: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) }],
isError: true,
},
});
});
return;
}
if (msg.id !== undefined) {
write({
jsonrpc: "2.0",
id: msg.id,
error: { code: -32601, message: `Method not found: ${msg.method}` },
});
}
});

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import { resolveBundledClaudeBridgeBinary, runClaudeCommand } from "./cli-spawn.js";
import type { ClaudeBinaryStatus } from "./types.js";
/** Claude auth belongs to its CLI/ACP bridge; availability never requires a Fusion-visible API key. */
export async function probeClaudeBinary(options?: { timeoutMs?: number; binaryPath?: string }): Promise<ClaudeBinaryStatus> {
const startedAt=Date.now(); const bridge=resolveBundledClaudeBridgeBinary(); const binary=options?.binaryPath?.trim() || "claude"; const result=await runClaudeCommand(binary,["--version"],options?.timeoutMs ?? 3000);
if (result.code===0 && bridge.kind==="resolved") return {available:true,authenticated:true,binaryName:binary,binaryPath:bridge.path,version:result.stdout.trim()||undefined,probeDurationMs:Date.now()-startedAt};
return {available:false,authenticated:false,binaryName:binary,binaryPath:bridge.path,reason:bridge.reason ?? (result.stderr.trim() || "Claude CLI unavailable"),probeDurationMs:Date.now()-startedAt};
}

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import { probeClaudeBinary } from "./probe.js";
const KNOWN_CLAUDE_MODELS = ["claude-sonnet-4-20250514", "claude-opus-4-20250514", "claude-3-5-haiku-20241022"];
export async function discoverClaudeProviderModels(options?: unknown) {
const settings=options && typeof options === "object" ? options as { binaryPath?: string; timeoutMs?: number } : {};
const probe=await probeClaudeBinary(settings);
if (!probe.available) return {models: [], source:"probe", fallbackUsed:true, reason:probe.reason ?? "Claude ACP bridge unavailable"};
return {models: KNOWN_CLAUDE_MODELS.map((id)=>({id,label:id})), source:"known", fallbackUsed:false};
}

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import { AcpRuntimeAdapter } from "./acp/index.js";
import {
buildClaudeAcpRuntimeSettings,
modelForCli,
normalizeClaudeCliModel,
} from "./acp-settings.js";
import { toAcpMcpServers, type AcpMcpServer } from "./mcp-forwarding.js";
import {
buildClaudeSkillRules,
extractRequestedSkillNames,
stageClaudeSessionSkills,
} from "./skill-loader.js";
import { startFusionToolBridge, type FusionToolBridge, type ToolLike } from "./tool-bridge.js";
import type {
AgentRuntime,
AgentRuntimeOptions,
AgentSession,
AgentSessionResult,
ClaudeSession,
} from "./types.js";
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-12:00:
Replace the one-shot headless path (`claude -p --output-format json`) with native
ACP transport (`claude agent stdio`) for realtime streaming, tool visibility, and
multi-turn session reuse. Implementation composes a vendored AcpRuntimeAdapter
(copied under ./acp/, not imported from fusion-plugin-acp-runtime) with
Claude-specific binary/args/env. Keep resolve-never-reject on prompt failures so
chat/executor always get a well-formed turn; surface create/prompt failures as
visible onText diagnostics rather than silent empty bubbles (FN-7779 invariant).
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-16:00:
Do not import `@fusion-plugin-examples/acp-runtime`. Claude is bundled/auto-install;
the generic ACP plugin is experimental. Vendor the client modules under src/acp/.
FNXC:ClaudeCliRouting 2026-07-10-10:54:
FN-7753's auto-derived `claude` runtime routing from a `claude-cli/*` model selection
still preserves the concrete model. Normalize provider-qualified ids
(`claude-cli/<id>` or `claude/<id>`) and pass only the concrete id as `claude agent -m`;
the no-model Runtime-mode path keeps `claude/default` and omits `-m`.
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-14:00:
Load Fusion tools + skills into the ACP session:
- Operator MCP servers → session/new.mcpServers (stdio/http/sse)
- Engine customTools (fn_*) → loopback MCP bridge + fusion-custom-tools server
- Skills → session-scoped --plugin-dir / _meta.pluginDirs + rules context
*/
export type AcpAdapterFactory = (settings: Record<string, unknown>) => {
createSession(options: AgentRuntimeOptions): Promise<AgentSessionResult>;
promptWithFallback(
session: AgentSession,
prompt: string,
options?: unknown,
): Promise<void | { stopReason?: string }>;
describeModel(session: AgentSession): string;
dispose?(session: AgentSession): Promise<void>;
};
export interface ClaudeRuntimeAdapterOptions {
/** Binary name/path to invoke. Defaults to "claude" (PATH resolution). */
binary?: string;
/**
* Injectable ACP adapter factory for tests. Production uses
* `AcpRuntimeAdapter` with Claude ACP settings.
*/
createAcpAdapter?: AcpAdapterFactory;
}
/** Turn-scoped stream accumulators stored on the session for prompt finalization. */
interface TurnAccum {
text: string;
}
interface SessionResources {
toolBridge?: FusionToolBridge | null;
skillStaging?: { dispose: () => void } | null;
}
function compactDiagnostic(value: string): string {
return value.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
}
function describeCreateFailure(error: unknown): string {
const reason = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error ?? "unknown error");
return compactDiagnostic(
`Claude ACP failed to start: ${reason}. Ensure the \`claude\` binary is installed and authenticated (` +
`\`claude agent stdio\`), or set XAI_API_KEY / GROK_API_KEY for key-based auth.`,
);
}
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-15-18:45:
`promptAcpSession` (acp-runtime provider.ts) already re-shapes JSON-RPC faults into a diagnostic
carrying the rpc code — e.g. `Internal error (acp rpc code -32603, retryable)`. Pass that through
verbatim rather than re-flattening to `error.message`, so the engine's transient classifier can
recognize a provider-side blip and retry instead of parking the task permanently.
FN-8004: the bare message reaching the merger was "Internal error", matched no transient pattern,
and terminally failed an auto-merge whose branch work was complete and correct.
*/
function describePromptFailure(error: unknown): string {
const reason = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error ?? "unknown error");
return compactDiagnostic(`Claude ACP turn failed: ${reason}`);
}
function appendMessage(session: ClaudeSession, role: "user" | "assistant", content: string): void {
const entry = { role, content };
session.state.messages.push(entry);
if (session.messages !== session.state.messages) {
session.messages.push(entry);
}
}
const TURN_ACCUM = Symbol("claudeTurnAccum");
const SESSION_RESOURCES = Symbol("claudeSessionResources");
type SessionWithExtras = ClaudeSession & {
[TURN_ACCUM]?: TurnAccum;
[SESSION_RESOURCES]?: SessionResources;
};
function getTurnAccum(session: ClaudeSession): TurnAccum {
const s = session as SessionWithExtras;
if (!s[TURN_ACCUM]) {
s[TURN_ACCUM] = { text: "" };
}
return s[TURN_ACCUM];
}
function resetTurnAccum(session: ClaudeSession): void {
getTurnAccum(session).text = "";
}
function collectCustomTools(options: AgentRuntimeOptions): ToolLike[] {
const fromCustom = Array.isArray(options.customTools) ? (options.customTools as ToolLike[]) : [];
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-19:00:
AgentRuntimeOptions.tools is typed as "coding"|"readonly"|undefined, but some call sites pass
an array of ToolDefinitions. Narrow via Array.isArray on the tools field, then cast the array
value only — never cast the whole options object to { tools: ToolLike[] } (TS2352).
*/
const toolsField = (options as { tools?: unknown }).tools;
const maybeToolsArray = Array.isArray(toolsField) ? (toolsField as ToolLike[]) : [];
return [...fromCustom, ...maybeToolsArray];
}
function ensureClaudeSessionShape(
session: AgentSession,
model: string,
options: AgentRuntimeOptions,
turnAccum: TurnAccum,
resources: SessionResources,
): ClaudeSession {
const messages: unknown[] =
Array.isArray((session as ClaudeSession).messages) ? (session as ClaudeSession).messages : [];
const existingState = (session as { state?: ClaudeSession["state"] }).state;
const state: ClaudeSession["state"] = existingState ?? { messages };
if (!Array.isArray(state.messages)) {
state.messages = messages;
}
const claude = session as ClaudeSession;
claude.model = model;
claude.systemPrompt = claude.systemPrompt ?? options.systemPrompt;
claude.messages = state.messages;
claude.state = state;
claude.lastModelDescription = `claude/${model}`;
// Prefer callbacks already installed on the ACP session (wrapped at create
// for turnAccum + engine fans-out). Only fall back to the raw engine options.
claude.callbacks = {
onText: claude.callbacks?.onText ?? options.onText,
onThinking: claude.callbacks?.onThinking ?? options.onThinking,
onToolStart: claude.callbacks?.onToolStart ?? options.onToolStart,
onToolEnd: claude.callbacks?.onToolEnd ?? options.onToolEnd,
};
const originalDispose = typeof claude.dispose === "function" ? claude.dispose.bind(claude) : () => undefined;
claude.dispose = () => {
void resources.toolBridge?.dispose();
resources.skillStaging?.dispose();
originalDispose();
};
(claude as SessionWithExtras)[TURN_ACCUM] = turnAccum;
(claude as SessionWithExtras)[SESSION_RESOURCES] = resources;
return claude;
}
function createDeadSession(
model: string,
options: AgentRuntimeOptions,
diagnostic: string,
resources?: SessionResources,
): ClaudeSession {
const messages: unknown[] = [];
const session: ClaudeSession = {
model,
systemPrompt: options.systemPrompt,
messages,
state: { messages, errorMessage: diagnostic },
sessionId: undefined,
lastModelDescription: `claude/${model}`,
callbacks: {
onText: options.onText,
onThinking: options.onThinking,
onToolStart: options.onToolStart,
onToolEnd: options.onToolEnd,
},
dispose: () => {
void resources?.toolBridge?.dispose();
resources?.skillStaging?.dispose();
},
};
return session;
}
export class ClaudeRuntimeAdapter implements AgentRuntime {
readonly id = "claude";
readonly name = "Claude Runtime";
private readonly binary?: string;
private readonly createAcpAdapter: AcpAdapterFactory;
/** Per-session ACP adapter so model-specific spawn args stay consistent. */
private readonly adapters = new WeakMap<object, ReturnType<AcpAdapterFactory>>();
constructor(options?: ClaudeRuntimeAdapterOptions) {
// The default is the staged, identity-pinned Claude ACP bridge; injection is test-only.
this.binary = options?.binary;
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-19:00:
AcpRuntimeAdapter returns ACP AgentSession shapes (acp/types); AcpAdapterFactory is typed
against Claude AgentSessionResult (messages/state). createSession always runs
ensureClaudeSessionShape after the ACP create, so the production factory is a deliberate
structural bridge via unknown rather than unifying the two session interfaces here.
*/
this.createAcpAdapter =
options?.createAcpAdapter ??
((settings) => new AcpRuntimeAdapter(settings) as unknown as ReturnType<AcpAdapterFactory>);
}
async createSession(
options: AgentRuntimeOptions = {
cwd: process.cwd(),
systemPrompt: "",
},
): Promise<AgentSessionResult> {
const model = normalizeClaudeCliModel(options.defaultModelId) ?? "claude/default";
const turnAccum: TurnAccum = { text: "" };
const resources: SessionResources = {};
// ── Skills ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const requestedSkillNames = extractRequestedSkillNames({
skills: options.skills,
skillSelection: options.skillSelection,
});
const skillStaging = stageClaudeSessionSkills({
requestedSkillNames,
additionalSkillPaths: options.additionalSkillPaths,
includeFusionSkill: true,
});
resources.skillStaging = skillStaging;
// ── Operator MCP + Fusion custom tools ────────────────────────────────
const operatorMcp = toAcpMcpServers(options.mcpServers);
let toolBridge: FusionToolBridge | null = null;
try {
toolBridge = await startFusionToolBridge(collectCustomTools(options), {
actionGateContext: options.actionGateContext,
});
resources.toolBridge = toolBridge;
} catch {
toolBridge = null;
}
const mcpServers: AcpMcpServer[] = [
...operatorMcp,
...(toolBridge ? [toolBridge.mcpServer] : []),
];
const rules = buildClaudeSkillRules({
skillNames: skillStaging.skillNames.length > 0 ? skillStaging.skillNames : requestedSkillNames,
toolMode: typeof options.tools === "string" ? options.tools : "coding",
fusionToolCount: toolBridge?.toolCount,
operatorMcpCount: operatorMcp.length,
});
const systemPromptParts = [options.systemPrompt?.trim() ?? "", rules].filter((part) => part.length > 0);
const systemPrompt = systemPromptParts.join("\n\n");
const sessionMeta: Record<string, unknown> = {
pluginDirs: [skillStaging.pluginDir],
rules,
...(systemPrompt ? { systemPromptOverride: systemPrompt } : {}),
};
const sessionOptions: AgentRuntimeOptions = {
...options,
cwd: options.cwd?.trim() ? options.cwd : process.cwd(),
systemPrompt,
defaultModelId: modelForCli(model) ?? model,
mcpServers,
sessionMeta,
onText: (delta: string) => {
turnAccum.text += delta;
options.onText?.(delta);
},
onThinking: (delta: string) => {
options.onThinking?.(delta);
},
onToolStart: (name: string, args?: unknown) => {
options.onToolStart?.(name, args);
},
onToolEnd: (name: string, isError: boolean, result?: unknown) => {
options.onToolEnd?.(name, isError, result);
},
};
const settings = buildClaudeAcpRuntimeSettings({
...(this.binary ? { binary: this.binary } : {}),
model,
pluginDirs: [skillStaging.pluginDir],
});
const acp = this.createAcpAdapter(settings);
try {
const result = await acp.createSession(sessionOptions);
const session = ensureClaudeSessionShape(result.session, model, options, turnAccum, resources);
this.adapters.set(session, acp);
return { session, sessionFile: result.sessionFile };
} catch (error) {
const diagnostic = describeCreateFailure(error);
const session = createDeadSession(model, sessionOptions, diagnostic, resources);
session.callbacks.onText?.(diagnostic);
appendMessage(session, "assistant", diagnostic);
return { session, sessionFile: undefined };
}
}
async promptWithFallback(
session: AgentSession,
prompt: string,
options?: unknown,
): Promise<void | { stopReason?: string }> {
const claudeSession = session as ClaudeSession;
appendMessage(claudeSession, "user", prompt);
resetTurnAccum(claudeSession);
const acp = this.adapters.get(session);
const hasConnection =
acp && "connection" in session && Boolean((session as { connection?: unknown }).connection);
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-12-06:15:
Dead / disposed sessions have no ACP connection. Follow-up prompts must not
append a user message and return silently — always re-surface a diagnostic
via onText + assistant message so multi-turn chat stays visible. Prefer the
previous errorMessage when present so operators still see the root cause.
*/
if (!hasConnection) {
const existing = claudeSession.state.errorMessage?.trim();
const diagnostic = existing
? `Claude ACP session has no live connection (previous error: ${existing}). Start a new session to retry.`
: "Claude ACP session has no live connection. The `claude agent stdio` process failed to start or was disposed.";
claudeSession.state.errorMessage = diagnostic;
claudeSession.callbacks.onText?.(diagnostic);
appendMessage(claudeSession, "assistant", diagnostic);
return;
}
try {
const result = await acp!.promptWithFallback(session, prompt, options);
const assistantText = getTurnAccum(claudeSession).text;
if (assistantText.length > 0) {
appendMessage(claudeSession, "assistant", assistantText);
} else if (result && typeof result === "object" && "stopReason" in result) {
const stopReason = result.stopReason;
if (stopReason && stopReason !== "end_turn" && stopReason !== "EndTurn") {
const diagnostic = `Claude ACP ended with stopReason ${stopReason} and produced no assistant text.`;
claudeSession.state.errorMessage = diagnostic;
claudeSession.callbacks.onText?.(diagnostic);
appendMessage(claudeSession, "assistant", diagnostic);
}
}
return result;
} catch (error) {
const assistantText = getTurnAccum(claudeSession).text;
if (assistantText.length === 0) {
const diagnostic = describePromptFailure(error);
claudeSession.state.errorMessage = diagnostic;
claudeSession.callbacks.onText?.(diagnostic);
appendMessage(claudeSession, "assistant", diagnostic);
} else {
appendMessage(claudeSession, "assistant", assistantText);
}
return;
}
}
describeModel(session: AgentSession): string {
const claudeSession = session as ClaudeSession;
return claudeSession.lastModelDescription || `claude/${claudeSession.model ?? "default"}`;
}
async dispose(session: AgentSession): Promise<void> {
const resources = (session as SessionWithExtras)[SESSION_RESOURCES];
try {
await resources?.toolBridge?.dispose();
} catch {
// best-effort
}
try {
resources?.skillStaging?.dispose();
} catch {
// best-effort
}
const acp = this.adapters.get(session);
if (acp && typeof acp.dispose === "function") {
await acp.dispose(session);
return;
}
const claude = session as ClaudeSession;
claude.dispose?.();
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-14:00:
Stage Fusion + session skills so Claude ACP discovers them the same way pi does.
Claude loads skills from trusted `--plugin-dir` / `_meta.pluginDirs` plugins
(skills/ SKILL.md tree). We materialize a session-scoped plugin directory with:
- the bundled Fusion skill (fn_* tool catalog + workflows)
- skills from engine additionalSkillPaths / skill roots
Requested skill names are also listed in runtime context rules so the agent
still sees the selection when a skill file cannot be resolved on disk.
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-12-06:15:
Packaged `@runfusion/fusion` publishes `skill/**` (not only monorepo
`packages/cli/skill/fusion`). Expand fusion-skill candidates so CLI installs under
`dist/plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/` still resolve `skill/fusion` at the
package root, via parent walks, createRequire of `@runfusion/fusion/package.json`,
and optional `FUSION_SKILL_SOURCE`. Missing fusion skill must not fail session
create — rules still list requested skills via buildClaudeSkillRules.
*/
import {
cpSync,
existsSync,
mkdirSync,
mkdtempSync,
readdirSync,
rmSync,
symlinkSync,
writeFileSync,
} from "node:fs";
import { createRequire } from "node:module";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
export const FUSION_SKILL_NAME = "fusion";
export interface ClaudeSkillStagingResult {
pluginDir: string;
skillNames: string[];
dispose: () => void;
}
function isSkillDir(dir: string): boolean {
return existsSync(join(dir, "SKILL.md"));
}
function pushUnique(out: string[], candidate: string | null | undefined): void {
if (!candidate) return;
const resolved = resolve(candidate);
if (!out.includes(resolved)) out.push(resolved);
}
function pushSkillLayoutsAtRoot(out: string[], root: string): void {
pushUnique(out, join(root, "skill", FUSION_SKILL_NAME));
pushUnique(out, join(root, "packages", "cli", "skill", FUSION_SKILL_NAME));
}
function walkAncestorSkillCandidates(out: string[], startDir: string, maxParents = 8): void {
let dir = startDir;
for (let i = 0; i < maxParents; i++) {
pushSkillLayoutsAtRoot(out, dir);
const parent = dirname(dir);
if (parent === dir) break;
dir = parent;
}
}
function pushPackageRequireCandidates(out: string[], from: string): void {
try {
const require = createRequire(from);
const pkgJson = require.resolve("@runfusion/fusion/package.json");
pushUnique(out, join(dirname(pkgJson), "skill", FUSION_SKILL_NAME));
} catch {
// Package not resolvable from this origin (plugin-only tree, tests, etc.).
}
}
/**
* Ordered candidate directories for the bundled Fusion skill (`skill/fusion` with SKILL.md).
* First existing skill dir wins in resolveBundledFusionSkillSource.
*/
export function getFusionSkillSourceCandidates(moduleUrl = import.meta.url): string[] {
const candidates: string[] = [];
const envSource = process.env.FUSION_SKILL_SOURCE?.trim();
if (envSource) {
pushUnique(candidates, envSource);
}
const here = fileURLToPath(moduleUrl);
const moduleDir = dirname(here);
// Monorepo source checkout relative to plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/src
pushUnique(candidates, resolve(moduleDir, "..", "..", "..", "packages", "cli", "skill", FUSION_SKILL_NAME));
// Relative siblings used in various dist layouts
pushUnique(candidates, resolve(moduleDir, "..", "..", "skill", FUSION_SKILL_NAME));
pushUnique(candidates, resolve(moduleDir, "..", "skill", FUSION_SKILL_NAME));
pushUnique(candidates, resolve(moduleDir, "..", "..", "..", "skill", FUSION_SKILL_NAME));
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-12-06:15:
Published package layout: dist/plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime/* → ../../../skill/fusion
at the @runfusion/fusion package root (files includes skill/**).
*/
pushUnique(candidates, resolve(moduleDir, "..", "..", "..", "skill", FUSION_SKILL_NAME));
pushUnique(candidates, resolve(moduleDir, "../../../skill", FUSION_SKILL_NAME));
walkAncestorSkillCandidates(candidates, moduleDir, 8);
pushPackageRequireCandidates(candidates, moduleUrl);
const argv1 = typeof process.argv[1] === "string" ? process.argv[1].trim() : "";
if (argv1) {
try {
const argvPath = resolve(argv1);
pushPackageRequireCandidates(candidates, argvPath);
walkAncestorSkillCandidates(candidates, dirname(argvPath), 8);
} catch {
// ignore bad argv paths
}
}
return candidates;
}
export function resolveBundledFusionSkillSource(moduleUrl = import.meta.url): string | null {
for (const candidate of getFusionSkillSourceCandidates(moduleUrl)) {
if (isSkillDir(candidate)) return candidate;
}
return null;
}
function installSkillDir(sourceDir: string, targetDir: string): boolean {
if (!isSkillDir(sourceDir)) return false;
mkdirSync(dirname(targetDir), { recursive: true });
if (existsSync(targetDir)) {
rmSync(targetDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
try {
symlinkSync(sourceDir, targetDir, "dir");
return true;
} catch {
try {
cpSync(sourceDir, targetDir, { recursive: true });
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
}
function collectSkillsFromRoot(root: string, out: Map<string, string>): void {
if (!existsSync(root)) return;
// Root may itself be a skill (…/skills/foo with SKILL.md) or a skills container.
if (isSkillDir(root)) {
out.set(basename(root), root);
return;
}
let entries: string[] = [];
try {
entries = readdirSync(root);
} catch {
return;
}
for (const entry of entries) {
const child = join(root, entry);
if (isSkillDir(child)) {
out.set(entry, child);
}
}
}
export interface StageClaudeSkillsOptions {
/** Engine-requested skill names (skillSelection / skills). */
requestedSkillNames?: string[];
/** Extra skill roots (plugin skill dirs, CE install roots, etc.). */
additionalSkillPaths?: string[];
/** Always include the bundled Fusion skill (default true). */
includeFusionSkill?: boolean;
}
/**
* Build a session-scoped Claude plugin directory with Fusion + requested skills.
*/
export function stageClaudeSessionSkills(options: StageClaudeSkillsOptions = {}): ClaudeSkillStagingResult {
const pluginDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "fusion-claude-plugin-"));
const skillsDir = join(pluginDir, "skills");
mkdirSync(skillsDir, { recursive: true });
const installed = new Map<string, string>();
const includeFusion = options.includeFusionSkill !== false;
if (includeFusion) {
const fusionSource = resolveBundledFusionSkillSource();
if (fusionSource && installSkillDir(fusionSource, join(skillsDir, FUSION_SKILL_NAME))) {
installed.set(FUSION_SKILL_NAME, fusionSource);
}
}
for (const root of options.additionalSkillPaths ?? []) {
if (typeof root !== "string" || !root.trim()) continue;
collectSkillsFromRoot(root.trim(), installed);
}
// Re-install collected skills (may overwrite with higher-priority roots).
for (const [name, source] of installed) {
if (name === FUSION_SKILL_NAME && includeFusion) continue; // already installed
installSkillDir(source, join(skillsDir, name));
}
// Second pass: additionalSkillPaths may have added fusion under a different name path.
for (const [name, source] of installed) {
if (!existsSync(join(skillsDir, name))) {
installSkillDir(source, join(skillsDir, name));
}
}
writeFileSync(
join(pluginDir, "plugin.json"),
JSON.stringify(
{
name: "fusion-session-skills",
version: "0.1.0",
description: "Session-scoped Fusion skills for Claude ACP",
},
null,
2,
),
);
const skillNames = Array.from(
new Set([
...installed.keys(),
...(options.requestedSkillNames ?? []).filter((n) => typeof n === "string" && n.trim().length > 0),
]),
);
return {
pluginDir,
skillNames,
dispose: () => {
try {
rmSync(pluginDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch {
// best-effort
}
},
};
}
/**
* Build a short rules block listing requested skills and reminding Claude to use
* Fusion tools/MCP when available.
*/
export function buildClaudeSkillRules(options: {
skillNames: string[];
toolMode?: string;
fusionToolCount?: number;
operatorMcpCount?: number;
}): string {
const lines = [
"Fusion runtime context for this session:",
`- Tool mode: ${options.toolMode ?? "coding"}`,
];
if (options.skillNames.length > 0) {
lines.push(`- Loaded / requested skills: ${options.skillNames.join(", ")}`);
}
if (typeof options.fusionToolCount === "number") {
lines.push(`- Fusion custom tools (fn_*) available via MCP server "fusion-custom-tools": ${options.fusionToolCount}`);
}
if (typeof options.operatorMcpCount === "number" && options.operatorMcpCount > 0) {
lines.push(`- Operator MCP servers forwarded into this session: ${options.operatorMcpCount}`);
}
lines.push(
"- Prefer Fusion fn_* MCP tools for task board / coordination actions (e.g. fn_task_done, fn_task_list) when they are available.",
"- Use the Fusion skill workflows when planning or managing tasks.",
);
return lines.join("\n");
}
export function extractRequestedSkillNames(options: {
skills?: unknown;
skillSelection?: unknown;
}): string[] {
const fromSkills = Array.isArray(options.skills)
? options.skills.filter((value): value is string => typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0)
: [];
const selection = options.skillSelection as { requestedSkillNames?: unknown } | undefined;
const fromSelection = Array.isArray(selection?.requestedSkillNames)
? selection.requestedSkillNames.filter((value): value is string => typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0)
: [];
return Array.from(new Set(fromSkills.length > 0 ? fromSkills : fromSelection));
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-14:00:
Host Fusion custom tools (fn_*) for the Claude ACP agent. ToolDefinition.execute
closures only work in-process, so ClaudeRuntimeAdapter starts a loopback HTTP
bridge and pairs it with fusion-tools-mcp-server.cjs (stdio MCP) that Claude
connects to via session/new.mcpServers. Dispose closes the bridge so no port
is left open after the session ends.
*/
import { createServer, type Server } from "node:http";
import { rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { randomBytes, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { effectiveDisposition, runApprovalForCategory } from "./acp/control-handler.js";
import type { FusionCategory } from "./acp/types.js";
import type { AcpMcpServer } from "./mcp-forwarding.js";
import type { PermissionGate } from "./types.js";
const BUILT_IN_TOOL_NAMES = new Set(["read", "write", "edit", "bash", "grep", "find"]);
const MAX_TOOL_CALL_BODY_BYTES = 1_048_576;
export interface ToolLike {
name: string;
description?: string;
parameters?: Record<string, unknown>;
execute?: (
toolCallId: string,
params: unknown,
signal?: AbortSignal,
onUpdate?: unknown,
ctx?: unknown,
) => Promise<unknown> | unknown;
}
export interface McpToolDef {
name: string;
description: string;
inputSchema: Record<string, unknown>;
}
export interface FusionToolBridge {
mcpServer: AcpMcpServer;
dispose: () => Promise<void>;
toolCount: number;
}
export interface FusionToolBridgeOptions {
/** Per-session engine action gate; absent gates default-deny custom tool calls. */
actionGateContext?: PermissionGate;
/** Honours the ACP runtime's explicit unrestricted-risk acknowledgement. */
allowUnrestricted?: boolean;
}
/**
* Fusion fn_* tools can mutate tasks, agents, secrets, and the workspace. They
* therefore use the action gate's task/agent mutation category as the
* conservative common floor instead of trusting a tool name supplied by ACP.
*/
const FUSION_TOOL_CATEGORY: FusionCategory = "task_agent_mutation";
export function toolsToMcpToolDefs(tools: ReadonlyArray<ToolLike> | undefined): McpToolDef[] {
if (!Array.isArray(tools)) return [];
return tools
.filter((tool) => tool && typeof tool.name === "string" && tool.name.trim().length > 0 && !BUILT_IN_TOOL_NAMES.has(tool.name))
.map((tool) => ({
name: tool.name,
description: typeof tool.description === "string" ? tool.description : "",
inputSchema: tool.parameters ?? { type: "object", properties: {} },
}));
}
function fusionToolsMcpServerPath(): string {
// Packaged CLI copies this as mcp-schema-server.cjs next to the bundled plugin.
return join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "mcp-schema-server.cjs");
}
function resultToText(result: unknown): string {
if (result == null) return "";
if (typeof result === "string") return result;
if (typeof result === "object") {
const obj = result as { content?: unknown; text?: unknown; details?: unknown };
if (typeof obj.text === "string") return obj.text;
if (Array.isArray(obj.content)) {
return obj.content
.map((block) => {
if (block && typeof block === "object" && "text" in block && typeof (block as { text: unknown }).text === "string") {
return (block as { text: string }).text;
}
return JSON.stringify(block);
})
.join("\n");
}
}
try {
return JSON.stringify(result);
} catch {
return String(result);
}
}
/**
* Start a loopback tool bridge and return the ACP mcpServers entry Claude should
* connect to for Fusion custom tools. Returns null when there are no tools.
*/
export async function startFusionToolBridge(
tools: ReadonlyArray<ToolLike> | undefined,
options: FusionToolBridgeOptions = {},
): Promise<FusionToolBridge | null> {
const defs = toolsToMcpToolDefs(tools);
if (defs.length === 0) return null;
const byName = new Map<string, ToolLike>();
for (const tool of tools ?? []) {
if (tool && typeof tool.name === "string" && typeof tool.execute === "function") {
byName.set(tool.name, tool);
}
}
const schemaPath = join(tmpdir(), `fusion-claude-mcp-schemas-${process.pid}-${randomUUID()}.json`);
writeFileSync(schemaPath, JSON.stringify(defs));
const capabilityToken = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
const server: Server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
const reject = (statusCode: number, text: string): void => {
res.statusCode = statusCode;
res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json");
res.end(JSON.stringify({ isError: true, text }));
};
if (req.method !== "POST" || req.url !== "/tool-call") {
reject(404, "not found");
return;
}
if (req.headers.authorization !== `Bearer ${capabilityToken}`) {
reject(401, "unauthorized");
return;
}
let body = "";
let bodyBytes = 0;
try {
for await (const chunk of req) {
bodyBytes += Buffer.byteLength(chunk);
if (bodyBytes > MAX_TOOL_CALL_BODY_BYTES) {
// Drain the remaining stream before returning a bounded rejection so
// the client receives a deterministic 413 instead of a reset socket.
req.resume();
reject(413, "tool call body exceeds limit");
return;
}
body += chunk;
}
} catch {
if (!res.writableEnded) reject(400, "invalid request body");
return;
}
let parsed: { name?: string; arguments?: unknown };
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(body || "{}") as { name?: string; arguments?: unknown };
} catch {
reject(400, "invalid JSON body");
return;
}
const name = typeof parsed.name === "string" ? parsed.name : "";
const tool = byName.get(name);
if (!tool?.execute) {
reject(404, `Unknown Fusion tool: ${name}`);
return;
}
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-17-15:30:
The loopback port is not an authorization boundary: another local process
can discover it. Require the per-session capability token and evaluate each
fn_* call through Fusion's action gate before its in-process closure runs.
Missing policy/HITL support is default-deny; custom tools are conservatively
categorized as task_agent_mutation rather than trusting ACP-provided names.
*/
const gate = options.actionGateContext;
if (!gate?.permissionPolicy) {
reject(403, "Fusion action policy is unavailable for this tool call");
return;
}
const disposition = effectiveDisposition(FUSION_TOOL_CATEGORY, gate, {
allowUnrestricted: options.allowUnrestricted === true,
});
const allowed =
disposition === "allow"
? true
: disposition === "require-approval"
? await runApprovalForCategory(gate, {
category: FUSION_TOOL_CATEGORY,
toolName: name,
dedupeKey: `claude-mcp|${name}|${JSON.stringify(parsed.arguments ?? {})}`,
args:
parsed.arguments && typeof parsed.arguments === "object"
? (parsed.arguments as Record<string, unknown>)
: {},
}) === "allow"
: false;
if (!allowed) {
reject(403, "Fusion action policy denied this tool call");
return;
}
try {
const result = await tool.execute(`claude-mcp-${randomUUID()}`, parsed.arguments ?? {}, undefined, undefined, undefined);
res.statusCode = 200;
res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json");
res.end(
JSON.stringify({
isError: false,
content: [{ type: "text", text: resultToText(result) }],
}),
);
} catch (err) {
res.statusCode = 200;
res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json");
res.end(
JSON.stringify({
isError: true,
content: [{ type: "text", text: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) }],
}),
);
}
});
const address = await new Promise<{ port: number }>((resolve, reject) => {
server.once("error", reject);
// Bind loopback only — never expose Fusion tools on a public interface.
server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
const addr = server.address();
if (!addr || typeof addr === "string") {
reject(new Error("tool bridge failed to bind"));
return;
}
resolve({ port: addr.port });
});
});
const bridgeUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`;
const serverPath = fusionToolsMcpServerPath();
return {
toolCount: defs.length,
mcpServer: {
name: "fusion-custom-tools",
command: process.execPath,
args: [serverPath, schemaPath],
env: [
{ name: "FUSION_GROK_TOOL_BRIDGE_URL", value: bridgeUrl },
{ name: "FUSION_TOOL_BRIDGE_CAPABILITY", value: capabilityToken },
],
},
dispose: async () => {
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
server.close(() => resolve());
});
// FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-17-11:35: The schema is session-scoped and can
// contain tool descriptions. Remove it with the loopback server so repeated
// Claude sessions do not leave unbounded artifacts in the OS temp directory.
rmSync(schemaPath, { force: true });
},
};
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
/*
FNXC:ClaudeAcp 2026-07-11-12:00:
Claude runtime now drives xAI Claude Build TUI over ACP (`claude agent stdio`) instead
of one-shot `--output-format json`. Session state mirrors the chat/executor
contract (top-level `messages` + optional `state.errorMessage`) while the live
ACP connection lives on the composed AcpSession fields (`connection`, `dispose`).
*/
/** Narrow permission gate view (structural copy; no @fusion/engine import). */
export type GateDisposition = "allow" | "block" | "require-approval";
export type ApprovalStatus = "pending" | "approved" | "denied" | "completed";
export interface PermissionGate {
permissionPolicy?: {
rules?: Record<string, GateDisposition>;
};
createApprovalRequest?: (
decision: unknown,
args: Record<string, unknown>,
) => Promise<unknown> | unknown;
findApprovalByDedupeKey?: (
dedupeKey: string,
) => Promise<{ id: string; status: ApprovalStatus } | null> | { id: string; status: ApprovalStatus } | null;
pauseForApproval?: (info: {
approvalRequestId: string;
decision: unknown;
}) => Promise<void> | void;
markApprovalCompleted?: (approvalRequestId: string) => Promise<void> | void;
}
export interface AcpMcpServer {
name: string;
command: string;
args: string[];
env: { name: string; value: string }[];
}
export interface ClaudeCallbacks {
/** Streams assistant text deltas from ACP `agent_message_chunk` updates. */
onText?: (text: string) => void;
/** Streams reasoning from ACP `agent_thought_chunk` updates. */
onThinking?: (text: string) => void;
/** ACP `tool_call` / start of a tool invocation. */
onToolStart?: (toolName: string, args?: unknown) => void;
/** ACP `tool_call_update` terminal status. */
onToolEnd?: (toolName: string, isError: boolean, result?: unknown) => void;
}
export interface ClaudeSession {
model: string;
systemPrompt?: string;
messages: unknown[];
state: { errorMessage?: string; messages: unknown[] };
sessionId?: string;
lastModelDescription: string;
callbacks: ClaudeCallbacks;
/** Live ACP connection when createSession succeeded (composed AcpSession). */
connection?: unknown;
resetTurn?: () => void;
dispose?: () => void;
}
export type AgentSession = ClaudeSession;
export interface AgentRuntimeOptions {
cwd?: string;
systemPrompt?: string;
tools?: "coding" | "readonly";
defaultModelId?: string;
onText?: (text: string) => void;
onThinking?: (text: string) => void;
onToolStart?: (toolName: string, args?: unknown) => void;
onToolEnd?: (toolName: string, isError: boolean, result?: unknown) => void;
signal?: AbortSignal;
actionGateContext?: PermissionGate;
mcpServers?: AcpMcpServer[] | unknown[];
/** Engine-injected Fusion tools (fn_*) with in-process execute closures. */
customTools?: unknown[];
/** Convenience skill name list. */
skills?: string[];
/** Structured skill selection from session skill context. */
skillSelection?: { requestedSkillNames?: string[] };
/** Extra skill roots (plugin skills, CE install dirs). */
additionalSkillPaths?: string[];
/** Opaque ACP session/new._meta (pluginDirs / rules / systemPromptOverride). */
sessionMeta?: Record<string, unknown>;
}
export interface AgentSessionResult {
session: AgentSession;
sessionFile?: string;
}
export interface AgentPromptResult {
stopReason?: string;
}
export interface AgentRuntime {
id: string;
name: string;
createSession(options: AgentRuntimeOptions): Promise<AgentSessionResult>;
promptWithFallback(
session: AgentSession,
prompt: string,
options?: unknown,
): Promise<void | AgentPromptResult>;
describeModel(session: AgentSession): string;
dispose?(session: AgentSession): Promise<void>;
}
export interface ClaudeBinaryStatus {
available: boolean;
/**
* FNXC:ClaudeCli 2026-07-09-00:00:
* FN-7716: means "Claude CLI runtime ready" (the `claude` binary is available
* on PATH or at a configured path) — NOT "a Fusion-visible API key was
* found". The `claude` CLI owns its own authentication (env var, project
* `.env`, `claude -k`, etc.); Fusion no longer requires visibility into a
* key to treat the provider as authenticated. See `apiKeyDetected` for the
* non-blocking informational key-presence signal.
*/
authenticated?: boolean;
/**
* FNXC:ClaudeCli 2026-07-09-00:00:
* FN-7716: non-blocking informational hint only — true when Fusion itself
* detected a Claude API key (GROK_API_KEY env var or
* ~/.claude/user-settings.json `apiKey`). Never gates `authenticated` or
* enable/disable; the direct xAI OpenAI-compatible streaming path
* (FN-7711/FN-7714) uses $GROK_API_KEY when present regardless of this CLI
* probe.
*/
apiKeyDetected?: boolean;
binaryPath?: string;
binaryName?: string;
configuredBinaryPath?: string;
usingConfiguredBinaryPath?: boolean;
diagnostics?: string[];
version?: string;
reason?: string;
probeDurationMs: number;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
{
"extends": "../tsconfig.base.json",
"compilerOptions": {
"outDir": "dist",
"rootDir": "src",
"declaration": true,
"declarationMap": true
},
"include": ["src/**/*.ts"]
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
import { defineConfig } from "vitest/config";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { computeMaxWorkers } from "../../packages/core/src/__test-utils__/vitest-workers";
const maxWorkers = computeMaxWorkers();
export default defineConfig({
resolve: {
alias: {
"@fusion/core": fileURLToPath(new URL("../../packages/core/src/index.ts", import.meta.url)),
"@fusion/plugin-sdk": fileURLToPath(new URL("../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/index.ts", import.meta.url)),
},
},
test: {
include: ["src/**/*.test.ts"],
environment: "node",
setupFiles: [fileURLToPath(new URL("../../packages/core/src/__test-utils__/vitest-setup.ts", import.meta.url))],
globalSetup: [fileURLToPath(new URL("../../packages/core/src/__test-utils__/vitest-teardown.ts", import.meta.url))],
pool: "threads",
maxWorkers,
},
});

131
pnpm-lock.yaml generated
View File

@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ importers:
'@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent':
specifier: 0.80.10
version: 0.80.10(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@3.25.76))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@3.25.76)
claude-code-cli-acp:
specifier: 0.1.1
version: 0.1.1
dockerode:
specifier: ^4.0.12
version: 4.0.12
@@ -248,6 +251,9 @@ importers:
'@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent':
specifier: 0.80.10
version: 0.80.10(ws@8.20.0)(zod@3.25.76)
'@fusion-plugin-examples/claude-runtime':
specifier: workspace:*
version: link:../../plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime
'@fusion-plugin-examples/cli-printing-press':
specifier: workspace:*
version: link:../../plugins/fusion-plugin-cli-printing-press
@@ -804,6 +810,37 @@ importers:
specifier: ^4.1.0
version: 4.1.8(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/node@25.5.2)(@vitest/coverage-v8@4.1.8)(happy-dom@20.10.1)(jsdom@29.0.1)(vite@6.4.1(@types/node@25.5.2)(jiti@2.7.0)(tsx@4.21.0)(yaml@2.9.0))
plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime:
dependencies:
'@agentclientprotocol/sdk':
specifier: 0.24.0
version: 0.24.0(zod@4.3.6)
'@earendil-works/pi-ai':
specifier: 0.80.10
version: 0.80.10(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.21.1)(zod@4.3.6)
'@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent':
specifier: 0.80.10
version: 0.80.10(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.21.1)(zod@4.3.6)
'@fusion/core':
specifier: workspace:*
version: link:../../packages/core
'@fusion/plugin-sdk':
specifier: workspace:*
version: link:../../packages/plugin-sdk
claude-code-cli-acp:
specifier: 0.1.1
version: 0.1.1
devDependencies:
'@types/node':
specifier: ^25.5.2
version: 25.9.5
typescript:
specifier: ^5.7.0
version: 5.9.3
vitest:
specifier: ^4.1.0
version: 4.1.8(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/node@25.9.5)(@vitest/coverage-v8@4.1.8)(happy-dom@20.10.1)(jsdom@29.0.1)(vite@6.4.1(@types/node@25.9.5)(jiti@2.7.0)(tsx@4.21.0)(yaml@2.9.0))
plugins/fusion-plugin-cli-printing-press:
dependencies:
'@fusion/core':
@@ -9886,7 +9923,7 @@ snapshots:
'@manypkg/find-root@1.1.0':
dependencies:
'@babel/runtime': 7.29.2
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
find-up: 4.1.0
fs-extra: 8.1.0
@@ -10356,13 +10393,13 @@ snapshots:
'@types/body-parser@1.19.6':
dependencies:
'@types/connect': 3.4.38
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/cacheable-request@6.0.3':
dependencies:
'@types/http-cache-semantics': 4.2.0
'@types/keyv': 3.1.4
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/responselike': 1.0.3
'@types/chai@5.2.3':
@@ -10372,7 +10409,7 @@ snapshots:
'@types/connect@3.4.38':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/d3-array@3.2.2': {}
@@ -10499,7 +10536,7 @@ snapshots:
'@types/docker-modem@3.0.6':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/ssh2': 1.15.5
'@types/dockerode@3.3.47':
@@ -10516,7 +10553,7 @@ snapshots:
'@types/express-serve-static-core@5.1.1':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/qs': 6.15.0
'@types/range-parser': 1.2.7
'@types/send': 1.2.1
@@ -10529,11 +10566,11 @@ snapshots:
'@types/fs-extra@8.1.5':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/fs-extra@9.0.13':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/geojson@7946.0.16': {}
@@ -10549,7 +10586,7 @@ snapshots:
'@types/keyv@3.1.4':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/mdast@4.0.4':
dependencies:
@@ -10568,11 +10605,10 @@ snapshots:
'@types/node@25.9.5':
dependencies:
undici-types: 7.24.6
optional: true
'@types/plist@3.0.5':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
xmlbuilder: 15.1.1
optional: true
@@ -10598,28 +10634,28 @@ snapshots:
'@types/readdir-glob@1.1.5':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/responselike@1.0.3':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/retry@0.12.0': {}
'@types/send@1.2.1':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/serve-static@2.2.0':
dependencies:
'@types/http-errors': 2.0.5
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/slice-ansi@4.0.0': {}
'@types/ssh2@1.15.5':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@types/trusted-types@2.0.7':
optional: true
@@ -10642,7 +10678,7 @@ snapshots:
'@types/yauzl@2.10.3':
dependencies:
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
optional: true
'@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin@8.58.1(@typescript-eslint/parser@8.58.1(eslint@9.39.4(jiti@2.7.0))(typescript@5.9.3))(eslint@9.39.4(jiti@2.7.0))(typescript@5.9.3)':
@@ -10885,6 +10921,14 @@ snapshots:
optionalDependencies:
vite: 6.4.1(@types/node@25.5.2)(jiti@2.7.0)(tsx@4.21.0)(yaml@2.9.0)
'@vitest/mocker@4.1.8(vite@6.4.1(@types/node@25.9.5)(jiti@2.7.0)(tsx@4.21.0)(yaml@2.9.0))':
dependencies:
'@vitest/spy': 4.1.8
estree-walker: 3.0.3
magic-string: 0.30.21
optionalDependencies:
vite: 6.4.1(@types/node@25.9.5)(jiti@2.7.0)(tsx@4.21.0)(yaml@2.9.0)
'@vitest/pretty-format@4.1.8':
dependencies:
tinyrainbow: 3.1.0
@@ -14541,7 +14585,7 @@ snapshots:
'@protobufjs/path': 1.1.2
'@protobufjs/pool': 1.1.0
'@protobufjs/utf8': 1.1.1
'@types/node': 25.5.2
'@types/node': 25.9.5
long: 5.3.2
proxy-addr@2.0.7:
@@ -15084,7 +15128,7 @@ snapshots:
simple-update-notifier@2.0.0:
dependencies:
semver: 7.8.0
semver: 7.8.5
simple-yenc@1.0.4: {}
@@ -15535,8 +15579,7 @@ snapshots:
undici-types@7.18.2: {}
undici-types@7.24.6:
optional: true
undici-types@7.24.6: {}
undici@7.24.6: {}
@@ -15690,6 +15733,21 @@ snapshots:
tsx: 4.21.0
yaml: 2.9.0
vite@6.4.1(@types/node@25.9.5)(jiti@2.7.0)(tsx@4.21.0)(yaml@2.9.0):
dependencies:
esbuild: 0.25.12
fdir: 6.5.0(picomatch@4.0.4)
picomatch: 4.0.4
postcss: 8.5.8
rollup: 4.60.0
tinyglobby: 0.2.15
optionalDependencies:
'@types/node': 25.9.5
fsevents: 2.3.3
jiti: 2.7.0
tsx: 4.21.0
yaml: 2.9.0
vitest@4.1.8(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/node@25.5.2)(@vitest/coverage-v8@4.1.8)(happy-dom@20.10.1)(jsdom@29.0.1)(vite@6.4.1(@types/node@25.5.2)(jiti@2.7.0)(tsx@4.21.0)(yaml@2.8.3)):
dependencies:
'@vitest/expect': 4.1.8
@@ -15752,6 +15810,37 @@ snapshots:
transitivePeerDependencies:
- msw
vitest@4.1.8(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/node@25.9.5)(@vitest/coverage-v8@4.1.8)(happy-dom@20.10.1)(jsdom@29.0.1)(vite@6.4.1(@types/node@25.9.5)(jiti@2.7.0)(tsx@4.21.0)(yaml@2.9.0)):
dependencies:
'@vitest/expect': 4.1.8
'@vitest/mocker': 4.1.8(vite@6.4.1(@types/node@25.9.5)(jiti@2.7.0)(tsx@4.21.0)(yaml@2.9.0))
'@vitest/pretty-format': 4.1.8
'@vitest/runner': 4.1.8
'@vitest/snapshot': 4.1.8
'@vitest/spy': 4.1.8
'@vitest/utils': 4.1.8
es-module-lexer: 2.1.0
expect-type: 1.3.0
magic-string: 0.30.21
obug: 2.1.2
pathe: 2.0.3
picomatch: 4.0.4
std-env: 4.1.0
tinybench: 2.9.0
tinyexec: 1.2.4
tinyglobby: 0.2.15
tinyrainbow: 3.1.0
vite: 6.4.1(@types/node@25.9.5)(jiti@2.7.0)(tsx@4.21.0)(yaml@2.9.0)
why-is-node-running: 2.3.0
optionalDependencies:
'@opentelemetry/api': 1.9.0
'@types/node': 25.9.5
'@vitest/coverage-v8': 4.1.8(vitest@4.1.8)
happy-dom: 20.10.1
jsdom: 29.0.1
transitivePeerDependencies:
- msw
void-elements@3.1.0: {}
w3c-keyname@2.2.8: {}

View File

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ packages:
- "plugins/fusion-plugin-acp-runtime"
- "plugins/fusion-plugin-cursor-runtime"
- "plugins/fusion-plugin-grok-runtime"
- "plugins/fusion-plugin-claude-runtime"
- "plugins/fusion-plugin-omp-runtime"
- "plugins/fusion-plugin-agent-browser"
- "plugins/fusion-plugin-whatsapp-chat"